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Foreword 
The papers in this volume were written by experts from Central and Eastern Europe 
and constitute the core of the material presented at the international workshop on 
"Macroeconomic Stabilization of Economies in Transition " held in Prague, Czech 
Republic from 22 to 24 April 1993. The workshop was organized by the Economic 
Transition and Integration (ETI) Project of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Institute for Economic Policy affiliated to the 
Ministry of Economy of the Czech Republic. The workshop was the first in a series 
of three to be arranged within the scope of the ETI research program. 
The purpose of the workshop was to assemble policy-makers and interested 
scholars from Central and Eastern European countries, as well as western experts 
to thoroughly discuss the accumulated experience with macroeconomic stabilization 
during economic reforms in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, former Czechoslovakia 
and its successors the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, and Ukraine. Those who presented papers and those who commented drew 
attention to problems now explicit and urgent in countries which pioneered reform 
to convert from communist central planning to a pluralist market system. The 
latecomers to the transition process are very likely to face similar complications 
and dilemmas. Organizers of the workshop firmly believed that dissemination of 
experience from more rapidly advancing reform countries could contribute to a 
better understanding of burdensome stabilization tasks and to a future improvement 
and refinement of stabilization policies and tools, particularly for the benefit of 
the transitional laggards. 
Macroeconomic stabilization of former centrally planned economies was 
generally perceived to be a critical requirement in the transition process to a 
market-type economy, particularly in the central European countries. In most cases, 
the large demand or monetary overhang accumulated in the past and inherited from 
the former socialist economy was perceived as a major threat for price stability 
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at the very beginning of reforms. Widespread fears that latent inflationary pressures 
would generate - after price liberalization -a hyperinflationary spiral and impede 
the attainment of other goals called for monetary, fiscal, and wage restrictions or 
at least soundness. In fact, some decline of output and employment would be 
necessary, inevitable, or even desirable during transition. Nevertheless, a related 
rise of unemployment should stay within limits in order to ensure the conservation 
of social peace as a necessary condition for pushing through painful reform 
measures. Thus, limited government intervention to moderate the wildest 
fluctuations were envisaged. Generally, stabilization of crucial macroeconomic 
variables should set the stage for a smooth and rapid transformation of the 
institutional background, property rights, and behavioral patterns of economic 
agents. Consequently, the target of stabilization has been assigned a significant 
role in most, if not all, reform blue-prints. 
While the initial results of stabilization programs have proved to be reasonably 
promising in some nations and regions, there are also signs of temporary, partial, 
limited, and, of course, adverse impacts. In any case, several years of experience 
reveal that the stabilization objective is a relatively easier task to accomplish than 
other parts of reform packages. 
The results of the workshop inferred that the stabilization of a post-socialist 
economy is a difficult but attainable goal. The character of stabilization policies 
underwent many modifications and adjustments. Their initial stringency was 
abandoned and replaced by more adaptive policies in some countries. The workshop 
participants generally also agreed that regardless of the approach utilized to 
implement the stabilization effort (shock versus gradual approach), countries face 
similar problems after the stabilization phase: they comprise long-term and painful 
restructuring of industries; budget imbalances; extensive restructuring of the public 
sector; enlarging the scope of currency convertibility; time-consuming privatization; 
and so forth. Recognition of the dynamic changes in the recent past, as well as 
the decisions facing policy-makers in post-communist countries in contemplating 
how to proceed where from each unique position already attained, guided us to 
choose "Stabilization Policies at Crossroads?" as the title of this volume. 
The structure of this collection of papers follows that of the workshop: four 
main topics were discussed. Part One, "Price Liberalization in Post-Socialist 
Economies: Impact on Macroeconomic Stability", contains two rather different 
papers. The first paper by Ivan Sujan and Milota Sujanovd provides an introduction 
to the whole volume. The authors attempt to develop statistical estimates of the 
role of reform-induced versus external economic factors in the economic decline 
in the former CSFR and its two successor states. The economic cost of the split 
of the country are illuminated and other general features of the transition period 
are mentioned: while macroeconomic stabilization (curbing inflation, stable 
exchange rate, and balanced state budget) might be only a relatively short and less 
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demanding period, extensive and far-reaching economic adjustment (privatization, 
microeconornic restructuring, and sustainable growth) will require much more time 
and effort. The second paper by Ioan Buda deals with the gradual process of price 
liberalization in Romania - a unique type of strategy, different than those applied 
in other countries. The Rumanian lesson provides a serious warning for other 
countries in transition: the policy mix combining drastic changes with a gradualistic 
approach is powerful enough to provoke strong inflationary expectations 
undermining the reform effort in all other areas. 
Part Two, "The Role of Monetary, Fiscal, and Wage Policies in the 
Stabilization Program", touches extremely important policy issues. Stanislaw 
Gomulka presents econometric analysis of the inflationary impacts of budget 
deficits in Poland and outlines the policy measures that should be taken to maintain 
inflation within a targeted level. Alternative simulations of the inflation path are 
generated based on his model. Pave1 ~ t ~ ~ d n e k  describes the development of the 
fiscal sphere in the former ~ S F R  and in the Czech Republic. He points both to 
the stabilization aspects of fiscal policy and to the issues related to restructuring 
the public sector. Not to use fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth is one of 
... 
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his main conclusions and recommendations. Andrzej Sopoc'ko discusses the role 
of monetary policy in Poland during transition. He tries to find an answer to the 
question of how monetary expansion could boost the industrial restructuring and 
revitalization without causing inflationary pressures and/or softening the hard 
budget constraint of firms. 
Part Three, "Exchange Rate Policy and External Pressures: Search for a 
Stabilizing Anchor", compares the experience of Hungary, Russia, and the Czech 
Republic with exchange rate policies. Artu'r Szentgyorgyva'ri examines whether the 
exchange rate of the forint served as a nominal anchor for the price level in 
Hungary in the last several years and arrives at a positive conclusion despite the 
fact that this outcome was never declared as an official policy target of the National 
Bank of Hungary. Andrei F. Kovalev studies the record of foreign currency 
exchanges and evaluates the efficiency of the Russian Central Bank to stabilize 
the exchange rate of the ruble by intervening on foreign exchange markets. 
Miroslav Hrnc'ir' analyses the role the exchange rate regimes and policies during 
different stages of transformation and identifies both strong and weak features. He 
investigates the evolution of fundamentals and makes recommendations for the 
current period of reform. 
Part Four, "Microeconomic Issues in Stabilization Policies", partly covers the 
vast area of interrelations between stabilization policies and microeconomic 
preconditions and consequences. Vladimir Schevchenko deals with the impact of 
major macroeconomic policy measures in Ukraine on microeconomic optimization, 
adjustment, and formation of competitive environment. He describes the set of 
incentives emerging on three kinds of markets and behavioral responses of 
economic agents entering therein. Pave1 Mertlik identifies some microeconomic 
causes of prevailing economic decline in the Czech Republic. He provides insights 
into the privatization process and critically discusses pros and cons of the whole 
reform strategy and outlines some features of likely future trends. 
We are in debt to all the authors for their generous contributions in time and 
effort to revise and complete their valuable papers. Much thanks are also in order 
for everyone who assisted in making the workshop a success; particularly Sharon 
Jandl, administrative assistant to the ETI Project, who also tirelessly typed several 
manuscripts and deciphered our often indiscernible editing remarks. Financial 
support for the project was provided by the former Czechoslovakian National 
Member Organization and by IIASA. The technical support of IIASA and the 
Institute for Economic Policy was indispensable. Of course, these institutions and 
individuals who have helped us are not responsible for the views expressed here, 
which are solely those of the authors. 
The editors thank all those who have made our work possible. 
Vit BArta Christoph M. Schneider 
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Part I 
Price Liberalization in 
Post-Socialist Economies: Impact 
on Macroeconomic Stability 

Chapter 1 
Macroeconomic Development 
in the Czech Republic 
Ivan h j a n  and Milota $ujanovd 
Czech Statistical Office, Institute of Economic Policy, 
Prague, Czech Republic 
1.1 Introduction 
As in other post-communist countries, the macroeconomic situation in the Czech 
Republic has changed dramatically during the last five years. It has been affected 
mainly by the start of the economic reform and the split of former Czechoslo- 
vakia. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief analysis of the macroeconomic 
development before and after these changes. 
This paper begins with an evaluation of Czechoslovakian economic perfor- 
mance before the 1989 revolution. Special attention is paid to overvalued growth 
rates given in the official statistics and to deformation of the industrial structure. In 
the third section, the economic reform scenario and its implementation is described. 
The fourth section contains an analytical estimation of the macroeconomic impacts 
of both reform and external factors. In the fifth section, the macroeconomic impacts 
of the split of Czechoslovakia are discussed and estimated. The predicted impacts 
on the Czech and Slovak GDP are compared with the actual data for 1993. Section 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 20th International Conference "Macrornodels '93", 
Lodz, Poland, December 1993. Although the authors did not attend the workshop "Macroeconomic 
Stabilization of Economies in Transition", they have generously allowed us to include this relevant 
and valuable contribution in this volume. 
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six then provides a comparison of the Czech economy with those of Slovakia, 
Hungary and Poland. An evaluation of the recent macroeconomic trends in the 
Czech Republic, as well as short-term forecasts are given in section seven of the 
paper, followed with some concluding remarks. 
1.2 The Czechoslovakian Economy Before 
the 1989 Revolution 
The economic status of pre-World War I1 Czechoslovakia was reasonably compa- 
rable with countries like Germany, France, Belgium, or Austria. According to the 
statistical data on industrial production, Czechoslovakia was one of the 10 most 
industrialized countries in the world before World War 11. 
However, during the post-war period until 1989, the allocation of resources 
through central planning rather than by the market mechanism resulted in a long- 
term slowdown of the growth in productivity and in the standard of living, as well as 
in the deterioration of international competitiveness of Czechoslovakian industry. 
Especially over the last 20 years of central planning, Czechoslovakia's economic 
performance has been disappointing. 
After the exhaustion of the so-called 'extensive sources' of growth, clear 
tendencies towards stagnation and a decline in production were already appearing 
in the last decade of central planning. The disintegration of the economic union 
of the former CMEA hastened the inevitable collapse of the socialist system. The 
transition to a market economy was supposed to be, in this situation, the only 
effective way to tackle the problems which have consequently accumulated. 
Table 1.1 portrays a considerable deterioration of the performance of the 
Czechoslovakian economy during the 1980s as compared with the previous decade. 
The average annual growth rate of real GDP contracted from 4.8% to 1.5%. A 
similar slowdown occurred in other macroeconomic indicators including average 
wages, productivity of labor, and productivity of fixed capital. On the other hand, 
inflation (expressed by the CPI) increased. 
According to many studies (including Marer 1990 and Nachtigal 1991), the 
real growth rates of macroeconomic indicators in the CMEA countries given by 
the official statistics were systematically overvalued because the corresponding 
deflators were undervalued. The lower part of Table 1.1 contains the growth rates 
corrected for estimated hidden inflation. In the period 1970-1 980, these rates were 
just about one half of the official data and were even negative or close to zero in 
1980-1990. The most severe decline occurred in gross fixed investment. Corrected 
average real wages stagnated during the 1970s and in decline during the 1980s. 
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Table 1.1 Basic Macroeconomic Indicators of the CSFR 
- -
Average Annual Rate of Growth in % 
Indicators (in constant prices) 1970-1980 1980-1990 
Gross domestic product (approximation) 4.77 1.50 
Net material product produced 
Gross material product produced 
Gross material product distributed 
Personal consumption 
Material social consumption 
Gross fixed investment 
Consumer price index 
Average nominal wages 
Average real wages 
Labor productivity in material sector 
Fixed capital productivity in material sector 
Import intensity of gross material product 
Indicators corrected for hidden inflation: 
Gross domestic product (approximation) 2.7 -0.7 
Net material product 2.1 -1.5 
Personal consumption 1.5 0.4 
Gross fixed investment 3.1 -5.1 
Consumer price index 2.8 3.5 
Average real wages 0.3 -1.4 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks for Czechoslovakia and author's own calculations. 
Another serious problem was a deformation of the industrial structure in the 
Czechoslovakian economy. According to econometric analysis covering 20 in- 
dustries in 10 countries over 20 years (Sujan and Strauch 1990), the industrial 
structure in  developed market economies depends primarily on economic level 
and size of the country. Using estimated parameters from this analysis, actual 
data on Czechoslovakia's economic level (real GDP per capita), and the size of 
the economies (volume of real GDP), the corresponding expected structure for 
Czechoslovakia was computed (Table 1.2, second column). It shows that the actual 
data for Czechoslovakia differed considerably from the computed data, as well 
as from the average structure in selected small Western European countries. In 
Czechoslovakia, the shares of mining, metallurgy, machinery, and production of 
transport equipment in total industrial production were too large, while the shares 
of food industry, furnitures, printing, and energy industry were too small. These 
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Table 1.2 Industrial Structure of Production (valued added) in % 
Average of Computed 
5 Small Data for Actual Data for ~ s F R  
Countries' CSFR 
Industry 1987 1987 1980 1987 1990 
Mining and quarrying 1.5 1.1 7.50 6.30 5.26 
Food, beverages, tobacco 13.0 13.8 7.93 7.15 8.22 
Textiles 2.7 6.2 5.54 5.24 5.18 
Wearing apparel 1.4 2.9 1.36 1.35 1.40 
Leather and products 0.2 0.5 0.47 0.44 0.48 
Footwear 1.1 1.1 1.5 1 1.29 1.35 
Wood products 2.9 1.5 1.95 1.93 2.31 
Furnitures, fixtures 2.4 3.2 1.06 1.02 1.15 
Paper and products 5.6 3.4 1.97 2.07 2.27 
Printing, publishing 4.9 3.8 0.68 0.68 0.74 
Chemicallrubber 
productions 11.9 12.6 11.69 10.77 1 1.62 
Non-metal products 3.5 6.2 6.24 5.66 5.92 
Iron, steel, other metals 5.0 7.5 10.48 9.23 9.82 
Metals products 6.8 6.3 3.99 3.94 3.93 
Non-electrical machinery 9.2 7.7 17.39 20.04 17.91 
Electrical machinery 7.4 6.4 4.30 6.30 6.49 
Transport equipment 7 .O 5.1 8.45 9.25 8.3 1 
Professional goods 1.2 0.8 0.47 0.46 0.5 1 
Other manufacturing 1 .O 1.1 1.12 1.05 1.15 
Electricity, gas, etc. 11.3 8.8 5.90 5.83 5.98 
' Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. 
Source: OECD Paris, Central Institute for Economic Research, Prague, and author's own calculations. 
differences cannot be explained by specific natural conditions. They are simply 
deformations as a consequence of central planning and the CMEA system. 
A considerable part of the traditional Czechoslovakian exports to the former 
USSR and other socialist and third-world countries (supported by government 
credits with doubtful returns), the production of arms, and a substantial part of 
outdated production for domestic use no longer finds sufficient demand and cannot 
survive in a market economy. The first phase of the economic transformation, 
therefore, led inevitably to a temporary decline in production. Only in the following 
phase with the gradual development of effective and competitive production is it 
possible to renew the growth of industrial output. 
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1.3 The Economic Reform Scenario 
The Czechoslovakian government's economic reform proposals were summarized 
in an "Economic Reform Scenario", adopted by Parliament in October 1990. This 
program emphasized the need for a radical transformation of the economy and the 
introduction of a market-based economic system at the earliest possible date. In 
addition to anti-inflationary economic stabilization policies, it contained a compre- 
hensive set of structural reform proposals. These included measures to liberalize 
prices and imports, alter ownership and management patterns at the enterprise 
level, promote the private sector, and bring about the internal convertibility of 
the Czechoslovakian crown (CSK) by granting domestic enterprises unrestricted 
access to foreign exchange for current account transactions. 
More specifically, the government's economic reform package contained the 
following crucial reform measures, which were implemented within as short a 
space of time as possible after 1 January 1991 (Klaus 1992, 1993): 
1. The liberalization of a wide range of domestic prices, including those of all 
tradeable goods and non-tradeable goods produced under reasonably compet- 
itive conditions; 
2. The introduction of the internal convertibility of the currency and the estab- 
lishment of a unified exchange rate responsive to supply and demand; 
3. The installation of an adequately financed social net to meet the needs of those 
individuals becoming unemployed or otherwise suffering losses in income as 
a result of the adjustment process; 
4. The progressive restructuring and privatization of state-owned enterprises; and, 
5. The implementation of restrictive macroeconomic policy to achieve economic 
stabilization through fiscal and monetary restraints and appropriate exchange 
rate, price, and wage policies. 
However, the fiscal and monetary policies in the first half of 1991 were too re- 
strictive. Therefore, the Federal Government adopted several changes in macroe- 
conomic policy in order to stimulate both domestic and foreign demand for the 
second half of 199 1. 
Statistical evaluation of the economic development in 1991 and 1992 revealed 
that the Czechoslovakian economy, was passing relatively successfully through the 
first phase of transformation despite worsened external conditions and had good 
prospects for successful completion. This was confirmed also by the evaluation 
of several foreign institutions (including IMF, OECD, UNIDO, etc.), which usu- 
ally listed the CSFR in first place among the reforming post-socialist economies 
(UNIDO, 1992). 
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By applying restrictive macroeconomic policies, the Czechoslovakian govern- 
ment succeeded in rapidly extinguishing inflationary pressures brought about by the 
one-shot liberalization of about 85% of all prices on January 1, 1991. The ability 
to eliminate inflation in three to six months and maintain complete price stability 
while liberalizing an additional 10% of prices was an impressive accomplishment. 
The economy also adjusted remarkably so that the private sector developed rapidly 
in response to the removal of administrative restrictions, price liberalization and 
provision of bank credit, and exports recovered after an initial period of significant 
decline. 
On the negative side, one observed an economy that plunged into a much 
more severe recession than was generally expected and forecasted by government 
officials. According to our analysis the recession was, to a significant extent, caused 
by external shocks associated with the disintegration of the CMEA. Nevertheless, 
the restrictive government policies also played a part. In undertaking the tough 
measures, the government greatly benefitted from the willingness of the population 
to undergo a painful transition. However, it was an open question of how much 
greater a decline would be tolerated. As a result, the government was prudently 
shifting emphasis from stabilization to restructuring and growth in 1992. 
Another major problem was the fact that state enterprises avoided the impact 
of the restrictive policies by relying to an increasing extent on inter-enterprise debt 
(credit). This debt rose rapidly and, despite the macroeconomic restrictions, very 
few enterprises were forced to close down. The impressive stabilization exercise 
was thus accompanied by only limited enterprise restructuring. 
1.4 Macroeconomic Impacts of the Reform 
and External Factors 
In the first year of the radical economic reform (1991), Czechoslovakia experienced 
a considerable decline of all major components of GDP, as well as an increase in 
inflation and unemployment. On the other hand, the current account balance was 
surprisingly positive. Similar changes occurred in other economies in transition. 
However, unfavorable economic development in the post-communist countries 
during the first stage of transition was not solely an unavoidable result of economic 
reform since the collapse of the CMEA and other external shocks also played 
an important role. Estimated impacts of the external shocks and the economic 
reform process on the changes in basic macroeconomic indicators of the CSFR 
between 1990 and 1991 are shown in Table 1.3.[1] The figures show that external 
shocks (with a predominant role of the collapse of the CMEA) were responsible for 
Table 1.3 Estimated Impacts of the Reform and Other Factors on the Czechoslovakian Economy in 1991 
&f 
Impacts Impacts of the Economic Reform i 
of the of which: B 
Total Collapse Restrictive 4 B 
Changes of the CD Liberalization Devaluation Macroeconomic 5 
Indicator 199111990 CMEA' Total of Prices of Currency2 Policy 5. 
Annual Changes %: S CD 
Gross domestic product, real -15.1 -5.8 -9.3 -5.1 2.4 -6.6 (7 
Private consumption, real -23.9 -4.3 -19.6 -10.1 -4.4 -5.1 2 0 
Gross fixed investment, real -31.8 -3.9 -27.9 -4.1 -9.8 -13.9 ~r 
a 
Consumer price index 57.9 6.0 51.9 49.3 
Annual Absolute Changes: 
Current account, in billion USD 1.7 -2.9 4.6 0.5 
Unemployment rate, in % 5.6 2.2 3.4 1.9 
' Including other external shocks like the Gulf War and slowdown in the world trade. 
Including other steps enabling liberalization of foreign trade. 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks for Czechoslovakia and author's own calculations. 
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about 5.8 percentage points of the total 15.1% decline in real GDP (Sujan 1993a). 
Trade disturbances considerably reduced the volume of Czechoslovakian exports 
implying (via multiplier effects) the decline in aggregate output. Another impact 
consisted of the decline in consumption and investment, as well as the increase 
in unemployment. External shocks also partially contributed to inflation mainly 
due to increasing import prices resulting from the shift to world prices and hard 
currency payments in trade with the former CMEA countries. As these shocks led 
to lower export volumes and higher import prices, they created strong pressure for 
a current account balance. 
The rest of the changes in macroeconomic indicators might be attributed to 
the impacts of the main steps of the economic reform process. From among 
this group of factors, the massive liberalization of prices since January 1, 1991 
was the main source of inflation that year. Secondary effects of relatively high 
inflation were reflected in reduced real demand for consumer goods and investment, 
which contributed 5.1 percentage points to the contraction of GDP, having had a 
corresponding effect on the rise of unemployment. 
Another important factor within the reform package was the massive devalua- 
tion of the currency (accompanied by supplementary steps such as the introduction 
of a temporary import surcharge, internal convertibility of currency, etc.). This 
factor had a positive impact on exports and negative impact on imports, which 
resulted in a highly positive current account balance, as well as in a positive con- 
tribution to real GDP (by 2.4 percentage points), though simultaneously reducing 
domestic consumption and investment in favor of higher exports. Of course, de- 
valuation contributed significantly to domestic inflation (more than one quarter of 
total inflation). 
As mentioned above, macroeconomic policy (including monetary and fiscal 
policy as well as wage control) appeared to be too restrictive in 1991, especially in 
the first half of the year. It reduced inflation by an estimated 12.5 percentage points 
and contributed to the current account surplus, but at the same time considerably 
reduced domestic demand (mainly demand for fixed investment), which resulted in 
an additional decline of about 6.6 percentage points in GDP, again with an adverse 
impact on the unemployment rate. 
Some have argued that so massive a devaluation of the currency and such 
restrictive macroeconomic policy at the beginning of the radical economic reform 
process were not necessary. However, it is obvious that potential effects of the main 
reform steps strengthened by external shocks were very uncertain and their ex-ante 
estimation was extremely difficult. Moreover, it has been also argued as desirable 
to create two buffers epitomized in a low exchange rate and in low real wages 
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level for the sake of medium-term macroeconomic stability during the period of 
transition. 
1.5 Macroeconomic Impacts of the Split of CSFR 
The Czechoslovakian Federation ceased to exist December 3 1, 1992. It has become 
obvious, that the split of a relatively stable Czechoslovakian economy (showing 
the first signs of output recovery in the second half of 1992) had significant effects 
on the economies of the newly independent Czech and Slovakian Republics. The 
macroeconomic impacts of the split of the former ~ s F R  may be sorted into three 
groups: 
1. The direct additional costs connected with the issues of new banknotes, state 
documents and valuables, and so forth. In this group, one should also calculate 
all costs connected with the division of the state administration, army, common 
properties, representative offices abroad, with the re-drafting and ratification 
of international agreements, with the decline in the international position of 
the ~ s F R ,  and, last but not least, with the deceleration of international capital 
flows and consequent fall of export ability. These last influences would be 
worse for Slovakia, which is considered to be less politically and economically 
stable. While some of the additional costs may be proportional in both countries 
(e.g., the costs of issuing new banknotes), some of them are relatively higher 
in Slovakia (e.g., the costs of creating a new central bank, as the former 
Czechoslovakian Central Bank was situated in Prague). 
2. The impacts of the inevitable reduction of mutual trade as a result of the change 
from internal to external trade under more difficult conditions for payments, 
crossing borders, and so on. Decline in mutual trade has had a negative impact 
on aggregate demand and consequently on GDP in both countries. However, 
the same volume of trade reduction constitutes a considerably higher share of 
Slovakian GDP than Czech GDP: consequently, its negative impact is relatively 
higher in Slovakia. 
3. The third group of effects follows from the end of the transfers between the 
two republics. There was a continuous net transfer of resources from the 
Czech Republic to Slovakia throughout the entire post-WWII period. These 
transfers were mostly indirect, like unproportional allocation of tax revenues 
and budget expenditures in favor of Slovakia, as well as non-market pricing of 
some deliveries in favor of the Czech Republic. The total net transfers from 
the Czech Republic to Slovakia in 1992 have been estimated by the Secretariat 
of OECD as 25 billion CSK or 7% of Slovakian GDP. In addition to this, 
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a considerable refinancing of Slovakian commercial banks from the Czech 
banks took place. With the end of the former CSFR, all these transfers were 
stopped. It is clearly a loss for Slovakia and a gain for the Czech Republic, 
and is reflected as a considerable deficit in the Slovakian government budget 
and a surplus in the Czech budget in the first three quarters of 1993. 
The total summarized impacts of the split of the ~ s F R  are negative in both countries, 
but they are much worse in Slovakia. Our ex-ante estimates (Sujan 1992) of the 
total impacts of the split were -2.1 % in Czech GDP and -5.7% in Slovakian GDP. 
Actual data thus far seem to confirm this prediction since Czech GDP growth was 
-2.2% on an annual basis in the first quarter and -0.9% over the first three quarters 
of 1993. The Slovakian GDP declined on an annual basis by approximately 5% in 
each quarter of 1993. Of course, the development of GDP is affected also by other 
positive and negative factors, but the split of the former CSFR seems to be one of 
the crucial factors of the 1993 decline in both countries. 
1.6 The Starting Position of the Independent 
Czech Economy: International Comparison 
The Czech economy is now well behind the developed market economies; however, 
many argue that it may be the most successful among the post-communistcountries. 
The division of the CSFR had some negative impacts on the Czech economy, 
delaying economic recovery by about one year but at which time the Czech Republic 
will have even better prospects for macroeconomic stabilization and growth (Sujan 
1992, 1993b). 
Real GDP per capita in USD is commonly used as the key indicator of eco- 
nomic development. In the Central European economies, purchasing power parities 
(PPP's) may be more appropriate convertors than official exchange rates. Accord- 
ing to such indicators, the economic level in the Czech Republic in 1992 was 23% 
higher than in the Slovak Republic, 31% higher than in Hungary, and 88% higher 
than in Poland (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2[2]). On the other hand, the economic level 
of the Czech Republic was just 40% of the level of Austria and 35% of the former 
West Germany. 
A comparison of basic macroeconomic indicators of the four Central European 
countries in 1992 is given in Table 1.4. In 1992, real GDP declined in both republics 
of the CSFR by about 7%. The recession in Hungary was not so profound and 
Poland even recorded a moderate recovery. However, Poland and Hungary started 
the economic transformation earlier, so they experienced a considerable fall in GDP 
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Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Poland 
Figure 1.1 Gross Domestic Product, 1992 
earlier than the Czech and Slovakian Republics. In the first half of 1993, the Czech 
GDP declined by just 0.5%, while the Slovak GDP declined by 5.2%. Similar 
results are also expected for the whole year of 1993, compared to about - 1.5% in 
Hungary and +2.5% in Poland. 
While the annual rate of inflation in both the Czech and Slovakian Republics 
was within acceptable limits (10-1 I%), it was much higher in Hungary and Poland 
(23% and 43% respectively). The growth rates of the PPP's of the USD were simi- 
lar. Because the changes in the official exchange rates were smaller, all the Central 
European currencies were revalued in real terms. Minor changes in the Czechoslo- 
vakian exchange rate just reflected the fluctuations of the dollar value against other 
convertible currencies, while Hungary and especially Poland made some official 
devaluations of their currencies, but well below the rate of inflation expressed by 
the consumer price index (see Table 1.4). The ratio of the official exchange rate 
to the PPP remained significantly higher in Czechoslovakia than in Hungary and 
Poland, indicating that the Czechoslovakian currency was undervalued. 
In 1993, the price level in the Czech and Slovakian Republics increased by 8 to 
9 percentage points due to the introduction of value-added (VAT) and consumption 
taxes. In the first 10 months of 1993, the annual inflation rate was about 21% in 
the Czech Republic and 23% in Slovakia, where inflation has been accelerated by 
the devaluation of the Slovakian crown by 10% since July 10, 1993. Inflation in 
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Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary Poland 
Figure 1.2 Gross Domestic Product per Capita, 1992 
Hungary and Poland in the first half of 1993 was similar to the level in the previous 
year (23% and 37% respectively). 
Similar to 1990 and 1991, the Czech Republic also achieved a considerable 
current account surplus in 1992 (about 7.5% of exports). A relative smaller surplus 
was attained in Hungary, while Poland and especially Slovakia faced current ac- 
count deficits. In the first half of 1993, the Czech trade balance and current account 
were in surplus again, while Slovakia had a moderate trade deficit and Hungarian 
imports were as much as 54% higher than exports. 
Foreign debt of the former Czechoslovakian Federation has been shared by 
the Czech and Slovakian Republics proportional to their population. In terms of 
the 1992 ratio of foreign debt to annual exports, it was clearly lower for the Czech 
Republic (about 74%) than for the Slovakian Republic (about 89%). Polish foreign 
debt per capita was lower than in Hungary, but its ratio to annual exports was higher 
(421 % against 21 3%) in 1992. 
The unemployment rate in the Czech Republic has been surprisingly low 
(just 2.6% at the end of 1992); even lower than in all the EC countries except 
Luxembourg. The updated value for October 31,1993, is 3.2%. The unemployment 
rate in Slovakia has been much higher, 10.4% on January 1 and 13.7% on October 
31, 1993. The Slovakian unemployment rate is similarly high as in Hungary or 
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Table 1.4 Basic Macroeconomic Indicators, 1992 
Czech 
Indicator Republic Slovakia Hungary Poland 
Annual Changes %: 
Gross domestic production, real -7.1 -7.0 4 . 5  1.5 
Inflation (consumer price index) 11.1 10.1 23.0 43.0 
Exchange rate 
(national currency for USD) 4 . 1  4 . 1  5.7 28.8 
Level in % of Exports: 
Current account surplus 7.5 -13.1 3.0 -2.0 
Gross foreign debt, end of period 73.8 89.4 213.4 42 1.3 
Level in % of Labor Supply: 
Unemployment rate, end of period 2.6 10.4 12.3 13.6 
Level in % of GDP: 
Government budget deficit -0.2 -3.3 -7.0 -6.0 
Source: Statistical Bulletin of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, No. 311993. 
Poland (see Table 1.4), where unemployment is also rising. The updated rates for 
June 30, 1993 are 12.6% in Hungary and 14.7% in Poland. 
Government budget deficit or surplus is also an important indicator of macroe- 
conomic stability. As can been seen in Table 1.4, the Czech budget deficit in 
1992 was very small in comparison with much higher relative deficits in the other 
Central European countries. This advantage of the Czech economy has been even 
more obvious in the first half of 1993, when the Czech Republic even recorded a 
budget surplus at 1.3% of GDP, while there were considerable deficits elsewhere 
(in percent of GDP): 9% in Slovakia, 8% in Hungary, and 5% in Poland. 
Summarizing a comparison of the four Central European economies, it is 
obvious that the Czech Republic has the best starting position at the beginning of 
the second stage of transition to a market economy: it has the highest level of per 
capita GDP and savings, a positive current account balance, relatively low foreign 
debt, very low unemployment, an exchange rate stable over the last 3 years, a 
balanced Government budget, the lowest inflation in Central Europe, and still very 
low levels of wages enhancing the competitiveness of Czech products. 
16 I. Sujan and M. Sujanovd 
1.7 Recent Macroeconomic Trends in the 
Czech Republic and a Short-Term Forecast 
The satisfactory level of macroeconomic stability reached in the former ~ s F R  has 
been maintained and even improved in the Czech Republic during 1993. On the 
other hand, the recovery of economic growth which started in the second half of 
1992 has been interrupted by the split of the ~ s F R  and postponed to 1994. 
Estimated impacts of major positive and negative factors on Czech GDP in the 
first half of 1993 are given in Table 1.5. The statistical data on GDP components 
reveals, that a moderate decline in GDP in the first half of 1993 has not arisen from 
the lack of demand. Aggregate demand increased by 14 billion Czech crown or 
CZK (in constant 1984 prices), or 4.6%. All components of domestic and foreign 
demand increased except exports to Slovakia. On the other hand, the increase in 
aggregate demand was fully satiated by an increase in imports, so there was no 
room left for GDP growth. Especially imports of investment goods increased very 
rapidly, which may support the future competitiveness of Czech industry. 
As shown in Table 1.5, the continuing world recession was one of the negative 
factors influencing the downward trend in Czech GDP, by an estimated 2.1%. 
The negative impact of the division of the CSFR was similar (-2.2%). Another 
negative factor was a too restrictive budget policy (creating unnecessary surplus) 
which might be responsible for a further 1.8% of the decline in GDP. On the other 
hand, continuing inflow of foreign capital, as well as an expansion of Czech exports 
(significantly supported by the relatively low exchange rate and low level of wages) 
were the major positive factors with 2.7% and 3.1% contributions respectively. A 
small negative decline in GDP (by 0.5%) was the difference between the positive 
and negative impacts. 
A more careful look at the statistical data also reveals quarter-to-quarter growth 
in Czech GDP in 1993: by 3.1% in the second quarter and 4.8% in the third quarter. 
Following this trend, fourth quarter growth will continue to be positive -so much 
so that when combined with second and third quarter growth they will compensate 
for the steep first quarter fall. Annual growth would thus attain the 0% predicted 
for the year in Table 1.6. 
Table 1.6 also contains forecasts of other macroeconomic indicators for 1993. 
Along with GDP, the most important ones are annual CPI or inflation (21%), 
unemployment rate (3.5%), and current account surplus including the account with 
Slovakia (2.1 % of GDP). 
In addition, Table 1.6contains our forecasts of basic macroeconomic indicators 
of the Czech Republic for 1994 and 1995. GDP has been estimated to grow by 
Table 1.5 Impacts of Major Factors on Czech GDP in the First Half of 1993 (bln. CZK, constant 1984 prices) s s. 
Data for the First Half Year Contributions of Factors to the Change b CD 
Inflow of Restrictive 3 
World Split of Foreign Expansion Budget Other 
Indicator U1992 U1993 Change Recession the ~ S F R  Capital of Exports Policy Factors 2 
Private consumption 98.0 101.5 3.5 -1.3 -4.8 2.8 3.3 -1.1 4.6 5 
Government consump- s 
tion 32.7 34.1 1.4 -0.4 1.4 0.9 1.1 -3.9 2.3 s CD 
Gross capital formation 50.1 57.6 7.5 -0.7 0.9 6.5 1.6 -0.6 -0.2 
Aggregate domestic 
0 k? 
demand 180.8 193.2 12.4 -2.4 -2.5 10.2 6.0 -5.6 6.7 2- 
Exports excl. the SR' 96.2 107.3 11.1 -2.9 4.2 3.8 6.0 - - 
Exports to the SR' 30.0 20.5 -9.5 -1.1 -8.4 - - - - F 
Aggregate demand 307.0 321.0 14.0 -6.4 -6.7 14.0 12.0 -5.6 6.7 2 u 
of which: 2. n 
Imports incl. the SR' 113.9 128.9 15.0 -2.4 -2.5 8.9 6.0 -2.1 7.1 
Gross domestic product 193.1 192.1 -1 .O -4.0 -4.2 5.1 6.0 -3.5 -0.4 
Im~acts on GDP in % 100% 99.5% -0.5% -2.1% -2.2% 2.7% 3.1% -1.8% -0.2% 
' Exports and imports including services. 
Source: Czech Statistical Office and author's own calculations. 
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 able 1.6 Macroeconomic Indicators of the Czech Republic 
Actual Forecast 
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Annual Changes % : 
Gross domestic product, real -14.2 -7.1 0.0 2.5 4.2 
Industrial production, real -22.3 -10.6 -5.0 0.0 2.8 
Construction works, real -27.5 22.0 -2.4 5 .O 8.4 
Retail sales, real -33.5 16.4 2.7 4.5 5 .O 
Gross fixed investment, real -17.7 3.8 2.0 6.5 8.5 
Exports excluding the SR1 -13.5 6.1 15.8 11.0 10.0 
Exports to the SR - -5.7 -17.0 -10.0 0.0 
Imports excluding the SR -27.5 27.9 7.0 12.5 7.5 
Imports from the SR - -15.7 -1 3.7 -5.0 4 .O 
Consumer price index 56.6 11.1 21.0 9.2 6.5 
Average nominal wage 16.4 22.6 25.8 16.8 15.0 
Average real wage -24.0 10.1 4.0 7 .O 8.0 
End of Period Values: 
Unemployment rate in % 4.1 2.6 3.5 5 .O 5.5 
Trade balance in % of GDP 
excluding the SR 3.5 -2.5 -2.6 -3 .O -2.2 
with the SR 0.5 1.6 0.9 0.0 -0.5 
Current account in % of GDP 
excluding the SR 4.9 3.0 1.7 1.3 2.2 
with the SR 2.1 2.4 0.4 0.0 -0.2 
' SR = Slovak Republic. 
Source: Czech Statistical Office and author's own calculations. 
2.5% in 1994 and 4.2% in 1995 under the following assumptions (Novotny 1994, 
Sujan 1994): 
the world recession will finish and recovery will start during the next two years; 
the negative impact of the division of the CSFR will be successively exhausted; 
inflow of foreign capital will increase reflecting the remarkable macroeco- 
nomic stability in the Czech Republic, its convenient geographic position, low 
exchange rate, low wage costs, and skilled labor force; 
expansion of Czech exports will continue taking advantages of the low ex- 
change rate, low wage costs, and support of foreign capital, including a growing 
share of machinery equipment imported from advanced countries; and, 
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macroeconomic policy (including fiscal, monetary, and wage policy) will be 
slightly expansionary. 
From among forecasts of other important macroeconomic indicators, the annual 
inflation as measured by the CPI is expected to fall to about 9.2% in 1994 and 6.5% 
in 1995. This forecast comprises 'core inflation' of about 5 4 %  and the impact 
of some additional abolishment of remaining price controls (3% in 1994 and 1% 
in 1995). The unemployment rate is expected to increase to about 5% and 5.5% 
respectively, at the end of 1994 and 1995. An increase in unemployment despite 
the GDP growth reflects expected speeding-up in the industrial restructuring of the 
Czech economy. 
It may be expected that the expansion of exports will nearly offset growing 
imports which are necessary for restructuring and creating higher competitiveness 
of Czech industry. Under the assumption of the slightly negative trade balance and 
continuing highly positive balance of services, the current account is expected to 
remain in surplus of about 1 5 2 %  of GDP until 1995. 
1.8 Conclusions 
Before the 1989 revolution, the macroeconomic performance of former Czechoslo- 
vakia was disappointing. The country was loosing its pre-war position among the 
advanced industrialized countries. The past decade saw no real growth in GDP and 
personal consumption. The inflexible industrial structure considerably prevented 
further economic progress. 
The radical economic reform was prepared in 1990 and started January 1, 
1991. The implementation of the reform was successful from the point of view 
of macroeconomic stability (relatively low inflation, stable exchange rate, current 
account surplus and nearly a balanced state budget). However, it was accompanied 
by a sharp decline in real GDP, which was further worsened by the collapse of the 
former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 
Another shock came from the split of the Czechoslovakian Federation, which 
affected negatively the expected economic recovery in both successor republics. 
As expected, the Slovakian Republic has suffered much more. 
According to the international comparison, the Czech Republic is now in 
the best macroeconomic position from among all the post-communist countries. 
Recent macroeconomic trends and short-term forecasts are promising. However, 
some important reform steps have yet to be completed (privatization, restructuring 
and initiating economic growth). Czech macroeconomic policy should be cautious 
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since any expansion under imperfect market conditions may cause higher inflation, 
current account deficit, and other undesirable developments. 
Notes 
[ l ]  These impacts have been estimated based on our method. Similar estimates have been 
published in some other studies (Bleaney 1993, VintrovA 1992). 
[2] GDP converted into USD using purchasing power parities. Source: Statistical Bulletin 
of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, No. 311993, CSU Prague 1993, 
and authors' own calculations. 
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Chapter 2 
Price Liberalization in Romania 
Zoan ~ u d a *  
Ministry of Finance, Bucharest, Romania 
2.1 Introduction 
After the events in 1989, it was hoped that promoting the development of a market 
economy would place Romania on the path to increased efficiency, progress, and 
eventually prosperity. Although generally recognized as bearing certain sacrifices, 
there was a belief that economic policy measures like price liberalization, 
liberalization of trade, fiscal and monetary austerity, and the internal and 
subsequent full convertibility of the national currency would also rapidly lead to 
stability and economic growth. After three years of transition to a market 
economy, it has become apparent that these hopes were premature. Real gross 
domestic product (GDP) continued to decline dramatically as a result of the 
decrease of production, prices increased with unexpected irregularity, real wages 
continued to fall, and the national currency was drastically devalued. 
The aim of this paper is to present the Romanian experience regarding price 
liberalization, the factors determining price increases, and the manner in which 
these factors behaved in the Romanian economy. The final section of the paper 
presents several policy measures that are considered necessary to continue price 
* 
The author is the Director of the Department for Prices and Protection of Competition. The views 
expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the Ministry of Finance 
of Romania. 
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liberalization, while simultaneously ensuring proper social protection, in order to 
attain price stability - an important element of the macroeconomic stabilization 
policy - as soon as possible. 
2.2 The Main Characteristics of the Romanian Economy 
after Three Years of Transition 
Romania made significant progress in enabling the transition towards a market 
economy since 1989 and demonstrated a commitment to reform in the face of 
difficult circumstances. Indeed, initial preconditions for an economic 
transformation were worse in Romania than in other Central or Eastern European 
states. Former state-directed industrial and investment policies were aimed at 
strictly equitable regional development, creating heavy industries with a large share 
of the labor force located in remote areas far from resources and infrastructure. 
The legacy is a large number of municipalities that are entirely dependent on single 
industries for employment of the local labor force. No attempt for economic 
liberalization was made under the previous communist government, unlike in some 
other countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Though foreign debt repayments 
were made ahead of schedule and debt was reduced to near zero by 1989, new 
foreign investment did not arrive due to political risk and structural weakness of 
the economy. An extremely distorted economic structure implied large output 
losses inevitably accompanying the shift towards a market economic system with 
actual market-driven prices. 
Most of the necessary legal framework was soon in place, though it has yet 
to be fully implemented. Prices were liberalized (though only partially), foreign 
trade fully liberalized, a two-tier banking system established, reform of the fiscal 
system was planned, enterprise ownership was restructured, and preparatory 
measures for large scale privatization were taken. Agriculture, small businesses, 
and retail trade have since been privatized. Direct foreign investment was 
subsequently protected by a law adopted in 1991 that was to ensure national 
treatment for foreign firms in all activities. 
Despite these achievements, the adopted policy of gradualism proved to be 
costly; GDP continued to decline precipitously in subsequent years (13% in 1991 
and 15% in 1992), inflation climbed to over 200% for 1992 as a whole (on average 
9.6% per month), real wages fell markedly, the unemployment rate rose to 9% by 
the end of the year, international currency reserves were sufficient for only a few 
weeks of imports, and the exchange rate of the lei was unstable and depreciating 
rapidly. Between 1989 and 1992, the official exchange rate was devalued annually 
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by an average of 1800% against the US dollar. Foreign currency evolved as the 
only reliable and available store of value, so foreign exchange was demanded 
virtually at any exchange rate. 
In 1990, the new government's main objective was to raise the standard of 
living by redirecting resources towards consumer demand. Nominal wages were 
increased whilst prices remained frozen. Credit was extended to state enterprises 
even though demand for capital goods was declining, leading to inventory 
accumulations. The consequent increase in demand, coupled with trade 
liberalization, resulted in a collapse in the balance of payments. The balance of 
payments deficit reached 9% of GDP and the foreign currency reserves fell to just 
two weeks of import equivalent. In November 1990, the lei was devalued and the 
prices partially liberalized. Since 1991, the Romanian government pursued 
macroeconomic stabilization policies and the share of budgetary expenditures and 
incomes in GDP was reduced. 
Overall, rapid growth in private sector trade, services, construction and 
agriculture were not sufficient to counterbalance the collapse in industrial 
production. It dropped by about 50% between 1989 and 1992 due to existing 
structural problems and shortages of inputs, especially energy, that led to idle 
capacities. Large scale heavy industries, in particular, continued to consume scarce 
resources as a consequence of the central administrative allocation system, which 
operated contrary to market criteria. Moreover, government support via credits 
and import quotas caused industry's demand for foreign exchange to grow despite 
erratic and unpredictable levels of foreign financial support. The financial 
discipline of enterprises deteriorated and high levels of inter-enterprise debt formed 
a severe obstacle to reform. Preferential credit was widespread and there were 
several rounds of enterprise debt forgiveness not accompanied by measures to 
prevent the renewal of debt accumulation. Thus, debts had again reached the same 
nominal level as in 1991 by the end of 1992. 
In spite of all these developments, the restructuring of the economy appears 
to be more successful than macroeconomic stabilization. The situation of the 
Romanian economy and the evolution of the main macroeconomic indicators are 
presented in Table 2.1A in the Appendix. 
In February 1993, the government obtained parliamentary approval for a 
revision of the economic reform program. This new plan prescribed tighter 
macroeconomic policies and reaffirmed the government's commitment to carry 
out effective microeconomic reforms and industrial restructuring. The reform 
program envisaged a further liberalization of prices, the topic dealt with throughout 
this paper. 
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2.3 The Evolution of Price Policy between 1990 and 1992 
The transition from a highly centralized price system to a new, less regulated price 
system and policy started at the beginning of 1990, when: 
(i) the system of free pricing for privately produced goods was introduced; 
(ii) agricultural product contract prices in the state and co-operative sectors were 
increased for centralized acquisitions and the possibility to sell the excess 
quantities on the free market was guaranteed; and, 
(iii) the competence of the existing institutional framework (official and govern- 
mental agencies) in setting prices was reduced. 
These measures were considered as a gradual decentralization of the price 
establishment. The changes, constituting the core of what has been called "a 
process of price liberalization" were based on Article 48 of Law No. 15/1990 
regarding the restructuring of state economic units as "regies autonome and 
commercial companies". The entities reorganized according to this law are free 
to set prices according to the relationship between demand and supply. However, 
this freedom was restricted under two circumstances: 
(i) either when there were less than three economic agents supplying the same 
goods or services; or, 
(ii) when the prices were subsidized from the state budget. 
In such cases, the prices were to be established by the government after 
negotiations with the economic agents. As a consequence of the various measures 
taken by government, the price system evolved continuously and passed through 
the following key stages: 
Stage I: Real price liberalization started only on 1 November 1990, when the 
principle of free negotiation was introduced. The two restrictions, provided 
by Law No. 15/1990, had been extended to include: 
products requiring protection and rational use; and, 
products and services of major importance for the national economy and 
for the population. 
The level of new prices was negotiated on the basis of the official exchange 
rate of the lei, which was then 35 leu1 USD compared to a rate of 21 lei11 
USD introduced on 1 February 1990 and a rate of 16 leu1 USD valid before 
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that date (for more details concerning the exchange rate of the lei see Figure 
2.1 presented later as well as Table 2.3A in the Appendix). Together with the 
new pricing system, a compensation/indexation system of incomes was 
introduced. At this time, the list of the subsidized products destined for 
industrial consumption included 21 items, and that for final consumption 
consisted of 1 1 items. 
Stage 2: On 1 April 1991, maximum indices for the price increases were 
established. The declared and envisaged purpose of this measure was to 
prevent monopolistic pricing practices and to discourage the excessive increase 
of the general price level. The prices for imported goods and for domestic 
basic raw materials were based on an exchange rate of 60 lei11 USD. The 
list of the subsidized products for industrial consumption was reduced from 
21 to 13 items, while the list of products for final consumption was 
maintained. 
Stage 3: On 1 July 1991, the previous indicative ceilings which were not in 
accordance with the principle of free negotiation were abrogated. The formula 
constituting quarterly adjustments of natural gas prices and monthly 
adjustments of prices for crude oil, electric energy, and raw materials 
(according to the import price levels) were adopted. The need for notification 
of the intention to negotiate price increases three months in advance was 
imposed. The lists of temporarily subsidized products were changed to 15 
items of mining raw materials and 14 items of consumer goods and services. 
Stage 4: As of 1 November 1991, free negotiation of prices was permitted on the 
basis of the initiative and responsibility of the economic agents. Negotiation 
was supposed to take into account the influences of: 
(i) unifying the exchange rates at the level of 180 lei11 USD; 
(ii) alignment of the prices of domestic basic raw materials, fuels, and energy 
to the world market level; and, 
(iii) the new salary indexation. 
The compulsory notification regarding the intention to negotiate price increases 
was set at 90 days in advance with a punitive extension possibility. The level 
of mark-up was limited to 30% no matter how many intermediaries were 
involved in the distribution from the producer or importer to the final 
consumer. 
Stage 5: On 1 August 1992, the manner of price and tariff negotiations were 
regulated under the conditions of completely liberalizing the exchange rate 
of the lei. It was stated that the following factors could be taken into account 
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when negotiating prices: liberalization of the exchange rate of the lei; aligning 
the pricing to the long run tendencies of world market price evolution; the new 
level of contribution for social security; and, the indexation scheme of salaries. 
The negotiated price level of basic raw materials, electric and thermal 
energy, and some liquid fuels was not to exceed that of similar products on 
the world market under comparable conditions of delivery and quality, 
expressed in lei using the actual exchange rate. In order to realize these 
provisions, a maximal increase indices would be taken into account (defined 
for 24 items instead of 35 items previously). The restriction regarding the 
level of mark-up remained in force, but the notification of the intention to 
increase as well as negotiate prices needed to occur only 30 days in advance 
(instead of the 90 days defined earlier). 
Regarding the relationship between the state and private sectors, it was 
stated that the commercial companies with state capital could buy their 
supplies, for industrial consumption or resale, from the private or co-operative 
sectors at only the prices and tariffs not exceeding the level of the offer from 
the state sector. The list of subsidized mining raw materials and other products 
was to be further maintained. According to the program of removing 
budgetary subsidies for consumer goods and services, the number of items was 
reduced and the subsidies were decreased. The subsidies for edible oil, sugar, 
meat and meat products, dairy products, cotton wool, and interurban passenger, 
bus, and railway transport were eliminated. 
By the end of 1992, the price system and price policy can be summarized as 
follows: compared with a 'pure' system wherein the prices are established 
exclusively on the free action of market forces, the price regulation and 
interventions were considered generally as restrictions and exemptions from free 
market principles. 
Although Law No. 1511990 regarding the reformation of state economic units 
sets forth that all prices must be negotiated between economic agents on the basis 
of demand and supply, the supervision of negotiations and the interventions andlor 
temporal restrictions imposed are economically motivated and based on given 
market conditions. Negotiations concerning the prices of those products and 
services not facing real competition - manufactured, sold, or distributed by less 
than three usually state-owned economic agents - as well as those temporarily 
subsidized from the public budget were to take place under the supervision of 
central or local public administration authorities. The number of products and 
services subjected to the price negotiation process under the supervision of public 
administration authorities were continuously decreasing in accordance with the 
creation of a significantly competitive environment and to the extent to which 
government subsidies were eliminated. In early 1993, still 112 products and 
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services were subject to supervised negotiations, though this number was scheduled 
to be reduced to 77 within a short period. 
Free negotiation of prices between parties without any interference and on 
a demand and supply basis had become practically overwhelming, i.e. 100% in 
the private sector and over 80% in the state-owned sector. The purpose of 
supervising was to prevent state-owned suppliers from having the dominant position 
on the market and imposing monopolistic or speculative prices. To this end, public 
administration authorities were empowered by the government to analyze whether 
price increases were based on objective factors such as: 
evolution of exchange rate of the national currency, which has direct effects 
on the prices for imported goods, and, further, via the basic raw materials, 
fuels, and energy prices, practically on all prices in the national economy; 
price evolution to world levels of imported goods; 
indexation of wages within a social protection program; and, 
increase in the amortization of capital equipment for the revaluation of fixed 
assets. 
Thus, the objective of regulation was to prevent the negotiated prices from 
transferring adverse influences generated by mismanagement of companies, thefts 
of material values, shortage of inputs, and so forth. In the cases of raw materials 
and of basic materials for industrial consumption, care was taken that the negotiated 
prices between the economic agents with state-owned capital did not exceed the 
world prices prevailing on the relevant markets for comparable products calculated 
in lei at the actual exchange rate. Supervisory bodies paid special attention to 
economic agents using primarily state-owned capital to produce goods and services 
similar to those existing in the market in order to insure that the negotiated prices 
would be in accordance both with the relation between demand and supply, and 
with the qualitative characteristics of the goods and services compared. 
2.4 Evolution of the Price Level 
The movement of prices is illustrated by the data presented in Table 2.2A in the 
Appendix. The accelerated increase of the general level of prices between 1990 
and 1992 was determined by: 
(i) the critically high level of costs and low level of profitability in many 
enterprises and industrial sectors in the 1980s; and, 
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(ii.) the subordination of the 'price system' to a general resource allocation system 
drafted and maintained for multilateral development with autarck economic 
tendencies until 1989; 
(iii) the imbalance between demand and supply on the domestic market which 
existed previously, but was accentuated by excessive revendication on the part 
of the employees in 1990; 
(iv) the rapid devaluation of the national currency after 1990. 
The increase of wholesale prices was more rapid than that of the consumer prices. 
The determination and the pressure of wholesale prices on consumer prices was 
obvious due to the coincidental increases. The tendency of the producer and 
consumer price indices to move together was clearly apparent in the period between 
1990 and 1992. In certain periods, the postponement of actualizing the prices 
according to modifications of the exchange rate generated rigidity of prices. The 
price level continued to be altered as a result of understating the depreciation of 
capital equipment which occurred due to the delay in updating the values of fixed 
assets. 
The development of consumer prices showed the specific flexibility 
commensurate with the situation of diminishing incomes over the three year period. 
The prices of food products increased more than those for non-food and both 
exceeded the dynamics of the prices for services. Food products constituted more 
than 50% of the average family's consumer expenditures. Furthermore, the 
limitation of the mark-up restricted the movement of relative prices, granting 
protection to the producers against an unexpected movement (change) in demand. 
The Romanian economy exhibited the characteristic features of an inflationary 
situation during the period studied in this paper. The presence of imported inflation 
can not be ignored, considering the decline of domestic production and the increase 
of imports. In these circumstances, three factors are acting jointly: the 'emptying' 
of the domestic market, the pressure on imports of consumer goods, and the 
increase of the exchange rate. In fact, Romania made an effort to fulfill its 
commitment to liberalize foreign trade and not create new restrictions in this area. 
However, there are experts who support the maintenance of some commercial 
restrictions in the period of unification and liberalization of the exchange rate. 
In the period from 1990 to 1992, domestic production shrank (to 50% 
compared with industrial production of 1989) and imports of consumer goods could 
not cover the difference. The monetary overhang accumulated in the past tended 
to dissolve. The polarization of incomes determined important structural changes 
in aggregate demand. The development of real wages between October 1990 and 
February 1993 is shown in Table 2.1. The real wage (monthly average) in January 
1993 represented only about 60% of its level in October 1990, when price 
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Table 2.1 Real Wages, October 1990 to February 1993, (in %) 
1990 1991 1992 1992 1993 1993 
Oct. Oct. Oct. Dec. Jan. Feb. 
Whole economy: 
Net average wage 
Consumer prices 
Real wage 
(Oct. 1991 = 100) 
(Dec. 1992 = 100) 
Industry: 
Net average nominal wage 
Real wage 
Industrial output 
Labor productivity 
Note: 
The sources for statistical data for this table apply also to all other tables. 
Sources: 
National Commission for Statistics, Monthly Price Statistics Bulletins (multiple issues 1990-1993). 
National Commission for Statistics, Romanian Statistical Yearbook 1993. Ministry of Finance, 
Deparment for Prices and Protection of Competition. 
liberalization began. This drop discloses the drastic impact of price liberalization 
on the purchasing power of the population. 
During the period observed, the exchange rate surged ahead of prices (see 
Figure 2.1 and refer to Tables 2.2A and 2.3A in the Appendix). The contribution 
of the devaluation of the lei to the revival of exports was hampered by increased 
costs of the inputs. About 60% of Romanian imports were nonsubstitutable and 
the production costs depended on the level of the exchange rate to more than 50% 
via direct imports and via the adjustment of domestic prices according to the 
evolution of the exchange rate. Further negative trends arose in response to the 
depressive effect of the restrictive monetary policy and the hesitation in maintaining 
other strict budget constraints as well as the lack of support by and co-ordination 
with the measures of trade policy. The estimated influence of various factors on 
the price increase in the liberalization process is shown in Table 2.2. The price 
increase is mostly due to the depreciation of the lei. In fact, the data already 
referred to in Table 2.2A in the Appendix clearly illustrates a 16 fold increase of 
the general price level compared to a 32 fold decrease of the exchange rate level 
of the lei during the three years of transition (from January 1990 to February 1993). 
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Figure 2.1 Exchange Rate of Lei to USD and the Consumer Price Index 
Thus, some of the fundamental economic indicators - as wages, for instance - 
reach alarming heights when converted into USD. 
As far as prices are concerned, the level attained could be explained by the 
general unfavorable condition of the economy: the reduced utilization of the output 
Table 2.2 Estimated Influence of Selected Factors on Price Development, 
1991 and 1992 
I 
1991 I I 1992 
I 
Wholesale Consumer 1 Wholesale Consumer 
prices prices prices prices 
(industry) ) (industry) 
I 
The price index (end of year) 676.3 344.5 j 1836.0 1230.0 
compared with October 1990 I 
(%) of which: I i 
modification of exchange rate 313.0 167.0 1 1092.0 662.0 
modification of wage level 240.0 114.0 / 529.0 385.0 
reduction of subsidies - - I - 57.2 
other factors 123.3 63.5 f 215.0 125.8 
Source: see Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.3 Exchange Rate and Consumer Price Index in Romania and Other 
Countries (1 989=100) 
I 
1991 (December) I ! 1992 (December) 
CPI Index of j CPI Index of 
exchange rate exchange rate 
(devaluation) I (devaluation) 
I 
425.2 Romania 1160.0 j 1352.0 2704.0 
Hungary 18 1.4 130.0 1 203.0' 148.0' 
CSFR 183.5 189.7 j 190.0~ 1 8 1 . 9 ~  
Poland 1309.4 769.4 1 1733.3~  96 1 .73 
Bulgaria - - I 1460.0~ 850.3~ 
-  - - - - 
July 1992 
October 1992 
August 1992 
Basic year 1990 
Source: see Table 2.1. 
capacities; the increase of the specific material consumption; increase of nominal 
wages; lack of financial discipline; and so forth. In the case of the exchange rate 
of the lei, which followed the trend to align with inflation, the level in mid April 
1993 should have been 320 lev1 USD; however, the actual rate was about 600 
lev1 USD - 37.5 times higher than the rate in January 1990. 
In contrast to Romania, other countries in transition have exhibited a much 
closer relationship between price development and devaluation of their national 
currencies (see Table 2.3). The data shows that the countries which devalued their 
currencies less, registered smaller price increases. As a rule, except for Romania 
and the ~ S F R  (until December 1991), the devaluation index is not in excess of 
the price index. In Romania, the price increase is smaller than the devaluation 
of the lei due to the measures taken by the government to combat the monopolistic 
tendencies of the economic agents. The process consisted of the notification of the 
intention to increase prices three months in advance (now 30 days) and selling 
goods from inventories at the old prices in order to erode the profits to compensate 
for the unfavorable influence (increase) of the exchange rate and, generally, the 
prices of inputs. 
The objective of sharply devaluating the lei was to encourage exports, while 
some additionally relevant side-effects were largely ignored. These included, for 
example, inflationary impacts of the imports and vanishing of the export stimulus 
when the rate of growth of the domestic price level exceeds the rate of devaluation 
of the currency. In fact, the Romanian government resorted to the import tax and 
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turnover tax exemptions and as well as to the reduction of profit taxes on exported 
goods in order to stimulate more export. As already mentioned, imports have been 
a necessity for Romania and, in most cases, the main supply of basic raw materials 
and energy resources. By increasing the exchange rate, the costs of those who 
use imported resources inevitably increased. For example, domestic crude oil was 
sold to the oil distilleries at 2,000 legton in October 1990 and 42,225 leilton in 
October 1992. In comparison, prices of imported crude oil were 52,000 to 54,000 
leilton. The price of gasoline increased 15 times and that of diesel oil 16 times 
in the same period. According to our estimates, about 60% of the increase of the 
price level could be attributed to the increase of the 'cost' of foreign currency, i.e. 
to the devaluation of the Romanian lei. 
If all the influences of the exchange rate were transferred into prices, the 
inflation in Romania could reach alarming dimensions. Indeed, this could 
destabilize the social equilibrium, including the minimum agreements reached with 
the social partners (trade-unions) in 1991 and 1992. From this point of view, 
pushing the exchange rate upwards had a destabilizing impact and did not support 
in anyway the interests of the Romanian economy throughout the transition period. 
Under such circumstances, the application of the rules acting in a standard market 
economy is completely unrealistic. The theoretical construction implemented until 
today in the Romanian economy, no matter how substantiated in other countries, 
was in no position to resolve the crisis the country was confronted with at the time 
this paper was prepared. The entire range of regulations in the field of pricing 
were to facilitate the alignment of domestic prices for energy, fuels, and other basic 
raw materials with world market prices. Since the electric power costs constitute 
a portion of almost all products' prices, the impact of the exchange rate is obvious. 
The prices of imported consumer goods are based on the prices in hard 
currencies negotiated with foreign suppliers and converted into lei at the current 
exchange rate. The final prices are supplemented by import duties, turnover taxes, 
and the commercial margins of the wholesalers, intermediaries, and retailers. The 
higher the exchange rate, the higher will be the domestic market price. A 
substantial contribution to the increase of consumer goods prices was brought about 
by the importers, who often added an exorbitant margin of up to 3,000% (which 
was, in fact, meant to cover their costs and profits). This situation required better 
regulation of import pricing so that the determination of the prices would remain 
free as before, but the possibilities of charging speculative prices would be limited. 
The exchange rate of 600 leg1 USD in the spring of 1993 pushed up the 
general price level. The price increase due only to the devaluation of the lei was 
expected to be as follows when compared with the price levels registered in August 
1992 (when the exchange rate was 375 lei11 USD): 
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. basic raw materials, fuels, and energy (which have already internationally 
aligned prices) by 65%; 
other industrial products by 30-52%; and, 
consumer prices by 30%. 
2.5 Projections Regarding the Price Regime and Policy 
The modification of reform strategy approved by the Romanian Parliament in 
February 1993 envisaged a complete liberalization of prices as an integral part of 
the future economic reform. The focus was to be on the following measures: 
(i) Reducing the scope and amount of subsidies for mining products. This could 
reduce costs in the subsidized sectors and lead to a better and more efficient 
mechanism for the allocation of resources. As a counterweight, this measure 
could stimulate imports and exert pressure on the exchange rate via the trade 
balance. The implementation of such a measure should take into account the 
sometimes exclusive dependence of some localities on such activities as 
mining. This implies a need for creating new activities which could be 
achieved only on the grounds of economic recovery and which should ensure 
both the import of the relevant resources and diversification of all branches 
and industries; 
(ii) Elimination of subsidies for all consumer goods and services scheduled for 
1 May 1993 was to be achieved under the condition of full compensation for 
these products and with wage indexation for the other price modifications. 
The expected impact of removing the subsidies was a 50% price increase as 
compared to December 1992 (see Table 2.4). 
(iii) Subsidies for agricultural inputs (chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and veterinary 
medicines) should be treated differently. In order to support this important 
sector, these subsidies could be removed but replaced by a premium to be 
granted to farmers for the agricultural products supplied. 
(iv) The normalization of the evolution of prices by means of correction of 
consumer prices and wholesale prices. The measures for adjustment which 
should be taken into account for 1993 consist of eliminating the remaining 
subsidies to consumer goods; application of a new regime for amortizing 
calculated on the basis of the reevaluated value of fixed assets; and the 
introduction of a value added tax. In order to assure a certain price stability, 
these measures should be combined with a proper exchange rate policy. 
(v) Abrogation of the compulsory notification of price increases and of the 30% 
limit on the mark-up at a suitable time. 
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Table 2.4 Estimated Impact of Total Elimination of Subsidies as of 1 May 1993 
on Consumer and Wholesale prices (December 1992 = 100) 
Consumer price index 
of which: 
Food products 
Other commodities 
Services 
Wholesale price index - average 
Source: see Table 2.1. 
The implementation of the above mentioned measures should be accompanied by 
granting the necessary social protection which will generate important wage 
increases with new effects on the level of prices. It is, therefore, advisable that the 
supervision of price negotiations by the public authorities should have been 
maintained throughout 1993 in all cases where no substantial competition existed 
or where products and services were subsidized. Under these circumstances, the 
inflation expected for 1993 should amount to 80-100% as compared with 200% 
in 1992. These projections have been made considering: 
a possible continuation of the devaluation of the lei; 
the total elimination of subsidies for consumer goods; 
application of a new regime of amortization in addition to the revaluation of 
fixed assets; and, 
introduction of the value added tax. 
Reconsideration of the reform strategy by the Romanian government is expected 
to result in the reduction of annual inflation to only 15% in the subsequent 3-4 
years. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In early 1990, price liberalization began in ernest as a crucial policy instrument 
of economic reform in forging the transition process to a market economy in 
Romania. Since this procedure took place in a highly monopolized environment, 
the Romanian government adopted a policy of 'gradualism'; namely, a step-by-step 
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deregulation of prices while simultaneously imposing some restrictions in cases 
where no real competition existed or where prices were subsidized from the state 
budget. As a consequence, price liberalization evolved in a continuous fashion. 
Free negotiation of prices based on demand and supply became pervasive, 
eventually reaching 100% in the private sector and 80% in the state-owned sector. 
And, today, the supervision of price negotiations is still maintained for a limited 
number of products in order to prevent state enterprises from unfairly utilizing their 
often dominant market position to charge monopoly or speculative prices. 
Nonetheless, recurrent shocks to the price system (such as structural changes, 
liberalization by stages, partial elimination of subsidies, and so forth) combined 
with a marked decrease in production as well as poor financial discipline at the 
microeconomic or enterprise level have created and consolidated inflationary 
expectations of economic agents and the population in general. These 
developments are further reflected in high inflation rates and a continuous 
depreciation of the lei. Indeed, this induced new price increases and subjected 
Romania to undergo a very difficult period of economic recession and inflation. 
According to our estimates, approximately 60% of the increase in the price level 
can be attributed to the devaluation of the Romanian lei, particularly since prices 
for imported and domestic raw materials and energy resources are determined at 
parity with world prices. The impact of price liberalization on the purchasing 
power of the population and domestic demand was drastic: the level of real wages 
in January 1993 was only 60% of its level in October 1990, the year price 
liberalization began. 
As excessive restrictions and gradualism of deregulation persistently proved 
to be costly policy alternatives, the Romanian government decided to introduce 
more rapid price liberalization and limit state prerogatives to a minimum with 
respect to this procedure. The main underlying objective of the shift in government 
policy is that all domestic prices should reach parity with world price levels over 
an acceptable time horizon and at a realistic exchange rate, hopefully stimulating 
structural adjustment and enterprise restructuring. Direct price control should be 
replaced by more indirect control through competition. In this spirit, measures 
to create and support a competitive environment favoring privatization, 
establishment of new commercial companies, as well as restructuring and 
eliminating existing monopolies and monopsonies must be adopted. The authors 
believe that the experiences of many other countries imply a need for further price 
regulation of goods and services produced by natural monopolies and public 
utilities. Active policies are required to promote enterprise restructuring and limit 
the price increases on various products that risk being subject to monopoly pricing 
due to a lack of competition and inefficiency of domestic producers. Such 
measures will foster a certain price stability and markedly reduce the rate of 
inflation. 
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Appendix 
Table 2.1A Main Statistical Indicators of the National Economy, 1989-1992 
(A: current prices); (B: percentage variation as compared to the previous year) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1992189 
(%I 
GDP (bln. lei) A 798.0 844.0 2109.7 5450.0 
B -7.4 -13.7 -15.4 67.9 
of which: 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Construction A 50.6 47.9 104.6 28 1.5 
B -9.5 -19.0 -9.9 66.0 
Transportation and A 60.0 56.5 95.6 294.9 
Telecommunications B -10.2 -26.2 -16.1 55.6 
Sales Turnover A 48.2 59.3 178.5 265.5 
B 23.2 -11.1 -17.1 90.8 
Other Services A 106.4 121.3 420.3 91 1.4 
B 9.4 2.6 -6.5 96.3 
GDPlEmployee (thousand lei) A 72.9 77.8 195.3 534.0 
B -6.5 -13.3 -10.5 72.6 
Investment (bln. lei) A 236.4 168.4 314.0 700.0 
B -38.3 -25.8 -20.0 36.6 
Total Exports FOB A 10631.0 6201.0 4368.0 4107.0 
(million RBL + million USD) B -38.3 -25.8 -20.0 36.6 
Ruble trade (mln.) A 4641.0 2699.0 830.0 88.0 
B -7.3 -41.7 -69.2 -89.4 1.9 
Dollar trade (mln.) A 5990.0 3502.0 3538.0 4019.0 
B -9.4 -41.5 1 .O 13.6 67.1 
Total Imports CIF A 9034.0 10221.0 5864.0 5514.0 
(million RBL + million USD) B 10.5 13.1 -44.6 -6.0 61.0 
Ruble trade (mln.) A 5275.0 4565.0 574.0 144.0 
B 6.8 -13.5 -87.4 -74.9 2.7 
Dollar trade (rnln.) A 3759.0 5656.0 5290.0 5370.0 
B 16.1 50.5 -6.5 1.5 142.9 
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Table 2.1A Continued. 
Balance of the current account of 
foreign payments (mln. USD) 
External debt (mln. lei) 
Retail Trade (mln. lei) A 
B 
Nominal Net Salary (leilmonth) 
minimum 
average 
CPI - Average in % 
(October 1990 = 100) 
Real Average Salary (% of 
previous year) 
Money supply (bln. lei) A 
B 
as % of GDP 
Source: see Table 2.1 
Table 2.2A Indices of Wholesale Prices, Consumer Prices, and Exchange Rate, 1990 to 1993 (1989 = 100) 
Total per 
Jan. Feb. March Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. year 
Wholesale prices 
Consumer prices 
Exchange rate 
Wholesale prices 
Consumer prices 
Exchange rate 
Wholesale prices 
Consumer prices 
Exchange rate 
Consumer prices 
Exchange rate 
--
Source: see Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.3A Exchange Rate (leilUSD) and Consumer Price Index (Oct. 1990 to 
Feb. 1993) 
Exchange Rate 
Consumer price index 
% % 
Month lei/ 1 USD (Oct. 1990 = 100) (Oct. 1990 = 100) 
October 
November 
December 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
January 470.30 2239.5 1483.0 
February 5 10.50 243 1 .O 1605.0 
Source: see Table 2.1. 
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Part I1 
The Role of Monetary 
and Fiscal Policies in the 
Stabilization Programs 

Chapter 3 
Budget Deficit and Inflation 
in Transition Economies 
Stanislaw ~omulka* 
London School of Economics, London, Great Britain 
3.1 Introduction 
Whatever the health of public finances just before the start of transition reforms, 
post-socialist economies tend to develop a fiscal problem, in some cases a fiscal 
crisis, in the course of transition. The causes of this tendency are reasonably well 
understood, and I shall discuss them only briefly. Less clear but vital for policy- 
makers are the implications of a budget deficit for the inflation rate, given the 
ways of financing the deficit, the recession conditions, the servicing requirements 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a Conference on Transition Economies at the 
London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance, on September 28-29, 1992 and 
at the International Workshop on Macroeconomic Stabilization of Economies in Transition in 
Prague 22-24 April, 1993. In writing this paper, I have benefited much from extensive discussions 
with Polish policy-makers. I want in particular to thank Leszek Balcerowicz, Stefan Kawalec, 
Andrzej Olechowski and Jerzy Osiatynski for their comments, questions and encouragement. All 
computer simulations were performed by Joanna Gomulka. I also wish to acknowledge the helpful 
comments made by Andrzej S. Bratkowski and Mark Schaffer. Section 2 on the causes of the fiscal 
problem draws on Gomulka (1993). 
* The author is Professor of economics at the London School of Economics and Chairman of the 
Macroeconomic Group at Poland's Ministry of Finance in 1992-3 as well as Economic Adviser to 
Poland's Finance Minister since Autumn 1989. 
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of the accumulating public debt, and the credit requirements of the economy. 
Considering these implications, it is then very important to decide on budget 
deficit reducing policy responses which would be sufficiently effective to keep the 
inflation rate on a downward path and which would minimize the social concerns 
of the population over tax increases and expenditure cuts. 
The primary aims of this paper are (i) to propose a simple macroeconomic 
model for the purpose of computing inflationary implications of budget deficits, 
(ii) to report simulation results of the model in terms of the inflation-budget deficit 
relationship under assumptions pertaining to transition economies, and (iii) to 
discuss specific policy measures intended to reduce the budget deficit. In order 
to make the simulation results instructive, the specific initial conditions chosen 
are those of the Polish economy at the end of September 1992. The model and 
its simulations, used in Poland in 1992 for the purpose of constructing the 1993 
budget, can be utilized to discover the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP that is 
consistent with an inflation path and acceptable to the policy-maker. Alternatively, 
the model can also be used to compute the inflation path which, given the 
assumptions, inevitably results from a given path of the deficit/GDP ratio. 
In the first year of Polish reform, the budget deficit was low and the inflation 
rate was high, much of it due to corrective price increases. In the second and 
third years of reform, 1991 and 1992, the deficit/GDP ratio tended to increase 
sharply while the inflation rate tended to decline. This led some economists to 
suggest that the relationship between the inflation rate and the deficit rate is 
negative. However, this apparently paradoxical phenomenon was easy to explain 
by noting that the observed inflation rate was the joint outcome of the cost-push 
and demand-pull factors, and that the initially dominating cost-push contribution 
to inflation was declining rapidly. The concern was, however, that there may 
come a point when the deficit is large enough to arrest and then to reverse the 
downward trend of inflation. Knowing where this point would be in 1993 was 
of immediate interest to Polish policy-makers in 1992. 
3.2 Causes of the Fiscal Problem 
Polish fiscal developments in aggregate terms are shown for the years 1987 to 
1993 in Table 3.1 (1993 values were forecasted in late 1992). The numbers 
indicate that the share of general government expenditures in GDP has been 
reasonably stable. The primary cause of the newly emerging fiscal gap has been 
on the revenue side. The central government was even able to reduce its 
expenditures as a share of GDP by some five percentage points in 1991-92, 
compared to the levels in the years 1987-90. State revenues as a share of GDP, 
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Table 3.1 Fiscal Indicators in Poland, 1987-93 (as % of GDP) 
Pre-reform 
Indicator 1987 1988 1989 
Transition 
1990 1991 1992' 1 9 9 3 ~  1 9 9 3 ~  
State budget 
Revenues 34.2 35.5 30.8 
~ x ~ e n d i t u r e s ~  37.7 37.0 36.9 
Balance4 -3.5 -1.4 -6.1 
General 
Revenues 47.0 48.0 41.4 
Expenditures 47.8 48.0 48.8 
Balance4 -0.8 0.0 -7.4 
' Preliminary. 
Expected outcome in the absence of corrective measures, the author's estimates. 
Expected outcome following the approval of corrective measures by parliament. 
On a commitment basis, except external interest which is on a cash basis. 
This IMF estimate of the 1991 deficit is on a commitment basis; except external interest, which 
is on a cash basis. The date of the estimate is Spring 1993 (Supplementary Backgroud Material for 
the GATT, March 17, Table 1). 
Definitions: 
State budget is the budget of the central government. General government includes central 
government, local authorities and extra-budgetary funds. 
Sources: 
IMF (September 3, 1993) for 1988-1993, and the Polish Finance Ministry. The primary data are 
all provided by the Polish authorities. 
however, fell by about ten percentage points in 1991 and have remained low. 
This fall can be traced mainly to the collapse of enterprise profits, but also in part 
to a fall in revenues from turnover taxes as industrial output fell much more than 
the GDP. This suggests that the primary remedy for the budget deficit problem 
must be found on the revenue side, probably through an increase of indirect taxes. 
Nevertheless, the expenditure side is also interesting because of large shifts 
in composition. Perhaps the most reform-related expenditure items are subsidies. 
Their pre-reform structure - about two-thirds of the total going to the household 
sector and about one-third to the enterprise sector - has remained virtually 
unchanged. Yet, the total sum of subsidies has fallen dramatically, from about 
16% of GDP in 1987-8 to 12.9% in 1989, 8.2% in 1990 and only 4.8% in 1991. 
However, the budgetary transfer to pension funds and the Labor Fund increased 
from 4% of GDP in 1987 to about 8% in 1990-91. The cost of unemployment 
benefits is still a relatively minor burden, about 1% of GDP in 1991-2. 
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The main problem on the expenditure side has been the meteoric rise of 
expenditure on pensions and other social insurance items. This occasioned the 
need to transfer resources from the state budget to the main three extra budgetary 
Funds: FUS (mainly workers' pensions), KRUS (mainly farmers' pensions) and 
the Labor Fund (mainly unemployment benefits). Total expenditures of the three 
Funds increased from 1 1 % of GDP in 1987 to 18% in 1991, and 2 1.6% in 1992. 
Pensions alone accounted for 6.6% of GDP in 1987, but as much as 11.1% by 
1991 and 13.5% in 1992. As subsidies to the household sector were reduced, the 
authorities apparently felt compelled to increase the average pension to about two- 
thirds of the average wage rate in 1992, up from about 50% the average wage rate 
before the reform. 
A fortunate aspect of the Polish fiscal position so far has been the light 
burden, about 1% of GDP, of servicing the external debt. The agreement with 
the Paris Club of April 1991 on about USD 30 billion of sovereign debt gave 
Poland three years during which 80% of interest payments due would be forgiven. 
Poland also continues not to service the bulk of the USD 13 billion of commercial 
debt. It may therefore be expected that in 1994 and thereafter the burden of 
servicing the external debt will greatly increase, possibly to about 3% of GDP. 
This will still be lower than the Hungarian burden now which, at some 5% of 
GDP, is a major cause of the weak fiscal position in that country. 
About 90-100% of the deficit in Poland as well as in most other transition 
economies, is financed by the banking sector with about one-third to two-thirds 
of this financed by the central bank. The difficulties in reducing the budget 
deficit are related to recession and to insufficient political cooperation between 
the government and the parliament, the latter reflecting in part the rising national 
concern over social costs of the transition. 
The budget problems have also arisen due to inadequate understanding of the 
reasons for a large budget improvement at the beginning of the reform, in the 
fourth quarter of 1989 and the first quarter of 1990. During that period of very 
high inflation, the nominal (zloty) value of inventories of materials, semi-finished 
and finished goods, increased rapidly. In line with the Polish accounting system, 
the consequent capital gains were counted as profits. However, insofar as they 
did not reflect any change in the volume of these assets, the gains were only 
'paper profits'. The existence of these profits was well known already in 1989- 
90, but the extent of their impact on total profits and corporate taxes was never 
properly estimated. An attempt at such an estimate was made recently by 
Schaffer (1992) and, independently and less accurately, by Barbone (1992). It 
appears that these paper profits significantly exceeded 'true profits' in the periods 
in question (fourth quarter of 1989 and first quarter of 1990), increasing the tax 
contribution of the enterprise sector by a factor of 2. 
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Table 3.2 Transfer to Social Insurance Funds in Poland, 1988-92 
To FUS: 
% of state budget 2.0 4.2 4.5 10.5 15.8 
% of FUS's expenditures 8.0 12.5 16.3 19.2 26.2 
To KRUS: 
% of state budget 1.9 3.5 3.8 6.5 7.9 
% of KRUS's expenditures 75.0 99.7 96.8 87.3 94.2 
Source: Polish Ministry of Finance. 
This automatic anti-inflationary stabilizer had already helped to eliminate the 
budget deficit in November and December 1989. It also accounts for the fact 
that, in 1990, corporate income tax and dividend tax revenues represented about 
16% of GDP and covered half of the total state budget expenditure, compared 
with about 11% of GDP in 1985 and 7.8% in 1982, which covered less than one- 
third of the total expenditure. 
It is now clear that the government made two major errors in the fiscal field: 
(1) it over-estimated the amount of revenues from the corporate and dividend 
taxes for 1991 by 6.5% of GDP, and (2) it failed to increase indirect taxes 
sufficiently to quickly compensate for the shortfall in revenues from the direct 
enterprise taxes. In view of the technical difficulties associated with introducing 
the VAT system, the government could have sharply increased the turnover tax 
by broadening its base and raising tax rates. The fiscal situation would also have 
been improved by a stricter wage policy. The excess wages tax was high and 
very progressive, but the instrument was ineffective due to the fact that the 
effective price indexation of wage norms was almost loo%, since the summer of 
1990 irrespective of the growth in nominal wages. The excessive and financially 
unsustainable indexation of wages and benefits continued throughout the period 
1990-92. A restrictive incomes policy would have increased profits and therefore 
budget revenue, and it would have reduced wages in the budget sphere as well as 
wage-indexed welfare benefits and, therefore, budget expenditure. The imposition 
of such an income policy would have required, however, close cooperation 
between the government and parliament, and this was singularly lacking in 1991 
and continued to be insufficient in 1992. 
Cooperation was and continues to be vital in implementing a program of 
budget savings. These are necessary in view of the development portrayed in 
Table 3.2. Underlying that table is the data shown in Table 3.3. A closer 
inspection of these figures and of Table 3.2. shows that the crisis of public 
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Table 3.3 Budgetary Costs of Pensions and Unemployment Benefits, 1989-93 
Pensions: 
No. (million) 6.8 7.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 
Cost (% of GDP) 7.2 9.4 11.4 12.8 13.3 
Unemployment benefits: 
No. (million) 0.0 0.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 
Cost (% of GDP) 0.0 0.5 1 .O 1.1 1 .O 
Total cost (% of GDP)  7.2 9.9 12.4 13.8 14.3 
Note: 
Cost is net of personal taxes; numbers are averages for the year. Pensions are of three categories: 
old age, early retirement and disability. The first two categories represent about 60% of the total. 
The average unemployment benefit is about 32% of the average wage and about 50% of the average 
pension, the latter now being equal to about 65% of the average wage. 
Source: 
Author's estimates based on Poland's Ministry of Finance data for 1989-92 and projections for 
1993. 
finance may be interpreted as being largely the result of a sharp increase in 
welfare expenditures. The cost of unemployment benefits is as yet insignificant 
compared with the cost of pensions, which is the result of a large increase in both 
the number of pensioners - the effect of recession and inherited legislation - 
and the real value of the average pension. 
To conclude this discussion on public finance, it is worth noting two 
circumstances that are important and common to nearly all transition economies 
and that complicate the policy-maker's task of reducing the budget deficit. One 
is the poor quality of bank assets and the other is widespread evasion of taxes in 
the private sector. 
The banking sector seeks to improve its portfolio of assets by lending more 
to the government and less to economic units. Given that, in Poland, about 50- 
60% of all enterprise debt is not being (properly) serviced and that the 
government debt is fully serviced, the ability of the banking system to pay 
reasonable interest on deposits is enhanced with the persistence of a large budget 
deficit. Apart from stimulating somewhat the real aggregate demand in the short- 
run, the deficit is thus also a way of providing a safety net for the banking system 
in the long term. In the course of time, the poor quality debt will be a declining 
share of all banking assets, and the significance of the budget deficit for the 
banking sector should consequently also decline. 
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The tax collection problem is in turn inducing the members of parliament 
representing taxpayers (who are the majority of the electorate) to impose an 
inflation tax in favor of other taxes. The reason is that inflation tax, because it 
is difficult to evade, is also paid by those operating in the black economy. 
3.3 The Model 
At this point, it is useful to list four basic assumptions of the model. 
Assumption (i): All of the deficit is financed by bank credit from either 
commercial banks or the Central Bank. In all transition economies, except 
Hungary and China, the sale of government paper to the public, domestic and 
foreign, is in its infancy. Given the low credibility of government policies and 
the lack of attractive alternative assets, these sales are likely to remain low. 
Assumption (ii): Credit provided to the economy (enterprises and households) 
is to grow in real terms at a given rate. This is a side condition which imposes 
a constraint on the size of the budget deficit. The given rate is a policy 
parameter. The crowding out of enterprise credit is admitted if the rate is set to 
be less than the growth rate of the economy. It is implicitly assumed that the 
demand for bank credit by enterprises and households is always sufficient to use 
up the credit supplied. 
Assumption (iii): Real GDP grows at a constant rate and dollar reserves grow 
at another constant rate, both given parameters. After two or three years of 
rapidly falling activity, output in transition economies tends to stabilize for a 
while at a low level and then begins to increase at a moderate growth rate. The 
model is applied at the point when this moderate growth begins to take place. 
Given that this is a medium-term analysis, the budget deficit path is assumed to 
have no impact on the growth path. 
Assumption (iv): The real exchange rate of the US dollar is constant. The US 
dollar is taken to be the reserve currency. Dollar reserves are typically assumed 
to be proportional to imports, and these tend to grow somewhat faster than the 
real GDP. 
S. Gomulka 
Notation: 
Mt broad money, end of period t; 
KI? accumulated credit to government by the Central Bank, end of period t; 
K: accumulated credit to government by commercial banks, end of period t; 
E K2,, accumulated credit to the economy by commercial banks, end of period t; 
net international monetary reserves of the banking system, end of period t; 
nominal exchange rate, average in period t; 
inflation rate in period t; 
effective interest rate on government debt to the Central Bank; 
interest rate on government debt to commercial banks; 
budget deficit as a ratio of nominal GDP in period t; 
budget deficit ratio net of servicing the public debt as a ratio of nominal 
GDP in period t; 
velocity of money circulation in period t. 
Given our assumptions (i) to (iv), the first group of equations of the model is as 
follows: 
In the simulations of the model economy, the time unit chosen is one quarter of 
a year. The one-period lags in (4) and (5) are adopted to ease these simulations. 
Equations (1) and (2) are implied by assumption (iii), equation (4) by assumption 
(iv) and equation (5) by assumption (ii). According to (3), the velocity of 
monetary circulation is changing (falling if y c 0) exponentially. The behavior 
of v during transition is an interesting subject in its own right, and we shall 
discuss it later in the paper. 
The second group of equations is as follows: 
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r,,, = p r2,, where 0 < p 5 1 
r2,, = i t  + 6 where 6 > 0 
M, = p,Y/v, 
Pr = ( l + i , ) ~ , ~  
By (6),  components of the change in broad money are: new net credit to 
government by the banking system, new net credit to the economy by commercial 
banks and the value, in domestic currency, of a change in international reserves. 
This equation follows from the definition of broad money: 
M, = NDA, + e p, 
where NDA, net domestic assets of the banking system, are: 
NDA = total accumulated credits + other net assets 
The change in 'other net assets' equals the valuation adjustment of the net 
international reserves, which is -Aep,.  Hence, 
AM, = A(NDA,) + A(ep,) 
= (net new credits), - (Ae,)R, + (Ae,)R, + e p R ,  
= (net new credits), + epR,,  
which is equation (6) .  
In equation (l), new credit to the government by the Central Bank, AKIG, 
and the value of a change in reserves, e m ,  are taken to be a proxy for a change 
in the base money of the banking system. The volume of new credit expansion 
by commercial banks is assumed to be proportional to the amount of that new 
base money. 
54 S. Gomulka 
These two equations, 6 and 7, may be solved in terms of AKIG and AKZG, 
giving this result: 
From (14) it follows that 1+ P is the money multiplier in this model. The left- 
hand side of (8) is the magnitude of the deficit financing required to pay for the 
cost of servicing the public debt and the purchase of goods and services, which 
is the right-hand side of (8). The operational deficit variables are d and x,  the 
difference between them reflecting the cost of servicing the debt, as a proportion 
of GDP. 
The effective budgetary cost of deficit financing by the Central Bank is, 
typically, only the resource cost of operating the Bank and printing the money. 
The Treasury may pay the Bank the same high interest as it does for commercial 
credit. Being a 'budgetary unit', however, all its profits should be returned to the 
government. In transition economies, some of the profits of the Central Bank 
may be used to subsidize some of the banks, e.g., those which fell victim of the 
deteriorating financial position of state enterprises or farmers. The interest rate 
rl would in this case also incorporate such hidden subsidies. This rate is still 
typically a small fraction of the commercial rate. 
3.4 Two Types of Simulations 
In version A, inflation path it, t = 1, 2..... is assumed to be given by the policy- 
maker and the model may be used to compute the deficit paths for dt and x,. This 
is a situation where the policy maker has an a priori view about the speed at 
which he wishes to reduce the inflation rate, and all he wants to know is the size 
of the budget deficit in the course of time that is consistent with that view. 
In version B, the policy maker has a view about the budget deficit path and 
seeks to discover the inflation path that would result. 
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Version A Version B 
inflation path given, deficit path implied deficit path given, inflation path implied 
Equations ( I )  to (5) are common in both versions. The forms and sequences 
of the remaining eight equations, (6) to (13), vary as between the version. 
These particular sequences of equations make clear the causality which 
operates in this model. 
In version A, the quantity of money supplied accommodates the given price 
path. This quantity poses a constraint, given changes in international reserves, on 
the amount of credit provided by the Central Bank to finance budget deficit. This 
quantity also limits, for a given amount of commercial credit to the economy,, 
commercial financing for the budget. Available bank financing from both sources 
determine the size of the budget deficit. 
In version B, the targeted budget deficit determines the quantity of money 
required and supplied, given the changes in foreign reserves and the amount of 
new net credit to the economy. This quantity in turn determines the price path, 
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as well as each of the two types of budgetary financing. The latter then 
determines the cost of servicing the public debt. 
In both versions, interest rates are inflation led. The relatively high velocity 
of money circulation observed in transition economies has the effect of 
magnifying the inflationary impact of a given budget deficit. 
3.5 Simulation Results 
As mentioned already, one quarter is taken to be the time unit. The simulations 
run for 40 quarters, and the starting conditions chosen are broadly those 
pertaining to Poland in or, when appropriate, at the end of, quarter 3, 1992. The 
specific magnitudes of the parameters and the initial values of the variables are 
as follows: 
The important parameter specification is that a = g = 0.08. It means that both 
the GDP and the real credit to the economy are assumed to grow at a common 
and constant rate of 0.8% per quarter (3.2% per year). It is also assumed, in all 
simulations presented in Figures 3.1 to 3.10 in Appendix 2, that the velocity of 
money circulation will be constant, as it apparently has been in Poland since mid- 
199 1 (see Figures 3. I1 and 3.12 in Appendix 2). 
In all four simulations of version A of the model, the quarterly inflation rate 
declines ultimately to 1%, but the starting rate varies from 7% in Figure 3.1, 11% 
in Figure 3.2, 16% in Figure 3.3 to 21% in Figure 3.4. The initial inflation rate 
is thus rather high, but the targeted rate of disinflation is assumed to be fairly 
rapid. 
The implied pattern of the deficit path is seen to be similar to the pattern of 
the inflation path. It is interesting that the deficit rate of 8% to 10% of GDP is 
consistent only with the quarterly inflation rate of some 15%. If the deficit rate 
is held at 10% throughout (Figure 3.9), the inflation rate would stabilize at about 
17% per quarter (about 87% per year). This balanced inflation rate is nearly 
proportional to the balanced deficit rate. This result rests on the stability of the 
velocity of money. When the deficit rate is held at 20% of GDP, the inflation 
rate stabilizes at about 35% per quarter (about 232% per year) (Figure 3.10). 
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In Poland, the budget deficit of the general government already reached 5.6% 
of GDP in 1991 (Table 3.1). It was estimated that if no new fiscal and 
expenditure measures were taken, it would reach 8% of GDP in 1992 and about 
10% in 1993. Based on the simulation results, Poland's economic authorities 
were advised that, again in the absence of new measures, the annual (December 
to December) inflation rate would progressively increase, assuming that the 
necessary monetary expansion by the Central Bank to finance the deficit would 
be forthcoming, from 45-50% in 1992 to about 50-60% in the first half of 1993 
and to about 80-100% in the second half. 
To maintain credibility of its macroeconomic policy, the Polish Government 
decided to set the size of the budget deficit in 1993 at a level which would ensure 
that, at least, the annual inflation rate does not increase above the 40% level. The 
level has thus obtained the significance of a critical policy choice. 
Simulations of version B of the model proved useful in discovering this 
critical size of the budget deficit. The results are displayed in Figures 3.5 to 3.8. 
In all four runs the deficit rate is assumed to decline in a step-wise manner to 0%, 
by 1% annually, starting from a level that varies from 3% to 9% of GDP. This 
exercise identified the critical size of the budget deficit in Poland, in the period 
from quarter 4 in 1992 to quarter 4 in 1993, to be about 5% of GDP. The 'new 
fiscal measures' were subsequently proposed to and approved by parliament to 
ensure this outcome for 1993. 
3.6 Theoretical Controversies 
The re-emerging budget deficit problem and an on-going debate about the best 
ways of responding to it have rekindled the earlier controversy about the causes 
of recessions in transition economies. 
Kornai (1993) calls the post-communist recession a "unique phenomenon: 
transformational recession" (page 2). He sums up the results of his research team 
in Hungary by saying that its six main causes "reflect the fundamental changes 
required in attitudes and behavior to achieve an altered economic structure" (page 
2). These causes are: shift from a sellers' to a buyers' market; contraction of 
investment; shift in the composition of output; shift in the composition of foreign 
trade; disruption of coordination; and, enforcement of financial discipline. In his 
view: "restructuring the (post-communist) economy is not simply a Keynesian 
type problem, to be solved by boosting aggregate demand. It includes the 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. ... If the pace of creation is slower 
than the process of destruction, if new capacities satisfying new demands cannot 
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counterbalance the rapid liquidation of obsolete capacities, the net result is 
recession" (page 3). 
With this diagnosis Kornai joins those economists who have argued all along 
that various transition related shocks, in particular price liberalization and the 
collapse of intra-CMEA trade, have sharply changed the product composition of 
demand, rendering a significant segment of the existing capacities not useful any 
more (Gomulka, 1989, 1991, 1992; Dqbrowski, 1992; Kastberg, 1991; Lane, 
1991; Siebert, 1991). Some of the capacities may become useful later, but this 
restructuring would require time, investment, financial resources, and some 
retraining of the labor force. In the meantime the aggregate level of real demand, 
given free prices, falls automatically to the reduced level of real aggregate supply. 
Any attempt to reflate the economy, unless directed at specific sectors where there 
is a surplus capacity, would increase prices or imports rather than outputs. 
A different view of the transformation recession, one inspired by the 
Keynesian-Kaleckian theory, is articulated well and in a spirited way, by Amit 
Bhaduri and Kazimierz taski  (1992). They note that the 'paradox of thrift' is 
nowadays often forgotten and that "some multilaterate institutions recommend 
indiscriminately austerity, especially in government spending, both for developing 
countries in balance of payment difficulties and for the former command 
economies trying to make a transition to the market system". In their view "the 
economic disaster of pursuing the orthodox remedy of 'austerity only' is now far 
too apparent in East Europe ... By restricting demand in almost every possible 
way - through an extremely tight money policy, reduced government 
expenditure in an attempt to reduce budget deficit, and restraint on wage - these 
economies have been precipitated in an economic depression which can be 
compared only with the Great Depression of the 1930s in the capitalist world" 
(page 5). They continue to remind us that "several democracies could not survive 
that economic debacle", and warn that " ... it will be unwarranted optimism to 
believe that all the fragile democracies of Eastern Europe can survive an 
economic depression of this magnitude, if it lasts much longer" and, quote: 
"Those who do not remember history, are condemned to repeat it" (page 5). 
In a recently published assessment (Portes, 1993), Mario Nuti and Richard 
Portes regard the fall in output as a big puzzle for which they themselves have 
no explanation. However, they reject the 'J-curve hypothesis' and insist that we 
are not observing Schumpeterian 'creative destruction' (too little innovation, 
investment and competition) and, instead of a J-curve, we observe a L-curve. 
They also argue that policies were too tight in (former) Czechoslovakia and, 
initially, in Poland. But they find it difficult to explain an equally deep recession 
in Hungary or much deeper recessions in Bulgaria, Romania and most republics 
of the Former Soviet Union where policies have not been tight. (This difficulty 
would also be encountered by Keynesians). They appear to be in favor of modest 
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budget deficits but, in contrast to orthodox Keynesians, do recognize the existence 
of a widespread fiscal crisis and advocate strong actions to reduce large budget 
deficits. 
In these discussions it is important not to overlook that during the Great 
Depression prices were falling, there were no dramatic shocks in the composition 
of demand nor in the institutional and ownership arrangements, and real interest 
rates were very high. Transition economies, apart from deep recession, 
experience also high inflation and low levels of savings and investment. In these 
circumstances the authorities should try to formulate their state budgets to be anti- 
inflationary, anti-recessionary, and promoting long-term development. In Poland 
and the other transition countries, perhaps with the exception of Hungary, the high 
budget deficit is the main source of high inflation. Moreover, by keeping interest 
rates high, the deficit discourages private investment, particularly in housing, so 
it is prorecessionary in this respect. It also prompts authorities to reduce 
government expenditure on infrastructure, research, labor retraining and other 
development promoting activities, rather than reduce current expenditure on public 
consumption. 
3.7 Policy Responses 
The primary purpose of fiscal policy during economic transition should therefore 
be, I maintain, to achieve large and enduring reduction in public dissaving, 
thereby controlling a major source of current inflation, reducing the interest rate, 
freeing the credit and saving required for enterprise sector growth, and protecting 
the external balance. 
Given this purpose, two key questions for reform governments are the 
following: what specific measures should be taken in order to contain and reduce 
budget deficit and how to achieve parliamentary approval of the measures as well 
as some support by the general public. While economic and social considerations 
influence the answer to the first question political considerations underly the 
answer to the second question. 
The package of policy measures designed by the Polish reformers in the later 
part of 1992 for implementation in 1993, represented some 6% of the GDP 
expected in 1993. The size of the package was the first crucial decision. This 
decision, as explained earlier in the paper, was motivated by the desire to keep 
the inflation rate below 40%, that is somewhat lower than in 1992. The second 
crucial decision concerned the composition of the package in terms of increased 
taxes and reduced expenditures. This composition was as follows (the effect of 
the policy measure in terms of % of GDP is given in parentheses): 
S. Gomulka 
Revenue to be increased by 3.2% of GDP: 
(i) An increase in excise duties and the statutory turnover tax rates (1.5%); 
(ii) A temporary (two-year) import surcharge of 6% (0.9%); 
(iii) Freezing personal income tax brackets (0.5%); 
(iv) Freezing the depreciation allowance for investments made before 1990 
(0.3%). 
Expenditures to be reduced by about 2.5 to 3% of GDP: 
(v) Reducing the ratio of pensions to the average wage by 9% (1.5% on an 
annual basis, about 1% in 1993); 
(vi) Reducing wage bill allocations in real terms in the budgetary sphere 
(0.7%); 
(vii) Reducing current non-wage expenditure in the budgetary sphere (0.8%). 
The package above affected everyone, but its composition was designed to 
distribute the pain in a manner that had a chance of being seen in parliament and 
by the public as fair. There was also the question of opportunity costs associated 
with the inflation tax, higher interest rates, and lower attractiveness of Poland to 
foreign investors - that could have been incurred in the absence of the package; 
or alternative costs if other measures were taken instead. 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
In transition economies high budget deficits represent a double threat: they use 
scarce private savings to finance (public) consumption rather than (public or 
private) investment and they keep inflation and interest rates very high. They 
have also the ability to (re-)produce the situation of a (near) hyperinflation quite 
rapidly. 
We have, in this paper, identified two major reasons behind the potentially 
large inflationary impact of a given budget deficit, both characteristic for most 
transition economies. They are: (1) that the deficit is financed almost exclusively 
by monetary expansion rather than external or internal borrowing, or the sale of 
state assets, and (2) that the velocity of money circulation is typically 
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exceptionally high, translating a given monetary expansion into an unusually large 
price increase. 
To reduce the threat of a public finance crisis, it is important to act quickly 
to reduce the dependence of the revenue side on enterprise profits. However, 
even more important is to reduce substantially subsidies to enterprises and ensure 
that various indexation rules do not lead to an unsustainable increase of pensions 
and other social benefits in relation to wages. 
The simulation results of this paper depend on a number of parameters, some 
of them technical, others representing policy choices. The primary aim of the 
paper was to show that these results and the underlying model can be a useful 
tool to a policy-maker who wishes to identify medium term implications of these 
policy choices, above all the choice of a budget deficit path, on inflation, public 
debt and interest rates. 
Appendix 1: The Velocity of Money Circulation 
The movements of this key monetary variable in Poland are shown in Figures 
3.11 and 3.12. There are, in fact, two velocities shown in Figure 3.11, pertaining 
to two categories of money. Velocity denoted by vl pertains to domestic money, 
both currency and deposits, while v2 is the velocity of total money, which 
includes in addition to domestic money, foreign currency deposits of households 
and enterprises held in banks operating in Poland. 
To arrive at v, and v2 for each month, first monthly nominal GDPs were 
estimated, and these were annualized by multiplying them by 12. Monthly 
nominal GDPs were estimated with the help of the assumption that the flow of 
real GDP had been constant within each year and the fact that the sum of nominal 
monthly GDPs for each year must equal the officially reported annual nominal 
GDP. The consumer price index was used as the GDP deflator. 
Since January 1990 the official exchange rate is about the same as the market 
exchange rate, and this common rate was used to obtain the domestic value of 
foreign currency deposits. For the year 1989, the official exchange rate was used 
to evaluate only enterprise foreign deposits, while the much higher free market 
rate was used to value the households deposits. 
The abnormally high market value of the dollar before the reform depressed 
velocity v2 during that period. Velocity vl, although not affected by this 
abnormality, increased sharply during the period of very high inflation (five 
months before and several months after the big bang of January 2, 1990). As 
inflation subsided, households have started to rebuild their depleted (in real terms) 
zloty deposits. This behavior tended to reduce the ratio of total cash to all - 
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deposits and, consequently, also the velocity of money circulation. However, the 
two velocities have been fairly stable since the middle of 1991. It is this stability 
which underlines my assumption in simulations A and B of the velocity remaining 
constant in the medium-term. 
Appendix 2: Simulations for Poland 1993-2002 
Legend for Figures 3.1-3.10: 
d,, budget deficit (as proportion of GDP) 
- - - - - - - - - - -  x,, net budget deficit (net of interest on public debt) 
_ . _ . _ . _ . _ .  it, inflation rate per quarter 
(A) Quarterly simulations of the relationship between the inflation rate it and 
the deficit rate dt. 
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Figure 3.2 Assumed inflation path it = 0.1(1 .I)-' + 0.01 
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Figure 3.3 Assumed inflation path it = 0.15(1.1)-' + 0.01 
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Figure 3.9 Assumed budget deficit constant at 10% GDP 
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Figure 3.11 Poland's velocities of money circulation 
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Figure 3.12 Poland's velocity of total money circulation in the post-reform 
period 
Note to Figures 3.11 and 3.12 
Figure 3.12 is an enlarged part of a section of v2 shown in Figure 3.11. Both figures take 
into account new (lower) estimates of nominal GDP in 1991 by the Central Statistical 
Office and a new definition of domestic money by the Polish National Bank. 
Source: Author's own estimates. 
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Chapter 4 
The Budget Reform in Czechoslovakia 
and the Czech Republic 
Pave1 Stzpa'nek 
Czech Ministry of Finance, Prague, Czech Republic 
4.1 Introduction 
The budget sphere in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic has undergone 
considerable changes. Its role within overall economic activities has changed 
radically. The purpose of this contribution is to provide an overview of both budget 
developments and fiscal policies in the early stages of the market transition in the 
Czechoslovakian Federation starting in 1990 and extending until 1993. The 
conclusion contains a first draft of possible lessons, that might be drawn from the 
budget developments during this period. 
4.2 Budget Changes, 1990 to 1992 
In many respects, 1990 was a preparatory year. The major reform measures were 
to be introduced in early 1991 and it was necessary to take various steps in advance 
to prepare for this situation. Basically, the preparatory steps consisted of stabilizing 
the macroeconomic framework while eliminating some of the already major 
systemic distortions. The state budget was designed to play an important role. 
Accordingly, some budget management defects were removed in tlie course of 
1990: the so-called 'negative turnover tax' for food stuffs, for example, was 
abolished in July 1990. The simultaneous introduction of state contributions 
compensated the citizens for the increase in prices of basic food stuffs. The impact 
of this policy was, therefore, neutral for households as well as for the budget. In 
fact, the 1990 budget surplus was higher than expected as a consequence of 
positive development of key revenues with the exception of turnover tax yield. 
The surplus amounted to 7.4 billion CSK, which was 1.5% of the overall budget 
revenue. 
The 1991 budget was again compiled as a restrictive and anti-inflationary one. 
The most important budget management measures included the unification of 
turnover tax rates (initially exceeding 1,500, the number of rates was reduced to 
four - 0%, 12%, 22%, and 32%), a decrease of the enterprise tax burden by 10 
percentage points (to 55%), and the introduction of an import surcharge to protect 
the balance of payments and the domestic market after establishment of internal 
convertibility. The budget recorded a substantial surplus in the first half of the year 
due to the substantial increase of taxes paid by enterprises. The response of 
budgetary expenditures was quite noticeably delayed. At the same time, in a mid- 
course adjustment, turnover tax rates were lowered by approximately 10% and 
the import surcharge was decreased due to a positive development of the balance 
of payments. 
Price liberalization led to a price increase by 25% in January 1991. This price 
jump, however, was absorbed quite quickly in the course of the year and the price 
level stabilized. The impact on budget revenue was strong in the first quarter but 
diminished during the year. Budget outlays showed the opposite development. 
Already in 1991, one could recognize the weakness of the Czechoslovakian 
Federation because both republics could have individually accommodated their 
expenditures to their revenues toward the end of the year. This fact finally resulted 
in a budget deficit of 17.5 billion CSK, or 3.5% of budgetary revenue and 1.8% 
of GDP. The final budget deficit in 1991 as well as the expected deficit for the 
following years could not have been further financed by direct central bank credit 
as used to be the case in the past. Then, the issues of treasury bills and state bonds 
were prepared to finance deficits. 
The budget for 1992 was burdened by the necessity of the reimbursement of 
the 1991 deficit. Nevertheless, it was drawn as a balanced budget. In fact, the 
whole year was marked by a tendency towards negative deviations of budgetary 
revenues in comparison with expected ones. A great number of factors was 
involved, such as overestimated revenues or lower yields of the turnover tax (due 
to growth of the savings ratio, the shift in demand of citizens toward goods with 
lower rates, and an increase in tax evasion). Last, but not least, tax arrears appeared 
for the first time. 
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The Czech government adopted a number of measures (including lower levels 
of some expenditure than initially planned) to prevent the budget from an excessive 
deficit. Due to this fact, the Czech budget resulted in an apparently small deficit 
while the Slovakian budget reached a huge deficit. 
4.3 The Fiscal Restriction 
The issue whether a budget should or should not be of a restrictive nature was 
widely discussed since the reform started and, in some respects, continues to be 
a contentious issue. Under conditions of price liberalization, internal convertibility 
of the Czechoslovakian crown, and foreign trade liberalization, a tight fiscal policy 
accompanied by strict monetary policy, was the only way to enable the launch of 
the economic reform program. In spite of certain negative impacts of the 
restrictions on economic growth, this procedure was the only alternative to prevent 
an inflation spiral that would obviously make the implementation of reform 
measures more difficult. If assessed according to macroeconomic aggregates, the 
results of Czechoslovakian economic reform from 1990 to 1992 proved the 
legitimacy of this approach (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Budget RevenueIGDP Ratio (bln. CSK) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
(A) Budget Revenue 415.4 463.1 505.5 540.0 
(B) GDP 758.7 81 1.3 977.8 1009.4 
A a s a % o f B  54.7 57.0 51.6 53.5 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance. 
If the budget surplus were the sole factor in determining a restrictive orientation, 
then only 1990 was characterized by truly tight budget constraints in 
Czechoslovakia. Should a decrease in the expected tax revenue be identified as 
determinant, one can see that such a decrease did not materialize either. However, 
these synthetic indicators exhibit insufficient explanatory power for an economy 
in transition. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze both the revenue and the 
expenditure sides as well as the budget incidence of their changes. 
4.4 State Budget Revenue Developments 
Between 1990 and 1992 
Before 1989, state budget revenue heavily depended on levies paid by enterprises 
and on turnover tax; taxes paid by households represented only a small portion 
of budget revenue. These proportions were maintained over the entire period 
analyzed in spite of the fact that a process of gradual reduction of the corporate 
tax burden had been initiated already in 1990. A more uniform tax approach to 
all types of corporate tax payers was adopted simultaneously, and the weight of 
indirect taxation increased slightly (refer to Table 4.2). 
The overall tax burden of households measured especially by the individual 
income tax remained roughly the same during the whole period (see Table 4.3). 
The changes adopted in this period were oriented toward unification of the tax 
treatment of similar economic activities. Major changes were postponed until the 
tax reform scheduled for 1993. At that time, small and medium sized businesses 
Table 4.2 Budget Revenue Development (bln. CSK) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total Revenue 415.4 463.1 505.5 540.0 
Tax Revenue 378.3 422.8 477.1 467.0 
Direct Taxes 293.3 304.6 342.3 325.0 
Individuals 60.7 62.9 77.1 77.0 
Corporations 232.7 24 1.7 265.2 248.0 
Indirect Taxes 85.0 118.1 134.8 142.0 
Non-tax Revenue 37.1 40.3 28.5 73.0 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance. 
Table 4.3 Budget Revenue Development (in %) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total Revenue 
Tax Revenue 
Direct Taxes 
Individuals 
Corporations 
Indirect Taxes 
Non-tax Revenue 
-- ~ ~- 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance. 
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were given preferential treatment in the form of lower tax rates, tax relief, and 
relatively high flat rate deductions of costs from the tax base. 
The significant change in the share of the non-tax revenue was due mainly 
to additional revenue given to local budgets from various sources. This additional 
revenue for local budgets represented a certain compensation for some of the 
adverse effects of privatization and restitution of the former local property, which 
led to a shift of a part of the revenue from local budgets to the central budget. The 
lost revenue was partly compensated, for instance, from the National Property Fund 
(the fund collecting privatization receipts), by changes in the level of different local 
fees during the year. 
The decline in the corporate income tax yield in 1992 reflected the decrease 
in economic activities in Czechoslovakia as a whole. This tendency was not already 
reflected in the 1991 revenues because of sharp price increases after price 
liberalization in January 1991. Its consequence was an increase in the profit tax 
revenue from corporations. 
4.5 State Budget Expenditure Developments 
Between 1990 and 1992 
Regarding the budget expenditure, there was a relatively substantial decline in 
transfers to enterprises especially since 1991 (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5). The 
reduction of the non-investment part of those transfers was even more acute. In 
this sense, the state budget unambiguously played a restrictive role. This partly 
corresponded to the reduction of the tax burden on enterprises, even if the 
dynamics of both processes were incomparable. The taxation of profits was reduced 
between 1989 and 1992 by some 20 percentage points. Besides the reduction of 
transfers to enterprises, a change of their structure was initiated. Before 1990, there 
were no fixed rules for corporate taxes. The corporate tax system was a 
nontransparent mixture of 'aid' to troubled enterprises and expropriation of profits 
from profitable ones. Since 1990, this approach was gradually oriented toward 
specifically targeted projects, especially concerning conversion of the armament 
industry and the compensation for negative effects of price control in the remaining 
spheres with regulated prices (for instance, energy, urban transportation, and rents). 
The most important element of transfers to households was represented by 
social security benefits. These included the compensation benefits for negative 
turnover tax removal. Initially, compensation was given in the form of general 
income support, while later only selected categories of households were eligible 
to receive benefits. Some adjustments of the pensions and other social benefits for 
inflation were made in connection with the price developments. A new social 
Table 4.4 Budget Expenditure Development (bln. CSK) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
- - 
Total Expenditures 
Transfers to Enterprises 
Investment 
Non-investment 
Transfers to Households 
Public Consumption 
Investment 
Non-investment 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance. 
Table 4.5 Budget Expenditure Development (in %) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
Total Expenditures 
Transfers to Enterprises 
Investment 
Non-investment 
Transfers to Households 
Public Consumption 
Investment 
Non-investment 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance. 
security item appeared in the form of unemployment benefits, which were 
particularly excessive in Slovakia. Gradually, active employment policies (new job 
creation and re-training programs) with consequent budget expenditures became 
more important. Considerable amounts of budget funds were allocated to create 
an appropriate social security net in order to avoid a profuse decline of the living 
standard of low-income households. 
The most important part of the budget expenditure on public consumption 
is represented by education and health care outlays. It is necessary to remember 
that these services were and still are financed mainly from the budget. The role 
of the private sector was and, in fact, still is only a marginal one.[l] Wholesale 
privatization of the health care system is expected only in 1994-5. 
A part of the expenditure increase revealed in Table 4.4 is due to the price 
developments leading to an increase not only of material costs but also to an 
increase of wages which were traditionally low in these sectors. Generally, the 
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expenditure increase allowed for only maintenance of the real level of these public 
services. There were many changes in the expenditure structure in state 
administration. The analyzed period was marked by shifts of power from the 
federal authorities to those in the republics, resulting in the establishment of new 
ministries on the republic level. New agencies were created in accordance with 
the reform and transformation strategy (anti-monopolistic agencies, labor offices, 
tax offices, and others). 
A major decline of expenditure occurred in defense. It was mostly due to a 
change of the political climate in Europe. In 1990-1991, the obligatory military 
service was shortened from two years to 18 months. By the middle of 1991, the 
last Soviet troops left Czechoslovakian territory. On the other hand, a decline in 
military expenditure led to the decline in the demand for armament industry 
products and to the conversion of military industry. The conversion issue was 
especially difficult in Slovakia where military industries were and still are more 
concentrated than in the Czech Republic. In addition, many changes occurred in 
the expenditures for internal security. The security system started the long process 
of readjustment and the functions of the secret police were redefined. The internal 
security expenditure development was forced to respond to the increase in crime 
which followed the opening of the borders and the liberalization of the living 
conditions in Czechoslovakia. 
As part of the expenditures, special attention should be paid to subsidies to 
agriculture. For several decades, there was a tradition of agricultural production 
in large productive entities legally defined as agricultural cooperatives (created by 
force in the 1950s) or, alternatively, as state farms in Czechoslovakia. Food prices 
were heavily subsidized and the final losses of the producers were compensated 
by the budget through a number of channels. Low prices of food stuffs unavoidably 
led to a relatively substantial over-production and waste in food consumption under 
the former regime. Since 1989 and especially after prices were freed in January 
1991, food consumption actually declined and, consequently, the production also. 
Naturally, this development had negative effects on producers. In addition, foreign 
trade liberalization led to an increase of imported food and food products. 
The system of subsidies was shifted from a differentiated one to a system 
involving a more uniform approach for all producers. In 1991, two Market 
Intervention Funds were established in both the Czech and Slovak Republics, with 
a further one added at the federal level in 1992. Their main purpose was to 
stabilize prices of agricultural products. These Funds have made inte~entional 
purchases on domestic markets to guarantee prices of selected basic agricultural 
products to their producers and, on the other hand, they contribute to the stability 
of basic food prices for consumers by occasional sales of their accumulated stocks. 
The Funds play a major role in foreign trade regulation and in eliminating 
monopolistic practices amongst food producers. 
4.6 Budget Balance, 1990 to 1992 
Prior to 1989, the balance of revenues and expenditures was entirely a formal issue. 
The state budget development in those years should be evaluated together with 
the monetary policies and corporate finance development due to the presence of 
many transfers, open or hidden, among these three sectors. 'Flexible' changes in 
the enterprise tax system and replacement of budget transfers by administrative 
credit allocation facilitated frequent changes in the financing of budget expenditure 
according to immediate needs. Also, some typical budget expenditure (as, for 
example, financing of government credit abroad) was transferred to the banking 
system. By these means, it was almost always possible to reach a balanced budget 
or a budget surplus every year before 1989. These moves, in fact, created no major 
difficulties in reaching the intended targets regardless of the economic development. 
A formally balanced budget or surplus was traditionally a major political goal. As 
a result, distortions of real budget development were enormous. The overall 
position of the government (including the so-called state financial assets and 
liabilities) was distorted as well. Therefore, the development of the state financial 
assets and liabilities only partially reflected the budget results of recent years. 
Another important factor was, for instance, administrative price changes (accounted 
for in the state budget) and other assets and accounting operations. 
Deficit financing commensurate with a market economy only began in 1991. 
As mentioned earlier, the general government budget showed an overall surplus 
of 7.1 billion CSK (0.9% of GDP) in 1990.[2] This included a remarkable central 
government budget surplus (a federal surplus by 4.0 billion CSK, while the Czech 
budget surplus was only 0.2 billion CSK and the Slovakian was in deficit by 0.4 
billion CSK). The surplus of local budgets was 3.3 billion CSK. The total budget 
surplus was used to increase the state financial reserves. 
Although still in surplus by as much as 17.7 billion CSK in the first half of 
1991, the budget finished the year in a deficit position of 10.4 billion CSK or 1.1 % 
of GDP. The separation of budget activities between the federal budget and the 
budgets of the two republics and the subsequent weak influence of the federal 
authorities on republic budget activities as well as on general budget activities as 
a whole played a key role in this dynamic process of budget development. The 
total result of the general budget was a combination of the two national budget 
deficits, and the federal budget and local budgets surpluses; namely, a Czech deficit 
of 13.6 billion CSK and a Slovak deficit of 10.3 billion CSK versus the federal 
surplus of 6.4 billion CSK and the local budgets surplus of 7.1 billion CSK. The 
federal budget surplus was used as compensation for the shortfall of some revenue 
in the republican budgets. By this operation, the Czech budget deficit was reduced 
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to 9.9 billion CSK and the Slovakian to 6.0 billion CSK. These final deficits of 
the republics were to be financed by issuing state bonds (prepared already in 1992). 
By the end 1992, the federal budget recorded an estimated deficit of about 
7 billion CSK. In addition, the federal government made the commitment to solve 
the liquidity issue concerning the Ceskoslovenski obchodni banka, the commercial 
bank that held external assets and liabilities of the Czechoslovakian Federation and 
subsequently of the two independent republics. The federal budget participated in 
this clean-up operation because these liquidity problems were generated by the old 
policies and the centralist decisions made on a non-market basis at the time when 
this bank was acting as an agent of the federal state. 
The Czech state budget was in deficit by 1.7 billion CSK in 1992. The deficit 
of the Slovak Republic reached 7.9 billion CSK the same year. The surplus of the 
local budgets represented 8.6 billion CSK. All together, the total deficit of the 
Czechoslovakian general budget was 8.0 billion CSK, or 0.8% of GDP in 1992. 
The net credit to government was to cover the deficit of the state budgets 
including the local budgets, the development of state financial assets and liabilities, 
and extra-budgetary funds including again local funds. This credit increased 
considerably from 5.9 billion CSK at the beginning of 1990 (equivalent to 1% of 
the domestic credit) to 40.5 billion CSK in October 1992 (4.8% of the domestic 
credit). As shown in Table 4.6, the development of the net credit to govemment 
was very irregular during this period - by the end of 1990, it already reached 
54.2 billion CSK and fell, but fluctuated, thereafter. 
Net credit to government was influenced by a number of factors which were 
not immediately connected with economic developments during the years studied 
in this paper; rather, these factors can be derived from the elimination of the 
distortions in the relationship between the govemment and the banking system in 
the previous years, and from distortions of the exchange rate. A substantial increase 
of net credit to government in 1990 was a result of financial operations regarding 
state assets and liabilities: these included the take-over of government credits 
abroad by the federal government, dealing with the impact of the major exchange 
rate changes in the economy, and the shift of foreign trade financing with countries 
Table 4.6 Domestic Credit and Net Credit to Government (bin. CSK) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 
31 Dec 31 Dec 31 Dec 31 Dec 
(A) Domestic Credit 583.6 640.2 749.1 847.0 
(B) Net Credit to GVT' 5.9 54.2 36.8 40.5 
(B) as a % of (A) 1 .O 8.5 4.9 4.8 
Including EC, WB, and G24 loans to government. 
Source: Monetary Survey, State Bank of Czechoslovakia, Czech Ministry of Finance. 
of the former CMEA from transferable rubles to hard currencies. In comparison 
with these operations, the result of prevailing budgets played just a minor role. 
The State Bank Act, which set limits on budget deficit financing, was 
introduced in 1992. As of February of that year, direct credit financing of the 
budget deficit was prohibited by law with one exception - a technical credit to 
cover the time lag between expenditure payments and revenue accrual was 
permitted but was not to exceed 5% of the current budgetary revenue. Therefore, 
1992 was the first year in which the state participated in the emerging 
Czechoslovakian money and capital markets. The development of the net credit 
to the government was no longer influenced by non-standard operations with state 
financial assets and liabilities. Thus, the credit reflected mostly the prevailing 
economic activities and the 1991 budget deficit. 
State bonds were issued in the total amount of 13 billion CSK for the first 
time in 1992. The revenue of this issue was designed to finance the state housing 
under construction. From February 1992, the three finance ministries issued 
treasury bills on a regular basis. In all, 42 issuances of treasury bills were made 
during the year. The treasury bills issued ranged from 1 to 11 billion CSK and 
their maturity varied from 5 to 91 days. Most of the issues were placed through 
auctions, but nine issues were bought directly by the Central Bank at a fixed price. 
Compared with interest rates on inter-bank markets, the interest rates on treasury 
bills recorded much more variation in the course of the year - they were below 
as well as above the market rate which varied between 11.05% and 11.92%. 
The federal and Czech treasury bills were placed without any problems; in 
all cases the entire volume was sold. Some problems were recorded in Slovakia 
by the end of the year despite the relatively high interest rate applied. These 
problems were caused by a lack of resources in the Slovakian commercial banks 
(due mainly to the lower saving rate in Slovakia) and by a lack of interest on the 
part of the Czech banks to invest in Slovakia. One auction had to be even canceled 
in Slovakia. Issues of the treasury bills in Czechoslovakia were organized under 
the conditions corresponding to the earliest emergence of the financial market. The 
number of participants was restricted; in fact, mainly commercial banks and two 
insurance companies took part. 
A similar situation occurred when issuing the state bonds in both republics. 
Again, there were problems only in Slovakia. The Czech Republic issued state 
bonds at a nominal price of 8.7 billion CSK in two portions (in May and August) 
with a maturity of 2 and 3 years. The interest rate was offered at 15%. The issue 
was successful; the selling price for the entire issue was higher than the nominal 
one. The Slovak issue was divided into three portions (in May, July, and 
September) with a maturity of 5 years each. The interest rate was offered at 8%, 
but the complete issue was not sold. The revenue from these bond issues was used 
to finance the state housing programs in both republics. 
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4.7 Budget Strategy for 1993 
For the first time, the budget for 1993 was prepared as a budget for the 
independent Czech Republic. In the process of its preparation, some 1992 data for 
the Czech Republic was additionally considered in order to enable a comparison 
with the 1993 budget. Of course, the actual merit of conducting the comparison 
of some data was questionable not only because the economy was engaged in a 
transformation process but the budget itself had undergone substantial changes. 
These changes also marked the 'value' of available statistical data. 
In spite of a rather mild budget deficit in 1992, the Czech Republic entered 
1993 with a debt that did not follow from concurrent budget management. The 
Czech budget 'inherited' a proportionate part of the federal budget deficit which 
was 9.5 billion CSK. The other part of the inherited deficit originated from the 
Czech Republic's obligation which followed from the consolidation of the balance 
of the Czechoslovakian State Bank. 
The 1993 budget development was primarily influenced by the tax reform 
introduced in January. The changes represented a fundamental transformation of 
the tax system: almost all taxes were altered in some manner. The tax reform also 
caused a shift of the funding for health care, social care, and unemployment 
benefits to no longer flow directly from the budget but to be financed by special 
funds. Three such funds were founded - Social Care Fund, Health Care Fund, 
and Fund for Employment. Throughout 1993, two of these funds - Social Care 
Fund and Employment Fund - were still operated within the budget due to special 
contributions paid by employers and employees. The Health Care Fund was the 
only one separated from the state budget that year (see Table 4.7). The state budget 
Table 4.7 The Overall Budget of the Czech Republic (bln. CSK) 
1992l 1993 
Revenue 
State Budget 
Local Budgets 
Health Insurance 
Expenditures 
State Budget 
Local Budgets 
Health Insurance 
Estimates adjusted for budget structure in 1993. 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance. 
continued to be involved in this Fund through contributions on behalf of people 
who were not employed for various reasons (women looking after small children, 
pensioners, jobless people, soldiers, and so on). 
The estimated nominal GDP of the Czech Republic was 738.3 billion CSK 
in 1992 and 870.0 billion CSK by 1993. The share of budget revenue in GDP 
should decrease from 50.0% to 48.1%. This decrease is due to the decline of the 
overall tax burden. The decrease in local budgets' revenues for 1993 was due to 
the fact that these had received additional revenues in 1992 (see Table 4.7). 
Revenue losses were partially compensated with receipts from privatization and 
other additional revenues connected with new functions (for example, for the 
establishment of trade agencies). Local budgets received the yield from state bonds 
for state housing under construction. 
The composition of revenue and expenditure also changed (see Table 4.8). 
Apart from the impacts of the tax reform and the establishment of the Health Care 
Table 4.8 Structure of Budget Revenue and Expenditure (bln. CSK) 
1992' share 1993 share 
% % 
Total Revenue 
Tax Revenue 
Indirect Taxes and Tariffs 
Income Taxes 
Individuals 
Corporations 
Other Taxes 
Payroll tax 
Nontax Revenue 
Social Security Contributions 
Health Insurance Contributions 
Total Expenditure 
Transfers to Households 
Transfers to Enterprises 
Current Exp. of Public Sector 
Public Sector Investment 
Government Loans 
Debt Service 
' Estimates adjusted for budget strucuture in 1993. 
Only a limited number of people were obliged to pay these contributions in 1992. 
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance. 
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Fund, a local budget reform was also introduced. Local budget revenues consisted 
of the yield from property tax and individual income tax, administrative and local 
fees, and revenue from sale and lease of local property. Earmarked subsidies 
included: a contribution to state administration functions carried by local 
governments, a compensation for local governments' social benefits, as well as 
specific subsidies to ensure a standard level of education and health care services 
throughout the country. The reasoning for general subsidies was to equalize 
outstanding differences in local government revenue across the country and the 
differences between 1992 and 1993. Local governments were obliged to utilize 
bank credit and bond issues. 
Table 4.8 depicts the structure of budget revenue and expenditure in 1992 and 
1993 - before and after the cessation of the existence of the former 
Czechoslovakia. Despite efforts to make the statistics fully comparable, some 
discrepancies still exist; the general interpretation, though, remains unaffected. The 
tax reform brought about an increase in the share of indirect tax due to the 
introduction of value-added tax (VAT). The new VAT, based on rates of 5% and 
23%, extended the tax base. Apart from VAT, excise taxes on fuel, tobacco 
products, spirits, beer, and wine were included among the indirect taxes, too. 
Simultaneously, there was a decrease in the corporate income tax rate which was 
considered to aid corporate sector development. The reduction was also in response 
to the previously high tax burden on enterprises. The decrease in the share of 
individual income tax in total tax revenue was linked to the establishment of the 
Health Care Fund. Until 1992 contributions for health care were a part of the 
individual income tax as well as part of the corporate taxes. 
Within budget expenditures, there was a further increase of transfers to 
households reflecting the social security benefit adjustment for inflation, 
amplification of the social safety net, an expected increase in unemployment, and 
still other aspects. Pensions and other social security benefits represent, by far, the 
most significant item within the group of transfers to citizens (60.3% and 21.8% 
respectively). 
The decline in the share of transfers to enterprises corresponded to the 
continuing process of limiting state paternalism and the concurrent progress in 
privatization. On the other hand, growing outlays for private sector support were 
involved in these transfers: among others, these included subsidies to 
Ceskomoravskii ziiruEni a rozvojovii banka (The Czech-Moravian Guarantee and 
Development Bank) and Exportni, garanEni a pojiSrovaci spoleEnost (The Institution 
for Export, Guarantees and Insurance). The primary objective of these two 
institutions was to provide the private sector with credit under more positive 
conditions than granted by other financial institutions, as well as to guarantee and 
insure credit for export. 
Current public sector expenditures increased in the 1993 budget. The reason 
has already been mentioned - the most dynamic item was the outlay connected 
with the establishment of the Health Care Fund. The outlays for education were 
increased as well, but to a lesser extent. A part of this increase might be explained 
by the new system of financing health and social care in which organizations 
providing educational services will pay contributions to these funds for the first 
time in 1993. Finally, the Czech government's willingness to accept a proportionate 
part of the former federal government loans (in 1992 partly financed by federal 
financial assets) caused a direct increase of government loans. 
4.7 Lessons and Conclusions 
It is very likely that the Czechoslovakian budget experience, while slightly different 
than that of other East European countries (especially in quantitative terms such 
as the size of budget deficits), has numerous similar aspects. This permits lessons 
to be drawn and some general recommendations regarding economies in transition, 
particularly those still in earlier phases, to be made. 
The first lesson relates to the stabilization phase of the reform. In very early 
stages, merciless liberalization as well as stabilization policies must be followed. 
Experience shows (though not only from the former CSFR), that the budget 
situation tends to improve in this initial period; yet, the explanation can be only 
partially captured by explicit fiscal targets. The sources of this initial budget 
improvement were connected with the initial price escalation and the currency 
devaluation. The liberalization of prices (accompanied by restrictive stabilization 
policies) eliminated the formerly hidden monetary overhang linked to the decline 
of labor costs in the corporate sector (a consequence of the decline in real wages). 
The devaluation effected an increase of profits for exporters. Both factors led to 
a dramatic improvement of the financial position of enterprises with positive effects 
on budget revenue. This improvement, in fact, occurred at the moment of the 
output decline. The factors leading to this budget situation were clearly of a short- 
time nature. It is, therefore, extremely important to properly evaluate the size of 
this initial positive impulse and not to overestimate it since the latter may cause 
the fiscal policy reaction to be inappropriate (i.e., the output decline eliminates 
profitability, the gradual increase of real wages increases costs and reduces profits, 
etc.). The Czechoslovakian experience documented this risk in the form of a mid- 
course budget policy adjustment in 1991 that was probably an overcorrection and 
responsible for the deficit at the end of the year. In 1993, a similar mistake was 
already avoided. 
The second lesson is that the initial restrictive orientation of fiscal policies 
does not necessarily extend beyond the short-term horizon and it may be even 
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undesirable under certain circumstances. These include the need for the policy mix 
of fiscal and monetary policies to be coordinated, macroeconomic stabilization 
policy development hand in hand with a merciless institutional (systemic) reform, 
focusing the core of structural transformation on the microeconomic level, and so 
forth. If all of these conditions are in place, it is not necessary to maintain a 
restrictive pace of the fiscal policy for an undetermined period, but for the initial 
phase only. Otherwise, there would be a strong case to believe that developing such 
restrictive policies would have undesirable and counter-productive consequences 
on output. 
This said, we are convinced that the budget is not an appropriate tool of 
supply-side management. Therefore, abandoning the restrictive character of fiscal 
policies in the transition time does not imply that we advocate the concept of 
expansionary fiscal policy (with fiscal deficits and so on). The experience of the 
Czech (and Czechoslovakian) fiscal authorities reveal that the most suitable concept 
is that of fiscal neutrality (neutrality in terms of demandlsupply management on 
aggregate levels, but not on the structural level). This target is not easily achieved 
given the fact that fundamental changes occur in the economic and fiscal 
framework over time (GDPItax base declines, tax reforms with changes in the 
structure of taxes and the tax rates, structural changes of the expenditure side of 
the budget, and others). 
The third lesson is that the fiscal reform itself follows a certain scenario, 
which is largely predetermined by the transition framework. For instance, one of 
the first steps is a massive reduction of government subsidies to enterprises, 
connected on the one hand with price liberalization and, on the other, with the 
gradual lowering of corporate taxes. At the same time, new items in transfers to 
households appear as unemployment benefits, compensation benefits to the low- 
income categories of people, and so forth. 
The tax reform is a crucial factor of fiscal strategy. At the earliest possible 
occasion, it is fundamental to create a neutral tax structure that can eliminate all 
the distortions of the old tax system and old tax policy (i.e., individual approach 
to taxpayers, avoidance of inappropriate social functions of taxes, and differentiated 
categories of taxpayers by source of income). These changes are unavoidable and 
should be made with as little hesitation as possible. The accompanying fundamental 
change in the structure of taxes (in light of harmonization with EC standards, 
especially with the introduction of the VAT) can occur later since it is not really 
a precondition for the development of a market environment. 
The fourth lesson is drawn from the solution to the puzzle of the following 
issues: reduction of the size of the budget (the budget/GDP ratio), maintenance 
of a balanced budget, continuity of the social functions of the budget, and the 
strategy of shifting the decisive responsibility for social welfare from the budget 
to individuals. A successful achievement of these multiple objectives ban only be 
achieved with a major reform of the social security, health and social insurance 
systems. This promises to be the most difficult task of fiscal authorities during the 
transition and is far from being successfully resolved. In an effort to increase the 
role of the individual decision on levels of benefits as well as decisive participation 
in financing the costs of those future benefits, the issue of reforming the social 
security, health and social insurance systems will not be successfully solved if not 
accompanied by efficient income policies vis-ri-vis households. 
A further related set of problems is associated with improving the efficiency 
of government public expenditure and consumption. In the past, a significant 
feature of public expenditure was a tremendous extent of budget resources, which 
was the function of at least two factors. The first was the anonymous nature of 
government money and the second consisted of technical deficiencies in the 
control of allocation and efficiency of public spending. Incidentally, this part of 
fiscal strategy in the economies in transition resemble problems of fiscal authorities 
in most other countries, the developed market economies included. In finding 
schemes to increase the efficiency, we suggest the shift from the so-called 'demand 
principle' of spending to one by which ministries base financing on integral 
medium-term programs. These programs should reflect the society's preferences 
for a certain period as well as contribute to more effective resource allocation and 
a greater effectiveness of the public sector as a whole. 
The fifth lesson relates to the issue of balancing the budget. It has been argued 
that a balanced budget is inappropriate as soon as the stabilization issue has been 
properly solved and the budget should then play a more active role via deficit 
financing. Universal agreement is still outstanding regarding this issue, and we are 
not convinced that state bureaucrats are able to make better strategic structural 
decisions than private investors. The main concern about the hypothetical fiscal 
deficit lies in the difficulties associated with financing such an increasing burden 
and the unavoidable crowding-out effect it produces (opinions that the budget 
deficit has no crowding-out effect, but rather a crowding-in effect are just 
speculation). Furthermore, the transition countries are still not fully opened vis-ri-vis 
the rest of the world, which gives them more autonomy in their decision-making 
(for instance, in the area of monetary policy), but also sets some limits on the use 
of various instruments of macroeconomic policy. This is of only minor concern 
as long as the country does not have to face the situation of a massive inflow of 
foreign capital. Fortunately, the Czech Republic is now in a situation in which such 
capital arrives, but at the cost of the central bank's efforts to combat the monetary 
risks of a suddenly increased money supply. In this context, even fiscal policy can 
not remain neutral since the development of the net credit to government has a 
tremendous effect on monetary aggregates. 
The final lesson of this exposition once again encompasses a mixture of 
problems; including, the allocation of privatization receipts, the budget/GDP ratio, 
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and the domestic debt. At the beginning of the reform, it has been argued correctly 
that the privatization revenue should remain outside the budget. The main reason 
was an apprehension about adding the privatization revenue to the current budget 
due to the potentially counter-productive effect on fiscal restriction and the 
aggregate demand management. Therefore, the money was frozen on separate 
accounts and its use was severely limited. These symptoms implied that the main 
argument was a macroeconomic one. Now that stabilization has been successfully 
achieved, the state budget appears to be in an increasingly explicit asymmetric 
position. On the one hand, the capital revenue of the state is not part of the state 
budget and, on the other, most of the capital expenditure items are carried outside 
the state budget; thus, the current budget revenue is being used not only to cover 
the current expenditure, but also the capital one. It is consequently completely 
appropriate to consolidate the balance of the state budget with that of the National 
Property Fund (which is managing the privatization program). In proceeding in 
this manner, it is essential to be aware of the specific character of the privatization 
receipts, which are a typical capital revenue, but only temporary. Decisions 
concerning the use of this revenue should be of paramount importance. As a result, 
it would be most suitable to utilize the money, for instance, to resolve some legacy 
inherited from the past (distortions in balances of financial institutions, ecological 
damages, domestic debt service, specific projects to improve the infrastructure, and 
the like). Such problems are related, in one way or another, to past decisions of 
the formerly centrally planned state and represent possibly the last obstacle to the 
successful establishment of a market economy in a country in transition. 
Notes 
[ I ]  Already in 1990, the first private schools appeared. Despite a rapid development of 
these activities, they remain a minority. Private schools obtain 90% of the level of 
subsidies allocated to public schools. 
[2] The data on budget results are given according to the former Czechoslovakian ( ~ s F R )  
methodology which corresponds to the decision-making process. Thus, the results 
differ from the statistics of the International Monetary Fund. 
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Chapter 5 
Monetary Equilibrium and the 
Polish Economic Transformation 
Andrzej Sopocko 
Institute of Finance, Warsaw, Poland 
5.1 Introduction 
The experiences of transition economies reveal the lack of a good theoretical model 
regarding the role of monetary policy for the transformation from central planning 
to a market system. There is enough evidence that the conventional measures used 
to stabilize the traditional market economy are not suitable. Decades of centralized 
rule molded the economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe in a manner 
which prevents the mechanical implementation of all significant elements copied 
from developed Western economies. The radical transformation of a centrally 
planned system shaped a unique kind of an economy. However, it could not last 
because the deficiencies of its non-standard features lead to significant negative 
results. 
5.2 The Structural Reasons for Hyperinflation 
In order to present some features of the transition economy alluded to above, let 
us begin with the basic monetary equation PQ = MV. That the left side represents 
the nominal value of total production is well-known, but could be distorted if taken 
as an explanation of the hyperinflation mechanism. The rising price level (P) would 
be the foundation for such reasoning. In transforming economies, rising prices 
become a built-in factor which perpetuates further increases. This factor possesses 
a very profound influence and is, in fact, indirectly induced by the efforts taken 
to rectify price distortions inherited from the past. At this stage, there does not 
appear to be a possibility to change relative prices by means of disinflation. 
Rather, a general price increase is advisable, the larger the relative price distortions, 
the higher should be the price increase and the longer should be the duration of 
this process. These are the principles of what is referred to as 'correction 
inflation'. In comparison to developed countries, the extent of correction inflation 
in transition economies is extremely high. The relationship between inflation and 
the dynamic price structure has become 'over-proportional'. If we take any 
indicator to measure the dynamics of the price structure and the rate of inflation, 
the relationship between these two numbers would have an exponential, rather than 
linear character. 
In stable economies such disproportions do not exist. Therefore, one might 
initially be inclined to believe that the inflation in post socialist countries is only 
a problem of political and social deception. Of course, this is not the case and, 
today, no expert will make such an assumption. However, the perceived need to 
suppress inflation remains strong. 
Forecasting inflation and attempting to explain the objective and subjective 
reasons for its development are very difficult tasks in East European countries. This 
problem is complicated and consists of many 'soft' elements so that clear 
presentation of price developments still have largely prophetic character. Therefore, 
the issue of the 'appropriate' level of inflation is still open, especially if the 
additional effect of relative prices 'normalization' is considered. The reaction of 
the economic system to changes in the general price level is not the same in every 
country. These differences depend on the level of internal integration in the 
economic system, the extent of recession, and the readiness of the society to bear 
the transformation burden.[l] Finally, only one conclusion remains certain: If 
there are fewer monetary constraints, then the pace of replacement of distortions 
in relative prices would speed up and if no monetary limits exist inflation would 
accelerate. 
Due to the absence of an applicable theoretical model of financial equilibrium 
for this kind of economic problem area, only one solution for financial policy 
exists: to continue step-by-step, experience-by-experience, by trial and error to 
eliminate price distortions and to decrease inflation. As a consequence, maintaining 
strict control of the money supply is a critical task that must be undertaken in the 
earliest phase of stabilization. As long as relative 'price normalization' does not 
occur, particularly in lieu of the externalities of this process and other impacts of 
the transformation, the money supply should be higher than nominal GNP. This 
implies some changes on the left side of monetary equation. 
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This paper attempts to document the presence of several significant factors 
on the right side of this equation that call for providing additional monetary 
emission. These factors are associated with slowing the velocity of money, a 
process lasting the major part of the transformation period. 
5.3 What Could Be Managed with Shock Therapy 
At the beginning of the transformation process in the post-socialist countries, 
several cmcial events occurred. The nations were on the verge of destroying an 
old system and creating a new one. Two decisive events were the loss of financial 
discipline and the wave of mistakes made in the business sector (i.e., wrong 
assessment of investment possibilities, neglect of the liquidity problem, and others). 
The main causes of these problems stemmed from the limited knowledge of market 
economics and a lack of training in the competitive conditions of the international 
marketplace. 
In order to minimize the adverse impact of such events, restrictive monetary 
policy was implemented; however, not successfully everywhere. Particularly for 
countries that have progressed some distance on the path of economic reform, 
where stricter management of the financial system is a necessity, do some 
theoretical problems regarding the limits of restrictive policy become apparent and 
significant. 
The results of restrictive monetary policy are both negative and positive and 
affected the economic and social dimensions. As a result, present discussions in 
Poland question whether the stabilization program was overambitious or not. But, 
it appears unwise to approach the issues from this angle. No one could arbitrarily 
determine the required intensity of the anti-inflation program. Even if it is too 
restrictive, one should consider its positive effects, like the additional, significant 
change in the behavior of the managers and employees. 
In the economic sphere, shock therapy helps to restrain inflation, induces 
restmcturing, and improves labor quality, but simultaneously causes a decline in 
the national product. The positive social aspect associated with this policy is the 
rapid spreading of 'economic literacy' in the society. The difficulties of 
participating in the operation of a market economy, such as the trouble with 
executing payments, teach marketing and financial principles better than it could 
be done in the colleges. Due to its inadequacy, this education was necessary and 
its results may be interpreted as a strategic resource for the future. Of course, 
negative aspects also arise, such as the social tensions and political anxiety caused 
by unemployment and decreasing standards of living. Be this as it may, the real 
question is concerned with the next step, which took place after shock therapy. 
The Polish experiences show, that this current stage is more complicated than the 
previous one. 
At the time when the Polish politicians decided to implement one and half 
years of strict monetary policy, the government did not expect such a drastic 
recession, enormous budget deficit, and precarious level of enterprises' profitability. 
As these features became stark reality, decision-makers were caught unprepared 
- without any counter measures on hand. The behavior of the politicians was 
inexcusable and could not be justified since there was a precedent for stabilization 
programs in recent history. The Chilean, Argentinean, and Mexican experiences 
show that the sequence of events taking place in Poland were inevitable. The 
optimistic attitude of the Polish government until the end of 1991 resulted in a 
surprised attitude that the budget deficit was growing, production was falling, and 
productivity was declining quickly. No program to combat the recession impact 
had been prepared. This also meant that the critical moment to break out of the 
recession and move to a path of economic growth was lost. 
During the recession the stabilization policies primarily affected those 
enterprises in which the major share of production was exported. The zloty 
exchange rate, as the nominal anchor, was unchanged over the year, in spite of 
high three digit inflation at the same time. This caused an additional decrease in 
the competitiveness and profitability of the major part of the Polish economy. 
Nonetheless, this situation should not be used as an argument against shock 
therapy. Throughout the first phase of economic transformation even very 
restrictive policy, applied as the so-called shock therapy, seems to be useful. Even 
the extensive losses in GDP can be viewed as a necessary cost of transformation, 
with the benefits for the economy gained as a consequence of positive changes 
in economic structures and social mentality. Nevertheless, no economic shock 
therapy, like every kind of shock remedy, lasts longer than one to two years. But, 
what happens afterward? 
The largest disappointment of this policy is the insufficient progress in 
reducing inflation and the greater than expected drop of national product. Thus, 
some experts are inclined to conclude that the policy was not restrictive enough - 
the money supply was too large and the people (employees, managers, and 
owners) were not active enough in adjusting their behavior in order to better adapt 
themselves to the new circumstances. It is, however, not the objective to pass 
judgment on the quality of the society as a whole. The society is, what it is. 
An analysis of the efficiency of constraints on the money supply would 
certainly be more useful as a means to fight inflation. The issue is: how to 
recognize the utmost level of monetary restriction which does not generate 
disturbances in the financial system. If the restrictions are too severe, a drop in 
GDP is the direct result. This does not only imply insufficient money supply for 
efficient production, but also a dampening of the incentives for new development. 
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Such a situation primarily caused excessive caution on the part of managers - 
an additional factor of recession.[2] With respect to these possibilities, one can 
not simply infer the less money the better. In addition, the hypothesis calling for 
more restraint, though commonly approved, is not automatically correct either. 
Namely, the idea to adjust the money supply according to GDP growth does not 
appear to apply to the transforming economies of Eastern Europe. In this case, 
it may well be too restrictive. 
Since Keynes' fundamental work, the velocity of money is considered as a 
constant in the short term. This assumption was proven to be valid when applied 
to conditions of established market economies which have displayed no major 
discontinuities in their history. But, the same assumption can be misleading in 
the case of economic systems undergoing rapid structural transformation, as in the 
former planned economies. The dynamics of money demand differs substantially 
when we compare stable market economies with economies in transition. 
The transformation from one system to another presupposes changes in the 
monetary needs. A market economy needs more money than a former, centrally 
planned system. This is one of the fundamental differences between these systems. 
For the system in which one can use the administrative orders instead of financial 
regulation, money flows are subordinate to any kind of other regulation. The central 
planning authorities of economic conduct would sometimes even act against the 
market and actually ignore the financial status of enterprises. Finally, money was 
just not so important as today, when the market dominates in the economy. In the 
past, every activity to procure money and to ensure its stable flow in the future 
was, in truth, supeffluous. In the shortage economy, money is not a necessary 
prerequisite for exchange and thus existence. In order to promote production or 
achieve a better position in the market, many factors other than money were 
determinant. It was most crucial to retain many connections to authorities, and 
to present and future commercial partners. Connections with bankers were not 
given high priority. 
In Poland, current economic conditions are not satisfactory for the 
implementation of successful monetary policy. On the one hand, the new system 
requires money to meet its new needs, because the necessary restructuring can 
not take place without an additional stream of money. On the other hand, each 
addition to the money supply weakens the incentives to alter economic behavior. 
The difficult choice between two alternatives remains: 
(i) maintain the restrictive policy to produce profitable, long term changes 
(restructuring, new kind of social mentality, etc.), or 
(ii) stay with the moderate monetary policy to ensure the liquid circulation and 
build the basic institutions of the capital market into the system. 
This choice is truly difficult, because in either case there will be significant losses 
for economic development. In an effort to avoid such losses, the 'pulsatory' 
strategy should be recommended as probably the most effective policy. First, 
shock therapy; later, thorough, long term restructuring of the financial system, and 
fulfilling the system's monetary needs in a step-by-step manner. 
However, there is a catch. It is not possible to restrict the money supply and 
issue additional money at the same time. If there would be only monetary 
restrictions, there would be no development. If there would be only the additional 
flow of money, there would be no motivation for reforms. Therefore, the solution 
will not lie in taking every possible measure available, but rather in realizing some 
sequence of main tasks during transformation. In the first phase, for example, to 
concentrate on the fight against inflation and restructuring of the old economic 
principles. In the next stage, breaking out of the recession and developing the 
system of money and capital reserves in order to shape a new financial system. 
No one stage in itself is able to transform the system to the final shape. It could 
be done only via a long chain of different kinds of economic policy. 
If the progress to reach a market economy may not be sufficient, one can 
repeat this sequence. However, in recognition of the actual social and political 
climate in post-socialist countries, the repetition of shock therapy seems to be very 
risky business. 
5.4 New Money Needs 
One can identify three types of money needs emerging during the transformation 
period and not present in mature, stable economies: 
(1) additional transaction money for growing circulation needs; 
(2) money for the expansion of capital and liquidity reserves and reduction of 
the portion of badly performing credits; and 
(3) special support for long-term credit lines (for housing and long run 
investment) to overcome the payment barriers. 
5.4.1 Transaction Money for Growing Circulation Needs 
In classical economic theory the amount of money, which is necessary to ensure 
the stable circulation of goods, is directly related to the GDP. Nevertheless, as a 
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result of the specific structural changes occumng in the transforming nations of 
Eastern Europe, the objective demand for transaction money could be higher than 
it could be explained by the GDP fluctuations. This situation is associated with 
the following three basic developments: 
(i) increasing number of transactions; 
(ii) the rapid development of the private sector and the shadow economy; and, 
(iii) the capital transactions becoming a significant part of the whole market in 
the economy. 
The impact of privatization on money demand, caused by the rapid development 
of the small business sector, does not seem to be well understood. Quickly 
developing spontaneous private entrepreneurship in the economies of 
transformation, is accompanied by the reverse process with respect to the old state 
firm, whose activities have become limited in the wake of recession ending in the 
eventual demise of this ownership form. In the first stage of the reform, the past 
system of business connections has elapsed. Subsequently, many different, small, 
and previously unknown types of firms, which have limited trust to each other, 
are appearing. The knowledge of these new firms about new producers and 
merchants often appears insufficient. Nevertheless, the pattern of existing partners 
will change because the character of the market and the sources of goods are 
continually fluctuating. Today's market operations require the entrepreneurs to 
actively seek new partners across the country; the days when business came to the 
monopolistic entrepreneur are as good as over. And, to participate in conducting 
business with new partners, the new entrepreneurs are compelled to have significant 
amounts of money at their disposal. The importance of cash is growing. This, 
however, does not mean the velocity of money is rising. The situation is, in fact, 
exactly the reverse. Now the system simply absorbs more money with the result 
of slowing the velocity of money in circulation. 
The search for evidence of this phenomena, using the theoretical-statistical 
instruments, needs some simplification that leaves the main subject of analysis 
unaffected. Let us begin by assuming that there is a standard unit of delivery in 
certain economic branches. The size of these units could vary for many reasons, 
such as transportation problems and others. On the financial side, this is represented 
by proper units of money which are necessary to cover the purchase of the 
identified commodity units - let us call them 'standard money amounts'. 
In the economy, there is always some uncertainty ex-ante regarding potential 
deals in the future. Consequently, it is advisable for any businessman to keep a 
certain amount of money as a reserve for potential transactions (i.e., investment). 
The size of this reserve is determined by random distribution. ~ s s u m i n ~  there is 
an average amount of expenditures, E(x), the money reserves, (M,), depend on the 
standard deviation and should amount to: 
where: 6 is the standard deviation, p is the value of the standard distribution by 
a likelihood of a. 
This equation implies that if risk remains at an acceptable level, minimum 
reserves should be no less than Mr. This, in fact, happened in practice as the trend 
was to take the risk of loosing money as a result of unreliable customers not paying 
rather than risking the chance of missing an opportunity to invest. 
A further point reveals the existence of an interesting difference in the value 
of money reserves (related to average expenditure) between small and large firms. 
This difference is caused by the variability of random distribution linked to the 
character of both firms. The choice of the random distribution to be used is 
determined by the so-called 'degrees of freedom', which correspond to our term 
'standard money amounts'. These are linked to the firm size. In a very large firm, 
the volume of 'standard money amounts' is very high. Usually if the degrees of 
freedom (that is, the number of 'standard money amounts') are higher than 200, 
one can use the Normal Distribution to calculate the money reserves. 
As this will not be possible for smaller values, one should use the T-Student 
Distribution, in which the shape is dependent on the degrees of freedom. The lower 
the degrees of freedom, the higher the value of the T-Student Distribution. This 
may be represented as follows: assuming two levels of the degrees of freedom, 
i and j, and if i c j, then 
The result is differences in necessary money reserves (M,), even when the 
acceptable level of risk is the same since we apply the following function in the 
presence of smaller firms: 
and the relation for the larger firms is: 
So, finally 
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This calculation shows that the small enterprises should keep proportionally more 
money reserves than the large ones. Otherwise, the smaller enterprises will be more 
likely to face liquidity troubles than the larger. In order to avoid such difficulties, 
therefore, the former should keep proportionally more money reserves than the 
latter. 
The equations depicted above show the special linkage between money 
demand and changes in the concentration ratio for the whole economy. If the level 
of concentration declines, especially as a consequence of the expansion of the 
number of small enterprises, the amount of transaction money must rise, ceteris 
paribus. 
The additional money demand in the small business sector generated by a drop 
in the concentration ratio is accompanied by an additional demand for cash 
stemming from the emergence of the shadow economy, where cash is generally 
the single means of payment. Small businesses must still keep high amounts of 
money reserves like the agents in the shadow economy due to the uncertainty of 
their activities. A precise estimation of the extent of the shadow economy is 
difficult. Yet, if it already produced the equivalent of 10-15% of GDP in the 
former, well-developed planned economy, one can expect it to be twice or even 
more times larger under the conditions of transformation. It is a special challenge 
for monetary authorities because both the private and shadow sectors are 
developing very quickly in the transformation phase. In addition, budget constraints 
do not allow government the necessary flexibility to react rapidly to these new 
needs and to evaluate their relative importance. The state bodies responsible for 
tax revenue are nearly helpless: developed in the old system, in which tax 
collection was a very simple accounting function, these authorities can not meet 
their new obligations. 
Another objective factor that prompts an increase of the money supply for 
transactions is the development of the capital market. Some transactions, belonging 
to this category already existed before transformation, but these are far-outweighed 
by today's new capital market transactions. The previous were practically limited 
to the sale of real estate and only occasionally to other objects, like small factories. 
However, after privatization the situation is changed markedly in commerce, 
transportation, and small business. The lack of experience, an unstable economic 
situation, and changes in the tax and tariff systems resulted in large movements 
in this segment of the capital market. The actual amount of money engaged in these 
operations is difficult to determine. One can only assume that the annual turnover 
should be comparable to the value of assets in the small business sector. Un- 
fortunately, the studies about capital assets in small business are very poor, not 
only in Poland. 
Only one statistic from the capital market area is well-known. This is the 
turnover on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and the market value of equities. By 
the end of 1992, the market value of listed companies amounted 3.5 billion zloty 
(USD 200 million), with the turnover liquidity at approximately 0.5%. During 
the first quarter of 1993, the turnover rose very quickly, gaining about USD 50 
million. Including the whole time of transaction and its payment, this would imply 
that the absorption of transaction money by the stock exchange was approximately 
USD 150 million - about 1% of all cash resources.[3] 
5.4.2 Money for Expanding Capital and Liquidity Reserves 
In the centrally planned economy, no capital reserves were necessary. It was 
enough to maintain only a very small amount of money to avoid troubles with a 
temporary lack of liquidity. Shortage of money was not the most significant 
problem for the enterprises, even if the liquidity problems have occurred (see 
above). Yet, in creating the market economy it became necessary to create the 
capital for the basic economic institutions. It may seem beyond the imagination 
of Western observers that enterprises, banks, and other economic agents could 
actually exist without capital, but it was the case. Nonetheless, they did require 
some artificial constructions on the passive side of their balance sheet, but such 
a formal problem did not pose a threat to their continued existence. Unfortunately, 
these constructions could not be transformed into real capital resources once the 
centrally planned system collapsed. 
Previously, the state was treated as the omnipotent institution by politicians 
and the population and, as a result, no capital was necessary to ensure any 
obligation of financial bodies. Consequently, the state was responsible for control 
over their business and for supplying enough money to cover needs claimed by 
pensioners, patients in clinics, clients of the insurance firms, and so forth. All such 
expenditures were covered from the state or local government budgets. 
The countries that have embarked on the path of market transformation should 
prepare many kinds of capital insurances to reduce the risk of business activity. 
This openness for business risk can be taken as a basic feature of the economic 
changes. In the emerging market economy, each institution should be ready to take 
some risk, otherwise no innovation can take place. This risk should be, of course, 
limited, but means to enable market participants to take the risk if they so desire 
should be guaranteed. Under the former system, the scale of risk was limited to 
personal responsibility. Those taking high risks were punished in the administrative 
way. One of the most negative features of the past methods was the lack of precise 
determination regarding the scale of risk permitted. This used to cause uncertainty 
and restricted individual activity. 
The application of the market system implies releasing peoples' creativity; 
thus, underlying the significance of its presence. The economic units should now 
Monetary Equilibrium and the Polish Economic Transformation 99 
act on their own responsibility and face disciplinary measures like bankruptcy in 
the event of failure. The state is not automatically obligated to help them in a 
difficult situation. Therefore, these units should develop their own safety system, 
which, in any case, should be based on their own capital. If this capital does not 
exist, the monetary policy should facilitate its creation. 
The monetary outcome is controlled by the interest on credit. In the first 
period of transformation, these means were not sufficiently successful and credit 
ceilings were implemented. Consequently, enterprises are compelled to manage 
their affairs under the conditions of restrictive monetary policy. Yet, the very 
restricted credit policy implemented in Poland in 1990-1991 resulted in new 
problems for the next period. After a short time, the situation was reversed: the 
special ceilings became superfluous as the interest rates on credits offered by banks 
made loans much less attractive. 
In the case of Poland, the final result was recession; some may initially 
describe it as a natural consequence of the restrictive monetary policy. Especially 
modem enterprises, which were built or modernized at the end of the 1980s. were 
compelled to pay exorbitantly high interest. Many of them fell into the credit trap. 
They borrowed when the credit was cheap, but were in the process of repayment 
when the credit became extremely expensive. It resulted in negative profitability 
and forced the firms to take short term credit to preserve financial liquidity. 
At the beginning of 1992, some signs of economic recovery were noticeable. 
The strongest enterprises overcame the market crisis and many could engage in 
the international marketplace. The revival was primarily reserved for those 
enterprises equipped with modem machinery and technologies. But these firms 
are also carrying the largest burden of the anti-inflation policy by paying very high 
interests on credit. This burden was extremely large in the manufacturing industry, 
due to the very high capital intensity of production. By creating an additional 
capital cost, the extreme interests on credits affected these producers. Although 
these enterprises were able to expand production, the low profitability forced them 
to face persistent liquidity problems, which dampened the potential production 
expansion. 
Thus, Poland was confronted with the phenomena of too much money in the 
banks and a too small demand for credit, partially explained by the high interest 
rate of about 11-12% in real terms. This situation raised the question why banks 
did not decrease their interest rates. The reason is ve j8imple:  they had to cover 
the cost of setting high interest rates to attract savings deposits and to cover losses 
caused by high obligatory reserves (bearing 0% interest) in the Central Bank. In 
addition, the cost of procuring money is very high for banks. About 50% of 
deposits are those of domestic citizens. In order to keep this money in the bank, 
banks should set the interest rate close to the level of the consumer price index 
(CPI). On the other hand, banks should set the interest rate for credits close to 
the investment price index because the most important clients are enterprises in 
this case. 
In Poland it is impossible to presently fulfill these two objectives due to the 
disparity between the consumer and investment price indices. The CPI is 10 points 
higher than the price index for investment goods. If bank policy would favor 
enterprises, the deposit interest should be drastically negative. The difference 
between consumer and investment prices' dynamics will probably persist 
throughout 1994. The main causes are the implementation of the tax and tariff 
reforms and shifting the tax and tariff burden to consumers. For three years, the 
subsidies for mostly consumer prices fell from 30% of state budget expenditures 
in 1989 to 5% in 1993. Subsidized prices will almost be completely phased out 
in the next several years. 
In such a situation one might consider the possibility of a contemporary 
negative real interest rate for deposits. Its presence should not prove disastrous, 
especially if it lasted only a short time. It would, however, have little or no effect 
in Poland. The Polish population keeps about half of their money resources in 
foreign currency. If the real interest rate on zloty deposits will be very low or even 
negative, money will escape to the foreign currency accounts. This movement will 
cause a strong increase of the rate of exchange (depreciation of the zloty), and will 
generate an increased volatility in the foreign exchange and price indices. 
A significant difference between the level of enterprise profitability and the 
level of real credit cost emerges as the result of restrictive monetary policy. If 
the former indicator amounts to about 3%, the latter was three times higher. This 
difference nearly prevents financing normal business activity with credit. The 
consequence has been a trend toward financing only the speculative ventures, but 
these are mostly undertaken by very small business. Yet, these small firms have 
too little capital and have existed for too short a time to gain the banks' trust. 
Finally, the businessmen capable of paying such high interest did not obtain credit 
as a consequence of regular, formal creditworthiness tests. 
These last experiences in this area are very instructive. At the beginning of 
the transformation process the banks have tried to continue with the old method 
of credit policy. It was very simple - anyone could obtain credit because credit 
risk was not taken into consideration. Later, the situation was reversed. In the 
presence of very high interest introduced to curb inflation, few debtors actually 
possessed the ability to repay loans. This resulted in a considerable amount of 
badly performing credits, now estimated at 30% of the total amount of credit 
provided to the economy.[4] 
It is perilous for banks to hold so many bade or non-performing credits. The 
problem of the imposing losses for banks becomes very significant. In such a case, 
the whole banking sector might soon be threatened by bankruptcy. Therefore, the 
state must help. Probably the efforts to solve this problem will be divided between 
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the state and banks. Regardless of the solution to this problem, the money supply 
should increase by about 2%. Only then the standard international rate of bad 
credits to total credits (10%) can be achieved. 
The negative experiences regarding the repayment of credits has changed the 
attitude of banks quite markedly. Banks are now extremely cautious when giving 
credit, especially in the case of long term obligations. This situation affected 
primarily industries, which need at least a couple of years to repay outstanding 
debts. In order not to inhibit recovery, it might well be necessary to create a 
special fund of credit guarantees, probably to the amount of 0.5-1% of all credit 
for the commercial sector. This could be about 1-2% of the whole money supply 
(as of April 1993).[5] 
In Poland, the banking system was very integrated for many years. Already 
before 1989, it was partially decentralized, but the process of equipping the banks 
with sufficient capital was still not completed by 1993. At the beginning of 1993, 
the average credibility indicator amounted to 4-5% of the banks' high risk assets. 
In order to attain the 'Cook Committee' recommendations, the reserve capital in 
the Polish banks should be doubled. It needs additional money on the order of 
0.5% of GNP.[6] The process to reach the recommended value of 8% of reserve 
requirement will take the Polish banking system at least two years. 
Even much more time will be necessary to develop the appropriate capital 
basis in the insurance, health and pension funds. Until today, the system of 
financing pensions and health is, like in the other post-socialist countries, directly 
linked to the state budget; as a matter of fact, it is part of it. The expenditures for 
health of the population are covered directly by the budget. The pension money 
is obtained from the obligatory liabilities related to the salaries (45% of the payroll) 
in enterprises. In the case of deficit or surplus, losses and profits are taken from 
or added to the state budget, though the latter is more than unlikely. Since the 
state even guarantees liquidity regarding payments capacity, the institutions 
mentioned above have practically no capital reserves. The state umbrella provides 
a high level of security for them and their clients, but also makes them inflexible 
and too costly. 
Indeed, this system is not only characteristic of East European countries; in 
fact, some of its essential features are present in Western Europe as well. The 
continuation of full state responsibility for social insurance programs is becoming 
a very heavy burden for the weak budgets in post-socialists countries. At least 
a part of the expenditures must be covered from other sources, mostly from the 
individuals' incomes. In order to make the overall system acceptable for everyone, 
a private insurance system must be developed. The same problems and solutions 
pertain to the pension funds. 
The new private insurance firms should collect enough capital to ensure their 
obligations to clients. According to the author's calculations, even if the private 
insurance firms occupy only a very small part of the pension and health insurance 
markets, like in Germany,[7] this mixed system would need additional capital to 
the order of 10% of GDP to attain a proper level social security.[8] 
5.4.3 Special Support for Long Term Credit 
Obtaining credit is a normal part of business activity. Polish enterprises (especially 
the most efficient and profitable) are, however, restraining themselves when 
applying for money from the banks. The total demand for credit by enterprises 
fell 13% in terms of real volume during 1992. 
In order to shed some light on these phenomena one must consider a 
significant event of Polish transition that is very rare when normally evaluating 
credit policy. Unfortunately, during the first period of rampant inflation an es- 
pecially high concentration of the repayment materialized simultaneously. It 
increases further with rising inflation (refer to Table 5.1). 
This table shows that in the case with higher interest and inflation rates, 82% 
of the whole burden of credit repayment is due within the first two years (add the 
Table 5.1 Concentration of credit repayment with respect to the level of inflation 
price index: 78% (corresponding to 1990); interest rate on credit: 80% 
Years principal interest payments total to be paid total to be paid 
payments (nominal value) (real value) 
total 
price index: 33% (corresponding to 1992); interest rate on credit: 40% 
1 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.45 
2 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.29 
3 0.20 0.24 0.44 0.19 
4 0.20 0.16 0.36 0.11 
5 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.07 
total 1.00 1.20 2.20 1.11 
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value in row 1 and 2 in the last column), while in the second case with lower rates 
only 74% is due during the same period. In contrast, achieving a substantial profit 
immediately in the first period of investment is very rare for the firm, especially 
in industry. Therefore, taking long-term credit becomes a very doubtful solution. 
This problem could be overcome in the following manner. The debtor should 
often take short-term credit (every year), rather than one large, long-term loan. 
This method allows him to pay the credit back in equal parts. Unfortunately, this 
is not the Salomon solution. This system results in a high level of uncertainty and 
is not a good idea for large investments (like building a new factory or housing 
construction), which should be realized in a short time and in which cases the 
repayment should extend over many years. In an effort to support these 
entrepreneurial investors some special measures should be prepared that facilitate 
and permit the capitalization of credit interest. The capitalization of credit interest 
is possible if the capitalization of deposit interest also occurred. If not, the banks 
lose liquidity due to the regular interest payments to depositors. Cash flow becomes 
negative. In order to resolve this situation, the state (Central Bank) should give 
the commercial banks long-term bridging credit. This will, once again, lead to 
an increase of the money supply. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This paper presents some remarks about the special money needs concerned with 
the specific status of an economy. This unique status refers to the period of 
transformation from central planning to the market economy. We attempted to 
reveal the special features of this period and provided some reasoning for the 
disappointment regarding the unsatisfactory results of monetary shock therapy as 
an element of the battle against inflation in Poland. 
In terms of quantity theory of money, the reasons for this situation can be 
found on both sides of the equation PQ = MV. On the left side, the major cause 
of inflation is the process of replacing the distortions of the price structure. The 
more relative prices were distorted, the longer was the period of high inflation. 
We also reveal special needs for additional money creation that do not exist 
in this form in the established market economies. These are concerned with the 
declining velocity of money. Its drop is caused by the needs to enlarge the amount 
of transactions money, to increase the required reserves ratio in the banks, and the 
capital basis in the emerging insurance and pensions funds. The additional money 
is also needed to remove some negative effects of the shock therapy; primarily, 
to reduce the badly performing credits and to decrease the detrimental impact of 
high credit interest on long term investment projects. 
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Possibility for Using the Exchange Rate 
as a Nominal Anchor for the Domestic 
Price Level: Some Evidence from the 
Hungarian Case 
Artlir ~zentg~iirg~va'ri* 
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6.1 Introduction 
This paper addresses the question whether the exchange rate of the forint can be 
used as a nominal anchor for the domestic price level. After a brief description 
of the institutional framework of exchange rate policy in Hungary and the evolution 
of the exchange rate of the forint during the past few years, the role of exchange 
rate changes in domestic inflation is examined for the period January 1990 to 
December 1992. An index of exchange rate expectations is constructed to study 
the impact of changes in exchange rate expectations on inflation. The basic 
conclusion is that the exchange rate, via different channels, worked as a kind of 
nominal anchor for the domestic price level in the period of observation. 
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6.2 The Hungarian Exchange Rate Regime and Major 
Exchange Rate Policy Developments in Recent Years 
Changes in the exchange rate of the forint vis-d-vis convertible currencies occur 
under an adjustable peg system. The rate relative to a basket of major currencies 
is adjusted at irregular intervals. Basically, exchange rate policy is the common 
responsibility of the government and the central bank where the two authorities 
have to reach an agreement before any adjustment to the rate can be made. The 
central bank has the right to autonomously adjust the rate within a band of +5% 
around the rate set by the last decision it has made jointly with the government. 
Since December 1991, the foreign currency basket of the forint is composed 
of 50% ECU and 50% USD[l] to reflect the relative importance of European 
currencies and the US dollar in Hungary's foreign trade (accounting for trade with 
developing countries and in primary products where prices are set in US dollars) 
as well as to reduce swings in the rates of major currencies expressed in forint due 
to cross rate changes in international markets. Prior to November 1991, the foreign 
currency basket of the forint was updated yearly and reflected the invoice currency 
structure of Hungarian exports and imports to the convertible currency area. 
In July 1992, an interbank foreign exchange market was introduced. Domestic 
banks authorized to deal in foreign exchange were exempted from the obligation 
to render all foreign exchange balances resulting from transactions to the National 
Bank of Hungary and banks were also allowed to hold foreign exchange in own 
accounts of up to 30% of adjusted risk-bearing capital. Rates for interbank buying 
and selling transactions can be set within a narrow range of 20.5% around National 
Bank midpoint rates. From 1 July 1992 to 1 June 1993 the width of the band was 
+_0.25%. The National Bank envisages to widen the band for interbank trading 
gradually up to +2.25%. 
Table 6.1 in the Appendix shows year-to-year changes in the real effective 
exchange rate index of the forint using different deflators. A higher value of any 
of the indices refers to depreciation of the forint. Figure 6.1 depicts the yearly 
evolution of the real effective exchange rate index based on industrial producer 
price indices,[2] while Figure 6.2 exhibits the same type of index, but together 
with the nominal effective exchange rate index on a monthly basis for the period 
January 1988 through December 1992. 
The most important exchange rate policy development in the past five years 
was the 10% appreciation of the forint in 1991 in real effective terms as measured 
on the basis of producer prices of industry. This marked the increased awareness 
regarding the short-term anti-inflation consideration versus the short-term 
competitiveness consideration in Hungarian exchange rate policy. 
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6.3 Exchange Rate Changes and Inflation 
In the context of liberalized imports (the three-year-long process of gradual 
liberalization of imports in Hungary was completed in 1991), prices in the 
vulnerable sectors and primarily in industry have tended to equalize internationally. 
Domestic price increases have been limited by international competition. Similarly, 
exchange rate movements have not only affected domestic prices on the supply 
side via altering the cost of imported input but also on the demand side by 
changing the prices of foreign goods competing with domestic products. 
Furthermore, the pricing behavior of domestic producers has been influenced by 
their expectation of future exchange rate changes. However, before we proceed 
to test these statements, we outline a simple model. 
In order to test the role of exchange rate expectations we assume that the rate 
of exchange rate depreciation expected to occur over the next twelve months is 
a fraction of the rate of inflation expected for the same period. The expected rate 
of inflation is simply taken as the rate observed for the twelve-month-period ending 
in the current month and the 'expected depreciationlexpected inflation' ratio is a 
simple geometric average of the ratios of actual twelve-month devaluation and 
inflation rates computed for the past twelve months. 
Obviously, this model of exchange rate expectations is simplified. A good 
deal of work is still to be done on modeling a more complex behavior of forming 
exchange rate and inflation expectations (Takagi, 1991). However, exchange rate 
expectations generated by the model show a relatively strong correlation with the 
ratio of the black market exchange rate to the official exchange rate, which is often 
taken as an indicator of expected depreciation (correlation coefficient: 0.749, for 
illustration see Figure 6.3). This allows us to use the simulated time series for 
expected exchange rates as the explanatory variable in our hypothetical model for 
inflation that we will test here. 
Figure 6.4 shows the indices of changes in the level of producer prices in 
industry and of consumer prices from those of the same month one year earlier, 
while Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the index of the actual changes in the forint 
exchange rate relative to the foreign currency basket and the index of expected 
changes in the level of the forint exchange rate relative to the basket. A look at 
these figures suggests that the moderation of devaluations and devaluation 
expectations that began in early 1990 may have anchored inflation and prevented 
it from becoming hyperinflation in 1991. This casual observation receives some 
confirmation from the results of our ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis which 
show the devaluation expectations variable and two import price variables that 
directly depend on devaluations to be significant (at least at the 2.5% error level) 
in explaining producer price inflation (Table 6.2).[3] 
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A somewhat different picture emerges from the OLS results for consumer 
price inflation. In this case, the exchange rate effect seems to be carried by 
industrial producer prices and the prices of imported manufactures. Two other 
variables that are not influenced by the exchange rate, domestic credit and the 
dummy that stands for price reform measures, appear to explain another part of 
consumer price movements (Table 6.3).[4] 
The findings reported above allow us to conclude that the exchange rate, partly 
via the influence of its actual behavior on expectations of future exchange rate 
changes, probably did function as a nominal anchor for the price level in Hungary 
over the observed period, although authorities have never declared that they were 
using the exchange rate for that purpose. 
6.4 Limitations to Achieving Low Inflation with the 
Help of the Exchange Rate Anchor 
The anchor role of the exchange rate, for which we appear to have found some 
evidence in the Hungarian case, obviously does not mean that any desirable low 
inflation rate or, ad absurdurn, the decreasing of the price level can be achieved 
by an appropriate choice of the rate of currency devaluation. There is no such rule 
for any anchor variable. 
On the contrary, international experience suggests that bringing inflation down 
to low levels frequently involves macroeconomic and social costs that 
policy-makers find not worth incurring. Given backward looking expectations, as 
assumed in the Hungarian case, bringing inflation down from moderate to low rates 
may be costly in terns of foreign exchange reserves and employment. Once 
authorities decide that a given moderate rate of inflation is low enough to exclude 
the danger of hyperinflation but simultaneously high enough to avoid the costs 
associated with getting inflation down to low levels, they still have the task to 
provide ways for economic agents to live with moderate inflation and to avoid 
costly forecast errors in predicting future price level and exchange rate changes. 
For this part of exchange rate policy, it is an explicit or implicit crawling peg type 
regime that may most appropriately serve those purposes (Dornbusch and Fischer, 
1993). 
Obviously, the crawling adjustment of the exchange rate must, from time to 
time, almost necessarily be supplemented by more sizeable adjustments for the 
following reasons. Any external shock that adversely affects the foreign currency 
earning capacity of the domestic economy will probably require an exchange rate 
adjustment in addition to the crawl. 
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Nonetheless, it may not be advisable to set the pace of the crawl so that it 
fully offsets unfavorable price differentials between home and abroad. Such a real 
exchange rate rule is likely to be built in inflation expectations and, thus, may be 
conducive to inflation getting out of control. (Montiel and Ostry, 1992). On the 
other hand, the allowance for some real appreciation when setting the pace of the 
crawl will induce companies in the vulnerable sectors to strengthen the non-price 
factors of their competitiveness in case the policy of (relative) exchange rate 
stability is credible (Marin, 1985). Also, the support of the labor unions is required 
so that there will be no wage increases that are not justified by a gain in 
productivity (Hochreiter and Knobl, 1991). However, if productivity is not 
improved or a consensus with the unions is absent, an adjustment of the exchange 
rate supplementary to the crawl can not be avoided. Of course, in case a sizeable 
exchange rate adjustment becomes inevitable, restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies must be in place if the inflationary impact of the exchange rate adjustment 
is to be alleviated and the competitiveness effect is to be maintained. 
An adjustable peg type system like the one outlined above can not be called 
a nominal anchor if the term is reserved for exchange rates fixed in the Austrian 
way. But it is a nominal anchor in the sense that once appropriately chosen and 
credibly maintained, it is capable of stabilizing exchange rate expectations and thus, 
as Hungarian experience suggests, may help control inflation. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, the possibility for using the exchange rate of the forint as a nominal 
anchor for the price level was examined. OLS was used to find that the exchange 
rate can and, in the period of observation, probably did serve as nominal anchor 
though not in the most commonly used sense of the term. 
Notes 
[I] As of 1 August, 1993, the basket contains 50% DEM and 50% USD. 
[2] The discussion regarding the type of deflator most appropriate for the real effective 
exchange rate index of the Forint is beyond the scope of this paper. 
[3] The explanatory variables were selected with the help of tests for Wiener-Granger 
causality between the dependent variable and a number of plausible explanatory 
variables including broad money. For different possibilities concerning the choice 
of price level anchors see Calvo and VCgh (1992). The lag structure of the explanatory 
variables was chosen on the basis of t-statistics. 
[4] See previous footnote for explanation. 
Table 6.1 Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate Index of the Forint, 1988-1993 (annual average 
for 1991 = 100) 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
Nominal effective exchange rate index 
Real effective exchange rate 
1988 108.82 107.28 109.23 109.15 108.58 107.27 107.72 110.45 110.32 112.78 111.91 111.65 
1989 107.04 106.19 106.81 113.15 113.92 112.91 112.84 110.18 109.32 110.35 110.47 121.16 
1990 114.40 116.22 115.63 113.71 113.33 112.80 113.11 113.31 113.35 113.52 104.91 102.28 
1991 104.69 104.20 99.36 97.76 97.20 95.18 95.60 95.36 96.75 97.52 102.97 104.28 
1992 102.51 101.23 99.75 99.60 99.29 100.14 102.84 102.29 101.25 98.27 95.74 95.74 
1993 92.23 92.09 92.77 95.76 
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Table 6.2 An OLS-Model of Producer Price Inflation in Industry 
Sample period Explanatory variable Estimated coefficient T-statistic 
Jan 90-Dec 92 INFLP. 1 0.364 2.961 
Jan 90-Dec 92 PMOIL.3 0.085 4.298 
Jan 90-Dec 92 PMMANUF.4 0.163 2.034 
Jan 90-Dec 92 DEVEXP 0.28 1 3.214 
' Dependent variable: INFL (Producer prices) 
DW(1) 1.983 DW(12) 1.784 F 4,31 10.098 R Bar Sq 0.51 
Table 6.3 An OLS-model of Consumer Price Inflation 
Sample period Explanatory variable Estimated coefficient T-statistic 
Jan 90-Dec 92 INFLC. 1 0.333 3.021 
Jan 90-Dec 92 INFLP 0.230 3.849 
Jan 90-Dec 92 P M M ~ U F . ~  0.089 2.443 
Jan 90-Dec 92 CREDIT.7 0.501 2.758 
Jan 90-Dec 92 R E P  0.01 2.38 
' Dependent variable: INFLC (Producer prices) 
DW(1) 2.095 DW(12) 1.437 F 5,30 12.449 R Bar Sq 0.621 
Table 6.4 List of Variables 
INFLP producer prices, industry 
PMOIL prices of imported energy 
PMMANUF prices of imported manufactures 
DEVEXP constructed variable for devaluation expectations 
INFLC consumer prices 
CREDIT credit extended by the banking system to domestic agents 
R E P  dummy variable for price liberalization and fiscal reform measures 
that have a direct inflationary impact 
Note: Figures after the names of variables, separated by dots, indicate the number of lags. All 
variables are first one-month differences of twelve-month differences in logarithmic form. 
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Table 6.5 Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices of the Forint 
(previous year = 100) 
Years Domestic Industrial Consumer GDP 
industrial unit prices deflator 
sales labor 
price cost 
Figure 6.1 The Real Effective Exchange Rate Index of the Forint, 1970-1991 
(1973=100) 
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l- Nominal effective exchange rote index ' ' ' Real effective exchange rote index 
Figure 6.2 Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate Indices of the Forint, 
1988-93 
l- Expectanon - - ' - Discrepancy 
Figure 6.3 Indices of Expected Exchange Rate Changes (current month=100) and 
the Discrepancy between Official (=loo) and Black Market Exchange 
Rate of the Forint 
A. Szentgyorgyvdri 
1 - - - - Mustrlal producer prices - Consumer prlces 1 
Figure 6.4 Changes in Consumer and Industrial Producer Prices (same month of 
previous year = 100) 
Observed - - - - Trend (&month rnovlng overage) 
Figure 6.5 Actual Changes in the Exchange Rate of the Forint Relative to the 
Foreign Currency Basket 
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Figure 6.6 Simulation Results of Expected Changes in the Exchange Rate 
Relative to the Foreign Currency Basket of the Forint (same month 
of previous year = 100) 
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Chapter 7 
Stabilizing the Market? 
1992 Exchange Rate Policy of 
the Central Bank of Russia 
Andrei F. Kovalev 
Central Bank of Russia, Moscow, Russia 
7.1 Introduction 
This paper is devoted to the discussion concerning the developments on the foreign 
exchange market in Russia during 1992. The analysis proceeds from one particular 
point of view: the interventionist policy by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). 
Though constituting only a minor part of overall monetary policy, this 
interventionism has profound consequences for the whole economy. Techniques 
towards this end were formed in the course of 1992 and successfully applied during 
the spring and summer of 1993. During this period, the CBR stabilized the 
exchange rate utilizing mainly exchange rate policy and, thereby, significantly 
improved the economic environment. 
In the second section of this paper, the general framework of the exchange 
rate market in Russia is described beginning with the introduction of the floating 
exchange rate regime. In the third section, different criteria are elaborated for 
evaluating the success of interventionist policy of an official agency; namely, the 
Central Bank. In the fourth section, the empirical evidence is provided and 
discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding the statement which is taken 
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for granted throughout the entire paper: namely, whether successful stabilization 
of the exchange rate is useful in itself. 
7.2 The Russian Foreign Exchange Market in 1992 
Recently, the foreign exchange regime and currency markets have undergone 
considerable changes which, in turn, reflected the alterations in conducting 
macroeconomic policy. The preconditions for introducing the floating exchange 
rate regime in Russia were established at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 
1992. 
Firstly, hard currency auctions began. These were followed by the creation 
of the interbank hard currencies market. However, the exchange rate regime 
allowed for the parallel existence of several official exchange rates applied for 
different types of transactions during this period, apart from the black or grey 
market rates. As described in various studies (see, for example, Goldberg 1992 
and 1993), this system created negative incentives for exporters. Namely, (i) 
exporters tried to avoid repatriation of hard currency earnings; and (ii) if obliged 
to repatriate, they tried to exchange earnings for rubles outside the official 
interbank market. 
As a result, currency markets remained very thin and the supply of hard 
currency heavily depended on sales by the Central Bank of Russia. It should be 
noted that the CBR advocated a rather tight monetary policy during this time. 
Official dollar sales (for sterilization purposes) in the interbank market constituted 
an important part of this policy. 
Secondly, the preparations for introducing the unified exchange rate regime 
began to unfold during the last months of the first half of 1992. Among other 
implications, this has led to an increase of the official sales, which were executed 
clearly against the trend. The goal of the creators of Russian domestic monetary 
policy (including the CBR) was to make the ruble reasonably strong. The 
argumentation for this objective was based on several factors revealed here. During 
the first hard currency auctions, the exchange rate was thought to overshoot its 
market equilibrium target and CBR interventions were supposed to induce the rate 
to reflect its real purchasing power. Secondly, the would-be unified rate was 
thought to be used directly for investment purposes. Therefore, the starting level 
should have been established at the level that would not discourage foreign 
investors on the one hand, and simultaneously prevent the impression of a cheap 
sell-out of national wealth on the other. Considering these issues, it is not 
surprising that the official foreign exchange reserves were completely drawn down 
while the nominal exchange rate appreciated during the first half of 1992 (the real 
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exchange rate even more remarkably). This fact, in itself, called for the reversal 
of the official policy on the currency markets. 
Almost simultaneously, numerous other prerequisites for a considerable change 
in the official role on the currency market were established. On 3 July 1992, the 
unified exchange rate regime was introduced. The unification of Russian exchange 
rates encompassed the merging of the rates applied for official transactions and 
the black market, though the latter has not ceased to exist and exerts a notable 
influence on the behavior of economic agents. Direct budget subsidies continued 
to play an important role for official transactions and, in part, substituted the 
formerly differentiated exchange rates for rather large segments of official traders 
on the foreign markets. Despite these persisting complications, the new exchange 
rate regime encouraged more exporters and importers to use the official market 
in order to arrange the necessary hard currency transactions. 
According to new regulations issued on 14 June 1992, exporters were to be 
compensated for their obligatory hard currency surrender (which was at the level 
of 50% of their export earnings) with rubles at the rate fixed at hard currency 
auctions of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX). This was 
substantially higher and more flexible than the official rate previously used for the 
said purposes. Moreover, 20% of the obligatory surrender could subsequently be 
sold directly at MICEX, or some other currency exchanges.[l] As a result, the 
supply of hard currency began to expand. 
The relaxation of the stance regarding the CBR's monetary policy became 
obvious during the second half of 1992. Under these circumstances, the trend- 
reversal of official policy at the exchange market as described above became 
completely unreasonable and obsolete. The new goal of the CBR was to smooth 
the fluctuations of the exchange rate. The summarized data on the CBR's role on 
the exchange markets is given in Table 7.1. It shows that in spite of a substantial 
decrease in the participation of the CBR on the exchange market in the second 
half of 1992, its influence remained rather important. 
In an economy with established competition, working arbitrage, and nearly 
perfect foresight of all economic agents, it is difficult to find any worthy 
justification for an active role of the Central Bank. Economic agents would have 
a clear perspective of the long-term exchange rate trend under such circumstances. 
The actual exchange rates would be pegged to this long-term exchange rate via 
the mechanism of the international interest rate differentials. Any attempt of an 
official agency to break the trend which does not emerge from a change in 
fundamentals would create a vast field for profit-raising, and would be offset by 
the matching funds. Yet, when the arbitrage is limited (both on the inter-country 
and interregional scale), foresight cannot develop and cannot be based on a long- 
term trend. As a result, spot exchange rate movements can acquire a momentum 
of their own. These may be very extreme, and cause distorted signals for the 
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Table 7.1 CBR interventions at the Moscow Interbank and St. Petersburg 
Currency Exchanges, 1992 
Comm. CBR's 
Ex.rate Hard CBR's % of banks & Hard 
RUBNSD Currency Sales Total their Currency 
Sales (mln.USD) Sales clients' Purchases 
(mln. USD) sales (mln.USD) 
(mln.USD) 
January 204.32 18.38 0.92 5.01 17.46 - 
February 175.76 33.25 11.09 33.35 22.16 - 
March 152.77 98.90 68.74 69.50 30.16 - 
April 152.78 46.93 22.33 47.58 24.60 - 
May 122.33 100.42 39.86 39.69 60.56 - 
June 125.26 308.92 224.29 72.60 84.63 - 
July 143.45 255.08 131.80 51.67 123.28 - 
Jan-July1 861.88 499.03 57.90 362.85 - 
................................................................... 
August 169.66 269.38 70.00 25.99 199.38 17.00 
September 226.00 466.21 178.99 38.39 287.22 27.00 
October 353.39 421.76 149.94 35.55 271.82 13 .OO 
November 427.02 369.95 119.72 32.36 250.23 7.71 
December 414.73 473.22 38.19 8.07 435.03 222.70 
Aug-Dec. 2000.52 556.84 27.83 1443.68 287.41 
Total 2862.40 1055.87 36.89 1806.53 287.40 
January-July figure is given to underline the change in the CBR's policy which became obvious 
with the change in leadership of the Bank in late July 1992. 
Source: Kommersant-Weekly, No. 5, February 1-7, 1993, p. 10. 
allocation of resources, discourage investment, and undermine general economic 
activity. 
If the Russian situation during 1992-1993 is to be understood, it is necessary 
to outline the set of circumstances that justified a more active role of the Central 
Bank in the currency market than would otherwise be within the traditional 
floating-rate mechanism. 
Firstly, political considerations play a very important role in the activities of 
economic agents. These are not only traditional consequences of the generally 
unstable Russian political environment which, obviously, exerts pressure on the 
domestic exchange market and constantly induces capital flight. The whole 
arrangement (according to which the official rate is established at the level fixed 
Exchange Rate Policy in Russia 
arrangement (according to which the official rate is established at the level fixed 
in sessions of the MICEX twice a week) is seen as the only, or at least the most 
significant, reason for rapid depreciation of the national currency by the influential 
group of politicians. The voices calling for the establishment of a fixed official 
exchange rate and the introduction of 100% obligatory surrender are prominent 
enough to cause speculative bubbles at the exchanges. The consequence has been 
very limited activity on the futures market. The average value of monthly futures 
contracts is approximately 0.5-0.6 million USD.[2] Moreover, this market is 
notably thinner than that of the spot rate. Forward rates have reflected the expected 
rate of ruble depreciation including high risk premiums. This fact combined with 
an obviously inadequate supply of rubles caused so-called overshooting of forward 
rates in comparison to the actual spot rate for the same periods for all of 1992. 
As a result, traders preferred to use the spot rate rather than forward, increasing 
demand and uncertainty due to the seasonal character of import contracts. 
Secondly, the prevailing business practices and regulations in force during 
1992 were frequently insufficiently coordinated to have a stabilizing effect on the 
exchange market. For example, according to the Decree on Obligatory Surrender 
alluded to earlier, 30% of an enterprise's export earnings were to be sold directly 
to the CBR within 14 days after receipt of payment. In addition, another 20% of 
export earnings had to be sold on the exchange market. However, no exact timing 
for these sales were defined.[3] As a result, enterprises retained earnings until the 
moment when balances had to be closed for reporting and tax purposes. Therefore, 
the supply of hard currency funds steadily rose as the end of a financial quarter 
or the year-end neared and radically fell during the intermediate period. 
The Decree No. 205 of the Council of Ministers, issued 6 March 1993, 
introduced limits on open positions of banks. This measure was envisaged to have 
a negative side effect, provoking additional pressure on the spot market. In order 
to avoid the risk of reporting only losses, banks had to be rather short and, thus, 
increased the volatility of the spot market. However, the introduction of explicit 
limits on open positions produced an overall stabilizing effect in the course of 
1993, mainly because of the steady increase in the supply of hard currency at the 
exchanges. 
Thirdly, the influence of such built-in regulators of the exchange rate as the 
feedback between the exchange rate and current account performance remain 
unclear. If some kind of lag in the reaction of the current account to movements 
of the exchange rate exists (like the J-curve effect), the supply of the offsetting 
funds on the exchange market may become too slow to smooth the fluctuations 
automatically. In Russia, the J-curve effects have been extremely significant. 
Partially, this can be explained by statistical problems: exports are under-invoiced 
for the simple reason that there are no clearly defined borders, apart from the lack 
of functioning custom controls. The J-curve effects with respect to the Russian 
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economy may originate from the territorial spread of the market, from the limited 
and hampered arbitrage, and, finally, from slow price adjustment. 
These three factors should facilitate a better understanding for an active market 
role of the Central Bank in Russia. Of course, the efficiency of its activity will 
depend on the particular set of circumstances under which Central Bank operations 
and intervention occurs. In the following part of the paper, several criteria are 
suggested that can assist in judging whether the CBR's activity during 1992 
corresponded to the target of attempting to 'stabilize the market'. This target was 
explicitly proclaimed only in the second half of the year. 
7.3 Evaluating Central Bank Interventions: The Criteria 
In order to assess the success of central bank activity in the exchange market some 
criterion should be clearly defined. In Milton Friedman's work (1953) on floating 
exchange rate, the so-called 'profitability criterion' is defined in the following way: 
"In any event, it would do little harm for a government agency to 
speculate in the exchange market provided it held to the objective of 
smoothing out temporary fluctuations and not interfering with 
fundamental adjustments. And there should be a simple criterion of 
success - whether the agency makes or loses money." 
This idea can be demonstrated with the help of the simple diagram presented in 
Figure 7.1. Time is depicted along the X-axis. Under the assumption of a uniform 
spread of the interventions over the periods in question, this axis may be interpreted 
also as a quantity axis (t, q). The vertical axis depicts the exchange rate (p). 
During the period shown in the left part of the diagram, the national currency 
is considered to be 'too heavy'. The central bank buys dollars, for example, and 
these purchases push the exchange rate to the level showed on the diagram in the 
form of a flatter curve. The area A (vertical lines) may be interpreted as the 
amount of the domestic currency spent to support the dollar. The shaded area, C, 
depicts the profit made by buying dollars below the reference (long term 
equilibrium) level Xo. 
In the right half of the diagram, the situation has been reversed. The domestic 
currency undershoots. This results in official dollar sales, and the amount of 
national currency purchased is shown by area B (horizontal lines). The shaded 
area, D, reflects the profit made by selling dollars above the equilibrium level. As 
long as area B is larger than area A, the official agency finishes with profit in terms 
of the national currency. This is an example of stabilizing and profitable 
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Figure 7.1 Interventions and Exchange Rates 
intervention. However, some serious problems with the practical applicability 
of this criterion are shown in Mayer and Taguchi (1983). In short, these are: 
1. Under specific conditions, unprofitable intervention may have a stabilizing 
effect. For example, it may be the case when the official agency intervenes 
in the right direction, but excessively. 
2. In order to obtain meaningful results some kind of equilibrium level (level 
X, in our diagram) should be used as a benchmark. The attempt to assess 
results (the reference point being the actual exchange rate differing from this 
level) may produce the same problem as discussed above: the case of 
unprofitable but stabilizing intervention. This problem may be avoided if the 
intervention is closed, or in other words, when the amounts of foreign 
currency sold and purchased during the period is equal. 
3. The assessment of results of interventions may become ambiguous when the 
equilibrium level is not static, but is subject to some kind of a trend. Once 
again, unprofitable intervention may have a stabilizing effect. Moreover, the 
assessment would depend on what has taken place first: sales or purchases 
of the foreign currency. By incorporating the implicit assumption of the 
interest rate differential, an amendment of the criterion would give results only 
under the specific set of circumstances, when 
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"...the nominal interest differential is equal to the path of the equilibrium 
exchange rate. Conversely, it can be seen, that if the interest differential 
is no longer equal to the exchange rate trend ... commercial profits or 
losses will still be measured correctly, but they can no longer serve as 
a reliable indicator of the stabilizing impact of official intervention" 
(Mayer and Taguchi, 1983, p. 16-17). 
Generally speaking, if judged on the basis of the profitability criterion, the 
stabilizing interventions would be rejected in most cases. In this sense, the criterion 
is definitely negatively-biased. Mayer and Taguchi advised to drop the profitability 
criterion and substitute it with the more direct approach disregarding interest rate 
differentials; thus, shifting from the use of the profitability criterion to another 
method. This should allow measuring whether the interventions, which occurred 
at a particular point in time, tended to push the actual exchange rate to the then 
prevailing equilibrium level, or not. The most important advantages of the 
alternatively suggested criterion are: (i) the opportunity to disregard interest rate 
differentials, and (ii) the possibility to avoid a dependence of the whole 
computation on the single (equilibrium) exchange rate level. The latter is even more 
significant as it facilitates the consideration of shifts in the trend of the equilibrium 
exchange rate. However, a serious difficulty with this approach lies in the search 
for the equilibrium rate. Mayer and Taguchi suggested to use some long-term 
moving average of the actual exchange rate as its proxy. 
This paper is based on the method elaborated by Mayer and Taguchi in spite 
of its shortcomings admitted by the authors themselves. There are some additional 
limitations concerning the use of this method with respect to the particular case 
of the CBR's interventions. The choice of a moving average for the actual 
exchange rate can be only arbitrary with respect to the number of points taken into 
consideration when the equilibrium exchange rate is computed. The less points 
considered, the less likely the result would look like any kind of equilibrium rate. 
However, increasing the number of points raises a further problem. The more time 
between points, the earlier the influence on the level of the equilibrium rate. This 
feature may be disturbing when breaks in trends are under consideration. 
Consequently, weighted averages should be used, but even this would not clear 
the method of negative or positive bias (which depends on the general direction 
of the trend). 
Another problem is linked to the actual practice of interventions made by the 
CBR. These are taking place during the sessions of the MICEX in Moscow (also 
at St. Petersburg Currency Exchange during the second half of 1992).[4] Currency 
exchanges in Russia work in the following way. Member banks of the particular 
exchange (approximately 90 banks are members of the MICEX) bid at each session 
under the directions given by their clients during the period preceding the session. 
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The aggregate data on supply and demand is at the CBR's disposal before the 
session. However, the banks may withdraw some of their bids during the sessions. 
As a result, the starting supply and demand bears the influence of the longer-term 
trends and expectations of the economic agents. However, interventionist policy 
seriously depends on interaction of supply and demand during each session. 
It follows, that the results of the study may be only approximate, either with 
respect to the actual way of using the Mayer and Taguchi method, or with respect 
to any cross-country, or cross-time comparisons. 
7.4 Evidence of CBR Intervention Policy 
As in Mayer and Taguchi's paper, this study uses three versions of the same 
method for the data on the CBR's interventions during 1992. 
The first version measures, in a simple way, the divergence of the actual 
exchange rate from the moving average. The weighted moving average was 
constructed on the basis of the data for 10 successive session days. Intervention 
was considered to be stabilizing if it succeeded to push the actual rate towards the 
equilibrium rate, and vice versa. The ratio of stabilizing and destabilizing 
interventions was computed on the basis of dollar amounts used for interventions, 
as well as on the basis of the number of cases when intervention was 'OK', or was 
not 'OK' (ordinary criterion). 
The second version considers the fact that the intervention seems to be more 
justified if it occurs when the divergence of the spot exchange rate from the 
equilibrium exchange rate is more significant. The 'weighted equilibrium' criterion 
was again computed as the ratio of 'good' interventions to 'bad' ones. In this case, 
however, both alternatives were represented by the product of the dollar amount 
of intervention and the divergence of the actual exchange rate from the moving 
average, expressed as a natural logarithm. The second criterion partially 
compensates for an arbitrary choice of the equilibrium exchange rate, because only 
significantly 'out of line' (divergent) levels of the actual exchange rate actually 
influence the ratio. 
The third version utilizes the approach of "leaning against the wind" (LAW), 
suggested by Mayer and Taguchi. The LAW is based on the following 
consideration: as the behavior of the market participants acquires considerable 
inertia, it may be advisable for the central bank to start to 'brake' this inertia before 
it has resulted in violent deviation from the equilibrium exchange rate. In order 
to take account of this consideration, the LAW criterion distinguishes between two 
types of exchange rate zones. 
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Figure 7.2 MICEX and St-Petersburg Currency Exchanges, 1992 
"Firstly, a band around the hypothetical equilibrium rate within which 
the stabilizing impact of intervention is judged according to the LAW 
criterion. And, secondly, the exchange rate zones outside this band, where 
official intervention is evaluated in terms of its impact in pushing the 
exchange rate towards, or away from, its equilibrium level" (Mayer and 
Taguchi, 1983, p. 26). 
In this paper, the stable band of -5% to +5% around the equilibrium level is used. 
The actual exchange rate, equilibrium exchange rate, and the LAW-band are shown 
in Figure 7.2. It depicts the dynamics of the MICEX (Moscow) and St. Petersburg 
currency exchanges during 1992. Notice the relative stability of the exchange rate 
for the first half of the year and the dramatic depreciation of the ruble beginning 
at the end of August 1992. 
The summary of the use of different criteria regarding the CBR's intervention 
policy is given in Table 7.2. The data presented in this table suggests three 
conclusions: 
1. On the whole, 'stabilizing' interventions exceeded 'destabilizing' ones during 
1992. 
2. During the first as well as the second half of the year, objectives of 
interventionist policies were achieved by policy-makers. The divergence of 
the actual rate index from the equilibrium rate is illustrated together with the 
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Table 7.2 Ratios of 'stabilizing' to 'destabilizing' interventions 
Unweighted, Unweighted, 
intervention number 
amounts of cases Weighted LAW 
- 
1992 2.54 1.68 1.88 8.37 
Jan-July 1.09 0.85 0.77 4.27 
Aug-Dec 5.45 3.13 4.13 18.13 
Divergence of Spot Ex. Rate from Equil. Ex. CBR sales(-)/purchases(+) - right scale 
Rote - left scale 
Figure 7.3 Divergence of Spot Exchange Rate from Equilibrium Exchange Rate, 
1992 
instances and magnitudes of intervention in Figure 7.3. At least two criteria 
suggest that the policy was 'successfully destabilizing' during the first half 
of 1992, in the sense that it corresponded to its goal to push the actual rate 
towards the predetermined level no matter how the market reacted (two ratios 
in Table 7.2 are less than one, and another is only slightly higher). 
Throughout the last 6 months of 1992, the CBR was trying to smooth the 
variations of the exchange rate around the long term-level. As all four 
criteria show, 'stabilizing' interventions significantly outnumbered those with 
a 'destabilizing' effect (ratios in Table 7.2 are mostly positive and greater 
than one). 
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3. The LAW criterion has been revealed as giving too optimistic an impression 
of CBR policy for the second half of the year. The problem with it may be 
attributed to the choice of the LAW-band width. It is advisable, that the future 
application of the LAW criterion is amended in a manner such that only those 
interventions inside the LAW-band should be judged according to the LAW 
criterion, which occur immediately after the rate has entered the band from 
outside. All others should be regarded according to ordinary criterion. 
7.5 'Stabilizing the Market' Goal Revisited 
As suggested by Goldberg, some evidence should be sought in order to support 
the idea expressed above; namely, whether variations in the exchange rate actually 
influenced the behavior of any agent in the Russian economy. In this sense, the 
CBR policy of 'smoothing out' the exchange rate variations could be judged as 
reasonable and justified. It is very likely, that available macroeconomic data would 
not be sufficient for a comprehensive evaluation. The average ratio of foreign trade 
operations in the balances of industrial enterprises was traditionally rather low in 
Russia. The deterioration of PPP during 1992 decreased the relevance of 
macroeconomic data even more. Therefore, the idea outlined in this paper can be 
applied for a rather limited segment of the economy, most likely for net importers. 
However, it is necessary to consider the following peculiarities of hard 
currency regulations and business practices in Russia. The majority of Russian 
exporters demand hard currency for import needs. They have had to sell 20% of 
their export earnings through currency exchanges, but there is nothing forbidding 
them to buy the same amount of hard currency at the very same bids. As a result, 
the free 'residue' of hard currency supply at each session (and, especially, in the 
long run) is severely limited. So, the foreign exchange supply provided by the CBR 
(and its variations) will be crucial for examining whether the Central Bank policy 
influences economic fundamentals and not the actual exchange rate fluctuations. 
Moreover, the actual exchange rate may not play the role indicated above for 
part of the importers (of food, spare parts, and many other commodities) because 
they enjoy preferential treatment in explicit or implicit terms. For example, easy 
access to cheap credit may have the same effect as the subsidized exchange rate. 
As a result, these importers may hold the demand at practically any level of the 
exchange rate. Therefore, there are not many economic agents for whom 
fluctuations of the actual rate may alter long-run behavior. These are net importers 
generally from the non-state, non-industrial sector (who have no state support) and 
speculators. The data on economic activity of these two groups, alas, is very 
difficult to specify and trace. 
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7.6 Conclusions 
Since the second half of 1992, the CBR has seriously decreased its participation 
in the foreign exchange market. The Central Bank officially declared that the major 
goal of its interventionist policy is to smooth the fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
The data supplied in this paper and the fact that foreign exchange reserves of the 
CBR accumulated during the period studied, reveal that the objectives of the CBR's 
policy were realized. 
Notes 
[I] According to the Letter of the CBR No. 41 of 28/06/93, the whole amount of the 
obligatory sales should be sold directly to one of the hard currency exchanges. 
[2] Kommersant-Weekly, No.7, February 15-21, 1993, p. 12. 
[3] According to the Letter of the CBR, quoted in the previous footnote, the sales to one 
of the exchanges should have been executed during the 14 days period. 
[4] The CBR participated on up to six exchanges by the fall of 1993. 
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Chapter 8 
Exchange Rate Regime 
in the Transition Period 
Miroslav Hrnc'ii 
Czech National Bank, Prague, Czech Republic 
8.1 Introduction 
In early 1990, at the start of the Czechoslovakian transition, three principal 
questions related to the exchange rate emerged: 
What could and should be the role of exchange rate? 
What level of the exchange rate should be adopted? and, 
What type of exchange rate regime should be maintained? 
These questions had to be addressed in an ex-ante manner. The transition also 
implied a discontinuity in the sphere of exchange rate policy. The trends and data 
from past developments could not provide a rational benchmark or, at least, could 
not be referred to in unqualified terms. While discussing the potential options of 
exchange rate policies, it was evident that their role would be, particularly in the 
initial phase, constrained by the inherited distortions from the centrally planned 
economy 'episode'. Nonetheless, an early opening of the small Czechoslovakian 
economy was considered crucial for the progress and ultimate success of the entire 
transition. 
Already in 1993, the processes materialized and the experience accumulated 
to form the basis for the discussion of exchange rate issues. These developments 
facilitate an analysis in positive terms, and not only in normative ones. 
With the benefit of hindsight, this paper examines the issues of the exchange 
rate's role in the course of the transition in former Czechoslovakia. In the first part, 
concepts and initial aims of exchange rate policies are contrasted with the results 
and lessons learned. On this basis, some conclusions for exchange rate policies 
in the Czech Republic[]] are drawn in the second part of the paper. 
8.2 Sources of Insight into the Role of the Exchange Rate 
Although neither theoretical reasoning nor experience from elsewhere in the world 
economy provided ready-made solutions for the selection of exchange rate regimes 
in the transition economies, both of these sources of insight proved relevant and 
useful for the policies and concepts adopted. While the theoretical approaches 
(particularly regarding optimal currency area and optimal exchange rate regimes[2]) 
provided desirable criteria, arguments, and organizational framework for the 
discussion, the lessons learned from postwar developments pointed to the 
importance of the international environment and the specific conditions of 
individual countries. Their properties co-determined the ratio of advantages and 
disadvantages as well as costs and benefits of exchange rate regime options. 
In the transition economies, unlike in other parts of the world economy, the 
institutional and economic environment undergoes rapid and wide-ranging changes, 
though with different speed across individual countries. This is their specific, 
distinguishing feature. As a result, the real contents and impacts of various 
exchange rate regime options and concepts may differ widely in the successive 
periods. The rationale and goals of a nominal exchange rate anchor, for example, 
may be quite different in the initial stabilization stage compared to the follow-up 
stages. 
8.2.1 Development Stages in the Transition 
Based on past experience, three stages are distinguished within the transition 
process: 
(i) Transition in a narrow sense: Includes macroeconomic stabilization, price, 
foreign trade and foreign exchange liberalization and deregulation, the 
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initiation of institutional, systemic and legal changes to create a market 
economy framework, based especially on the privatization program launched; 
(ii) Adjustment and consolidation period: After the institutions and the rules of 
the new system have been introduced, the newly created market institutions 
and agents must undergo learning and adjustment processes. The resulting 
resource reallocation and income redistribution is intermediated through 
progressing factor markets: in particular, labor, money, capital, and foreign 
exchange markets; and, 
(iii) Period of 'normality': The transition economy has already achieved the 
character of a 'normal' European market economy. The ensuing economic 
trends and policy issues now primarily result from the 'standard' market 
economy functions and processes, and not from the legacy of the centrally 
planned economy. 
Though the given stages cannot be separated by a clear-cut dividing line and the 
mentioned processes inevitably overlap, their identification, which highlights the 
substance of each period, provides useful organizing criteria. By historical 
coincidence, the dividing line between the first and second stages approximately 
coincides with the split of former Czechoslovakia into two separate states, the 
Czech and Slovak republics. 
The previous period, extending for three years from the Velvet revolution of 
November 1989 until the end of 1992, was dominated by macroeconomic 
stabilization and liberalization in both the domestic and external spheres and by 
the initiation of an extensive privatization process. An asymmetry between the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions of the transition was symptomatic 
for this stage. Although they were initiated during this time, most institutional and 
ownership changes were yet to be made effective and consolidated. Macroeconomic 
measures, including exchange rate policies, consequently lacked adequate 
microfoundations. 
A restrictive stance with respect to macroeconomic policies coupled with a 
number of external shocks resulted in a severe, unexpectedly deep recession in the 
stabilization stage. The subsequent period of adjustment and consolidation, on the 
other hand, should create conditions for economic recovery and positive growth 
rates. The aspired effects of privatization, of increasing inflow of foreign 
investment, and the formation of new market institutions and agents are expected 
to contribute to this goal. 
8.3 Exchange Rate Policies and Developments in 1990-92 
At the beginning of Czechoslovakian economic transition, the issues concerning 
the exchange rate level and exchange rate regime were closely linked with the 
policies on currency convertibility. While there was a fairly general consensus 
about its desirability, views differed widely as to what type and degree of 
convertibility and, particularly, when it should be introduced: should at least a 
limited type be introduced at the beginning of the transition process (to follow, 
among others, the Polish approach) or should it be conceived only as an element 
in a longer-term gradual adjustment (the concept followed in Western Europe in 
the 1950s)? 
8.3.1 Pros and Cons of Early Convertibility 
Czechoslovakian authorities opted for simultaneous liberalization in both the 
domestic and external spheres, including the move to so-called internal 
convertibility for registered businesses on current account items.[3] These 
measures were implemented as a concerted package at the beginning of January 
1991.[4] 
Opponents of the reform claimed that such a rapid introduction of 
convertibility and liberalization of foreign trade, requiring a large devaluation, 
would be premature, inflationary, and too costly. The alternative option was to give 
domestic liberalization priority and proceed with loosening regulations in the 
external sphere in only a step-by-step fashion within a time horizon of a few years. 
While both options evidently had their particular benefits and costs, the early move 
to currency convertibility, however limited, seemed to be a necessary component 
of the chosen policy package given the transition strategy and prevailing initial 
conditions. The benefits of hindsight disclose that the introduction of internal 
currency convertibility proved to be a success. The regime has been maintained 
without any serious tensions and even further extended within a relatively short 
time. 
The commitment to early convertibility required that it be credible and that 
the conditions for its sustainability would likely to be met. On the microeconomic 
level, a satisfactory standard of financial discipline was especially required. On 
the macroeconomic level, aggregate demand had to be under control and a 
reasonable balance in foreign exchange payments secured, at least in the medium 
term (the flow issue), as well as a sufficient level of reserves (the stock issue). The 
main procedure to achieve these goals was seen in the implementation of the 
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government's stabilization program based on the restrictive stance of macro- 
economic policies. 
However, under the given conditions, a number of serious constraints were 
faced: 
(i) Stabilization policies had to be applied mostly within the inherited institutional 
framework in an almost entirely 'socialized' economy. The responsiveness 
of traditional state enterprises to restrictive fiscal, monetary, and credit policies 
was hardly predictable, but it had to be assumed as relatively low; and 
(ii) The economic policy calibration and targeting had to cope with the 
discontinuities of previous trends and with a rather high degree of uncertainty 
regarding current economic development. This uncertainty was due to both 
the legacy of the past as well as to a number of contemporary external shocks 
coinciding with fundamental institutional changes initiated domestically. 
Based on the resolution to cope with these limitations, the authorities attempted 
to adjust their policies accordingly and focused their efforts in the following three 
main areas: 
(i) Linking the instruments of traditional stabilization policies (fiscal, monetary, 
and credit) in a pragmatic way with the instruments of wage and incomes 
policies (i.e., with the elements of so-called heterodox approach); 
(ii) Opting for a more restrictive policy stance and for an 'overshooting' 
devaluation of the domestic currency than seemed warranted by the relatively 
stable macroeconomic situation of Czechoslovakia; and 
(iii) Undertaking efforts to increase the volume of foreign exchange reserves.[5] 
As a result, securing the necessary conditions for the sustainability of currency 
convertibility, however limited, implied considerable costs from the very beginning 
of the transition. However, the issue of convertibility was closely intertwined with 
the entire concept of the specifically selected transition strategy and, therefore, the 
incurred costs were not just the function of early convertibility, but of the given 
type of transition program as a whole. 
8.3.2 The Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime 
A competitive exchange rate is the major determining factor for a sustainable 
balance-of-payments development. Given the wide range of uncertainties faced at 
the beginning of the transition, both domestic and external, the selection of an 
exchange rate level and an exchange rate regime was far from being an 
unambiguous and non-controversial issue. 
In order to avoid some uncertainties involved, the floating exchange rate 
option was repeatedly suggested, at least to facilitate the initial setting of market- 
like values. Nevertheless, the potential merits of such a solution seemed severely 
constrained in the environment of the transition economies: in particular, due to 
the existence of rather thin currency markets, lack of fully functioning foreign 
exchange market institutions, and absence of forward foreign exchange markets 
and of short term arbitrage and speculative flows which, under certain conditions, 
could work towards stabilizing the exchange rate (Williamson, 1991). Conse- 
quently, the extent of misalignments and exchange rate volatility was likely to be 
much greater than in consolidated market economies. And, even in those stabilized 
economies with experience with a floating exchange rate regime, results were all 
too often not particularly encouraging. The instability of this key price would also 
undermine the main aim of currency convertibility: to discipline domestic agents 
and to promote adjustment of domestic relative prices. 
If the monetary authorities tried to intervene to dampen the exchange rate 
volatility, for instance, if the resulting solution would be a kind of managed or dirty 
float, the crucial issue would immediately re-assert itself: how to identify the 
desired exchange rate levels which should be defended? 
Czechoslovakia opted for a fixed exchange rate regime with the aim of using 
the nominal exchange rate as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization - as 
a nominal anchor of the stabilization process. This approach followed similar 
examples applied elsewhere in stabilization programs utilizing the fact that the 
exchange rate is a special 'macroeconomic' price with a potential impact across 
the entire national economy.[6] Despite embarking on the strategy of a 'nominal 
exchange rate anchor', the Czechoslovakian authorities did not commit themselves 
to any pre-announced period of keeping the exchange rate unaffected. Given the 
extent of uncertainties, shocks, discontinuities, and initiated changes, including 
institutional ones, it appeared unrealistic to attempt to fix an irrevocable rate at 
that time and to make it reasonably sustainable for a pre-determined period. 
Such a solution was, in a sense, a compromise; a combination of the elements 
of the stabilized 'norm' and the flexibility of possible adjustment. However, just 
because of the lack of any ex-ante determined commitment andlor the rule for 
parity changes, this compromise could not aspire to create the credibility of the 
adopted exchange rate. Since the very beginning of the transition, Czechoslovakian 
authorities, particularly the Central Bank, sought to make only realistic 
commitments and to avoid, as far as possible, any breakdown and retreat. Again, 
hindsight shows that such an approach proved to be rewarding. Developing 
exchange rate policies as 'credible' under the given conditions actually required 
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a certain sense of potential revocability of the given rate; that is, to postpone 
'earning' its credibility to a later stage. 
The Czechoslovakian koruna (CSK) has been pegged to a basket of five 
currencies since the beginning of January 1991. This peg has remained virtually 
untouched.[7] The changes only reflected the shifts in cross-rates of basket 
currencies. The same policy of nominal exchange rate stability was followed by 
the Czech authorities after the split of the federal republic and the separation of 
the Czech and Slovak koruna at the beginning of 1993. The stabilized level of the 
CSK's and later the CZK's nominal exchange rate distinguishes their developments 
from Poland's zloty and Hungary's forint. Both Hungary and Poland have been 
adjusting nominal exchange rates to restore their competitive levels given a 
substantial inflation differential. 
In Poland, the extensively devalued nominal exchange rate (by 31.6% against 
the peg) introduced along with the zloty's internal convertibility at the beginning 
of the Polish stabilization program in January 1990, survived unchanged until May 
1991, despite 250% inflation in 1990. In May 1991 the zloty was devalued by 
14.4%, in February 1992 by 12% and again in August 1993 by 8%. In addition, 
the crawling peg system was introduced in October 1991, implying continuous pre- 
announced depreciation of the zloty vis-a-vis convertible currencies: each banking 
day the value of the basket was increased by 9 zlotys, and presently by 15 zlotys. 
In a less inflationary environment, the Hungarian authorities corrected the 
ensuing price level differential via repeated but relatively small discrete 
devaluations of the forint. In 1991, the forint was devalued twice against its 
currency basket, by 15% and 5.8%; in 1992 on three occasions, but each time by 
only less than 2% (1.9%, 1.6%, 1.9% respectively); and, finally, four times in 1993 
by a total of 10.1%, including a 3% drop in July. In 1991, the policy intentionally 
did not correct for the entire inflation differential allowing thus for real appreciation 
of the forint with the aim to promote gradual competitive adjustment of Hungarian 
firms. In 1992, the official policy evidently returned to a stabilized real exchange 
rate target. 
8.3.3 The Underlying Factors of the CSK Exchange Rate Developments 
in 1990-1992 
Given all the upheavals of the first stage of transition, the unchanged nominal 
exchange rate of the former Czechoslovakian koruna and now of the Czech koruna 
since the end of 1990 raises several questions: What are the reasons behind this 
stability? Is the given nominal exchange rate likely to remain unchanged also in 
the next stage of transition, or is the move to a further devaluation only delayed, 
compared to the Polish and Hungarian experience? Under which conditions would 
it be justified to continue maintaining an unchanged nominal rate? 
8.3.3.1 Balance of Payments Developments 
After a sharp deterioration in 1990, the current account balance in convertible 
currencies recovered and registered significant surpluses both in 1991 and 1992. 
Two main tendencies were surfacing in the period under consideration (see Table 
8.1); firstly, the role of trade in invisibles (i.e., services) has substantially increased 
in the current account compared to the past when merchandise trade flows were 
dominant. The growing services balance surplus was solely responsible for (in 
particular, receipts from transport services and tourism) covering the increasing 
trade deficit; and, secondly, the capital account revealed that the increased inflow 
of long term capital (direct foreign investment (DFI) and foreign loans, mostly by 
international organizations) was just matched by the outflow of short term capital. 
On the whole, balance of payments proved to be more favorable than expected 
in the years 199 1 and 1992. In 1991, a current account surplus of USD 0.3 billion 
was achieved instead of an envisaged deficit of USD 2.5 billion, as estimated by 
Table 8.1 Balance of Payments in Convertible Currencies 1989-92 (in million 
USD) 
Current account 
Trade balance 
Service balance 
Income balance 
Transfers 
Capital account 326 326 47 
Direct foreign investment 256 181 592 
Portfolio investment - - - 
Other long term capital -53 718 1732 
Short term capital 123 -573 -2277 
Errors and omissions -197 -324 494 
Changes in reserves (increase = -) -569 1102 -898 120 
Source: Czech National Bank 
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Table 8.2 Balance of Payments Developments in 1992 (in million USD) 
1-6 1-9 1-11 1-12 
Current account 826 895 687 226 
Trade balance 188 -44 1 -790 -1576 
Service balance 433 1128 1329 1652 
Income balance 111 58 -22 9 
Transfers 93 150 170 140 
Capital account -54 -259 155 4 1 
Direct foreign investment 443 968 995 1055 
Portfolio investment - 1 - -43 
Other long term capital 520 658 673 47 1 
Short term capital -1021 - 1887 -1517 - 1 443 
Errors and omissions 28 73 -556 -386 
Changes in reserves (increase = -) -800 -709 -286 120 
Source: Czech National Bank 
both government and IMF experts.[8] In 1992, an initially predicted deficit of 
USD 0.6 billion was revised at mid-year to an expected surplus of USD 1 to 1.2 
billion (the surplus effectively achieved in the first half of the year amounted to 
USD 0.8 billion). However, the end-year result was much more modest, due to 
the abrupt deterioration of the trade balance in the fourth quarter, especially in 
December 1992. The data on balance of payments in the second half of 1992 
(Table 8.2) portray these developments. 
The increasing trade deficit may point to a gradual loss of competitiveness, 
caused by the growing disparity in 'fundamentals'. The abrupt deterioration of 
the trade balance experienced in December 1992 (the trade deficit doubled in the 
course of one month) also seemed to suggest the impact of biased expectations 
on the part of both domestic and foreign subjects. Among the reasons were the 
forthcoming split of the federal state, uncertainties concerning the future currency 
arrangements between the newly created political entities, potential devaluations 
andfor retreat to trade restrictions, and the extensive tax reform introduced at the 
beginning 1993.[9] 
Turning now to the capital account, the inflow of DFI almost doubled in 1992 
compared to 1991, steadily increasing throughout the whole year. Short-term 
capital outflow already started in 1990 and attained a substantial dimension in 
terms of the small Czechoslovakian economy in 1991 (compare data in Table 8.1). 
The existing positive interest rate differential between Czechoslovakia and foreign 
markets was evidently outweighed by the uncertainties and risks perceived during 
the transition, including exchange rate risks. However, short-term capital outflow 
partly reversed towards the end of 1992 when the uncertainties and biased 
expectations culminated. 
8.3.3.2 Changed Institutional Setting and Exchange Rate Level 
Despite its formal existence, the exchange rate was only of minor relevance under 
the traditional centrally planned economic framework, which persisted until the 
end of the 1980s in Czechoslovakia. While pegged to the basket described earlier 
since 1979, the 'official' exchange rate was maintained as unchanged throughout 
the 1980s despite its increasing overvaluation. On the other hand, various black 
and parallel market rates, operating outside the legal framework, provided a 
distorted evaluation of the currency as well, inevitably depressing its value to an 
unrealistic level. Though more relevant and realistic, the 'implied' exchange ratios 
and various coefficients used domestically for trade and non-trade flows were 
widely dispersed between official and parallel market rates. 
Only as late as 1990 were steps towards the unification of existing diversified 
exchange ratios initiated by eliminating the duality of the so-called commercial 
and non-commercial rates at the beginning of the year and phasing out a special 
tourist rate at the end of that year. However, this unification could only effectively 
materialize provided a proper exchange rate level was introduced. The requirements 
associated with the scheduled general liberalization and opening of the economy 
called for an initial undervaluation of the exchange rate compared to what could 
be defined as the 'fundamental equilibrium exchange rate'. The controversial issue 
was by how much to deviate and, consequently, by how much to devalue? The 
policy objective was to avoid both an unnecessarily large undervaluation, which 
would imply inflationary cost-push pressures and mitigate the desirable disciplining 
function of external competition, and overvaluation, which would result in 
unsustainable balance-of-payments deficits undermining the very existence of 
currency convertibility and the active liberalization program. 
A wide range of values was proposed: from CSK 16 per USD, which was 
close to the former 'commercial rate', up to 35-40 CSK per USD, which 
approached the marginal and parallel market ratios. Czechoslovakia finally started 
its stabilization and liberalization program at an exchange rate of CSK 28 per USD. 
Though it could be argued that the former exchange ratios, including the so-called 
commercial rate, hardly represented the de facto exchange rate since the resulting 
depreciation of the CSK was substantial: from CSK 14.29 per USD at the end of 
December 1989 to CSK 28 per USD on December 28, 1990. The option adopted 
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by the authorities was thus closer to the existing marginal and parallel market rates. 
As a result, the depreciation appeared to overshoot an ex-ante acceptable target. 
The adopted exchange rate was the outcome of three successive devaluations 
of the CSK vis-ii-vis convertible currencies in the course of 1990: the CSK was 
devalued by 16.6% on January 8, by 55.3% on October 15, and by 15.98% on 
December 28, 1990. The first two devaluations represented more-or-less only 
administrative corrections of the existing exchange ratios rather than proper 
devaluations since they were implemented as isolated acts without accompanying 
price liberalization. Thus, the impact was limited. The second devaluation (of 
October 15) was originally scheduled for the beginning of 1991 as a component 
of the liberalization package, which also implied phasing out the so-called foreign 
exchange retention quotas. As a preannounced policy, the devaluation became the 
object of much public debate and also gave enterprises and households the 
opportunity to react accordingly. Imports dramatically increased in the second half 
of 1990, simultaneous with growing pressure on the liquidity of the banking sector 
and on foreign exchange reserves. In addition, a substantial share of foreign 
investors recalled their deposits from Czechoslovakian banks despite the official 
support from abroad to the reform program of the new, non-communist 
Czechoslovakian government. Therefore, the second devaluation was thus an 
'unplanned' act implemented under distress, with the aim to reverse the depletion 
of foreign exchange reserves. 
These developments reminded authorities about the role of expectations and 
represented a harsh lesson from their own conduct and policies. However, the 
resulting tensions also prompted them to err in overshooting the undervaluation 
rather than the other way around. Consequently, the third of the successive 
devaluations followed, finally fixing the exchange rate at CSK 28 per USD. 
8.3.3.3 Exchange Rate and the Developments of 'Fundamentals' 
In order to identify underlying trends affecting the exchange rate of the CSK in 
the first, stabilization stage of the transition, calculations were made to assess the 
developments of: 
- purchasing power parity (PPP); 
- parallel market rates (PMR); 
- nominal effective exchange rate (NEER); 
- real effective exchange rates (REER), based both on consumer price indexes 
(CPI) and producer price indexes (PPI); and 
- unit labor costs in industry (ULC).[lO] 
Purchasing Power Parity Developments 
A common feature of the former centrally planned economies was a wide gap 
between domestic and external purchasing power of their currencies, significantly 
wider than in comparable market economies (see Summers and Heston, 1988). 
The devaluations introduced at the start of the Czechoslovakian economic 
transition in 1990 widened this gap still further. At that time, most expert studies 
identified the PPP rate in the range of CSK 7-8 per USD. Using the mid-point of 
the interval (i.e., 7.50 CSKAJSD) as a benchmark, the resulting trends in the PPP 
rate are presented in Figure 8.1 (for data see Table 8.3). The registered decrease 
in the implied purchasing power of the CSK with respect to USD from CSK 7.50 
in January 1990, to CSK 13.39 in December 1992 reflects Czechoslovakia's 
inflation differential as measured by CPIs. 
As follows from data in Table 8.3, the ratio between exchange rate and PPP 
rate, amounting to 2.17 in January 1990, reached a high at the end of 1990 after 
the devaluations and in expectation of a sweeping liberalization of domestic prices. 
Thereafter, it decreased only gradually from the record level of 2.89 in December 
1990 to 2.13 two years later. Thus, the December 1992 figure almost matched the 
initial level of January 1990. A study by PlanEcon (PlanEcon Report 16-17,18, 
1992) assessed the PPP rate of the CSK even more favorably: 6.20 CSKAJSD in 
- Purchasing power parity - Nomlnol effective - Parallel market rate 
rate (PPP) exchange rate (NEER) (PMR) I 
Figure 8.1 Official Exchange Rate, Parallel Market Rate, and Purchasing Power 
Parity of CSK 
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Table 8.3 Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, Purchasing Power Parity and 
Parallel Market Rate of CSK in 1989-1992 (CSK per USD, average 
per period) 
1 2 3 4 5 
p p p p  
Note: 1 = Purchasing power parity rate (PPP). 2 = Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), 3 = Parallel market 
rate (PMR), 4 = NEERIPPP (2:1), 5 = PMRMEER (3:2). 
January 1990 and 10.30 CSWUSD in May 1992. While deviating at the initial 
level, the rate of change coincides with our estimates. 
Unlike in the Czechoslovakian case, the exchange rate/PPP rate ratio decreased 
significantly in both Poland and Hungary. In January 1990, the level dropped from 
3.88 in Poland and 2.15 in Hungary to 1.70 and 1.68 respectively by May 1992. 
Comparing these findings, one might conclude that the CSK remained undervalued 
based on the PPP criterion. 
Parallel Market Rate 
Contrary to PPP developments, the initial wide spread between parallel market and 
official exchange rates of the CSK (coefficient of almost 3 in 1989 and 2.5 in 
January 1990) was virtually eliminated since April-May 199 1 after successful 
introduction of internal currency convertibility (compare Figure 8.1 and Table 8.3). 
The remaining spread was, as a rule, only marginal - as low as 2% in the first 
half of 1992:However, it did widen again to as much as 6-8% by the end of the 
year due to the re-appearing uncertainties associated with the forthcoming split 
of Czechoslovakia. 
Real Effective Exchange Rates 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) regularly calculates and publishes real 
effective exchange rate (REER) indices only for Hungary and Poland. Our own 
calculations were made for Czechoslovakia and, therefore, cannot be considered 
strictly comparable with the IMF figures. Although the concept of real effective 
exchange rate itself is unambiguous there is a number of methodological and 
technical issues that may qualify the results and their interpretation when REER 
is defined as a nominal effective exchange rate index adjusted for relative 
movements in national price (or cost) indicators of the home country and its partner 
(or competitor) countries. Without engaging to deeply in their discussion,[l I ]  some 
notes specifying the approach adopted in the calculations of the CSK REERs 
presented in this paper (see Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2) are necessary and described 
below. 
(a) REER appreciation and depreciation. 
A country's exchange rate is considered to appreciate in real effective terms if: 
the devaluation (depreciation) of its nominal exchange rate is less than its relative 
inflation; or if the revaluation (appreciation) of its nominal exchange rate is less 
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Table 8.4 Effective Exchange Rates, 0.65 DEM + 0.35 USD per CSK (Indices, 
January 1990 = 100) 
Note: 1 = NEER, 2 = CPI Czechoslovakia, 3 = CPI basket currency countries, 4 = WPI Czechoslovakia. 5 = 
WPI basket currency countries, 6 = REER (consumer prices), 7 = REER (wholesale prices). 
I -NEER - REER (consumer prices) x -  REER (wholesale prices) 
Figure 8.2 Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates 
than its relative deflation compared to the (weighted) average of its partner 
countries. In the type of formula adopted here, real appreciation of the domestic 
currency materializes when the index value is above 100 (or, in relative terms, 
when its value increases) and vice-versa for real depreciation. 
(b) The choice of partner countries and of the weighting criterion for the selected 
currencies. 
The calculations presented in Figure 8.2 and Table 8.4 are based on the 
composition and weights of the basket to which the CZK has been pegged since 
May 2, 1993 (DEM 65% and USD 35%). Just for comparison, parallel calculations 
were also made adopting composition and weights of the basket as valid for the 
CSK peg in 1992; namely, USD 49.07%, DEM 36.15%, ATS 8.07%, CHF 3.79%, 
and FRF 2.92%. In principle, the resulting trends of both versions coincided: after 
a substantial real depreciation of the CSK in the fourth quarter of 1990, a reversal 
recurred in January 1991. Since then, the CSK was gradually appreciating in real 
terms throughout 1991 and 1992, until at the end of 1992 it virtually reverted to 
the ratios of early 1990; that is, to the situation at the start of the Czechoslovakian 
economic transition. Nevertheless, the shift in the basket's composition 
(particularly in the relative weights of DEM and USD) affected the data as 
expressed by the deviations of 9% to 10%. 
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Comparing the December 1992 figures, the REER index based on the CPI 
was 96% and on the PPI 102% in the first option (as presented in Table 8.4), while 
102% and 107% respectively in the second option. This comparison shows the 
sensitivity of the REER's calculations depending on the choice of the basket and 
points to the necessity for caution in discussing and interpreting the obtained 
figures. 
(c) Options in price (cost) indices. 
Calculations of REERs presented in this paper are based on both CPI and PPI 
indices as quoted in the international financial statistics (IFS).[12] An alternative 
basis for the calculation could be various selected cost indicators, such as relative 
labor costs. 
The price data for Czechoslovakia was not, however, entirely comparable to 
that from the basket market economies in the period under consideration. In the 
years 1990-92, the entire institutional framework of price setting changed in 
Czechoslovakia. In 1990, most prices were still regulated. One year later, at the 
beginning of 1991, approximately 87% of consumer prices had been effectively 
liberalized. As a consequence, both the comparability with prices from countries 
in the currency basket as well as consistency in time series were subject to 
qualifications. 
(d) Choice of the base period. 
Although the choice of the base period for REER evidently affects the results, its 
criteria are far from being clear-cut even in stabilized market economies. In 
principle, the base period should represent an interval of time in which the current 
exchange rate closely corresponded to its 'equilibrium value'. Such an approach 
is, however, hardly relevant for the former centrally planned economies in the 
initial stage of their transition. 
Instead, January 1990 was selected as the base period for REER and other 
calculations in this paper due to its quality as the starting point of the 
Czechoslovakian transition (even though the main liberalization and stabilization 
measures were taken only one year later). Thus, the reservation made above with 
respect to price consistency applies here as well. Despite the limitations and 
possible errors involved, the REER indexes provide an insight into the underlying 
trends of exchange rate developments. 
In 1990, both the NEER and REERs largely developed in a parallel way; 
depreciating only modestly in the first nine months (REER based on CPI even 
started to appreciate in the third quarter of 1990), while a rather sharp depreciation 
materialized in the fourth quarter (compare Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2). Since the 
start of 1991, the trends of NEER and REER of the CSK deviated. While the 
NEER remained almost stable for two years, the calculated REER indicates gradual 
but persistent appreciation. The REER based on CPI appreciated by 41 % and that 
based on PPI by more than 44% in the period from December 1990 to December 
1992. According to standard reasoning, this implied a corresponding loss in relative 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, the REER values at the end of 1992 just about 
matched the initial levels of January 1990, considered as the base period. 
Unlike the CSK, both the Hungarian forint and especially the Polish zloty 
appreciated considerably in the period examined. Parallel calculations for the time 
from January 1990 to May 1992 showed appreciation by 140% of the zloty and 
32% of the forint. The divergent trends in the REERs across the three reforming 
countries were linked to the differences in their inflation records and nominal 
exchange rate adjustments. 
Inflation DifSerential 
The inflation record of former Czechoslovakia was relatively favorable in terms 
of the transition economies (see Table 8.5). Apart from the price outburst following 
the sweeping price liberalization in January 1991, inflation has remained well under 
control throughout the entire period. Nonetheless, the inflation rate (partially 
fuelled by various institutional changes and shocks) considerably surpassed the 
average of the EC and OECD members (compare Table 8.6). 
Table 8.5 Consumer Prices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in 1986-92 
(average annual percentage changes over the previous year) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Czechoslovakia 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.4 10.0 57.9 10.3 
Hungary 5.3 8.6 15.5 17.0 28.9 35.0 23.0 
Poland 17.7 25.0 60.0 251.0 586.0 70.0 40.0 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Federal Statistical Office, Prague, ~ S F R ,  International Financial 
Statistics, Federal Statistical Office, Prague, ~ S F R .  
Unit Labor Costs in Czechoslovakian Industry 
The data which approximates the changes in unit labor costs (ULC) in 
Czechoslovakian industry reveal a dramatic decrease in the first half of 1991 
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Table 8.6 Inflation Differential with Respect to Market ~conomies '  
(CPI, 1985 = 100) 
1990 1991 1992 
Czechoslovakia 1 12.3 177.2 195.6 
Austria 
France 
Germany 
Switzerland 
USA 
OECD 124.1 130.5 136.1 
EC 123.4 129.7 135.3 
' Czechoslovakia compared to its 'currency basket' countries and to OECD and EC averages. 
Sources: OECD Main EEonomic Indicators, International Financial Statistics, Czech National Bank. 
(associated with a 24% drop in real wages in 1991), followed by a gradual recovery 
in the course of which the January 1990 level was finally regained towards the 
end of 1992 (compare Table 8.1A and Figure 8.1A in the Appendix). Accordingly, 
unit labor costs in industrial branches did not exceed their value at the start of the 
transition within the first three years of reform. It goes to follow that income and 
wage increases were evidently not the major causes of the inflationary pressures. 
The formula used to calculate ULC (see Estrin et al., 1992) was as follows: 
ULC = ( W/P) I (Y/L) 
where: W = wages in industry 
P = producer prices 
Y = output in industry 
L = employment in industry 
and: W/P denotes real product wage 
Y/L denotes labor productivity 
The developments of ULC in Czechoslovakian industry as well as that of its two 
components are summarized in Table 8.7. In 1991, the large fall of real product 
wage outweighed the parallel decline in labor productivity resulting in a 20% 
decrease in ULC compared to 1990. In 1992, unlike the previous year, a further 
decrease in labor productivity (though relatively modest) reinforced the impact of 
the real product wage increase. As a result, ULC started to grow again since 1992. 
Table 8.7 Unit Labor Costs, Real Product Wage, and Labor Productivity 
(January 1990 = 100) 
ULC W E  Y/L 
Annual Changes in % 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Federal Statistical Office. 
8.3.4 Conclusions on the Developments in the Stabilization Stage 
Summarizing the evidence presented, the conclusions which can be drawn on the 
underlying trends of the exchange rate developments in 1990-92 are as follows: 
(i) At the end of 1992 the competitive edge of the devaluations introduced in 
1990 appeared to be eroded. In broad terms, the values of the underlying 
ratios, as revealed by the REER and other indicators reverted to a level 
comparable to the situation at the start of the Czechoslovakian transition. 
(ii) A more favorable inflation record in Czechoslovakia than Hungary and 
Poland throughout the period under consideration was the major factor 
facilitating maintenance of an unchanged nominal exchange rate of the CSK 
and CZK since the beginning of 199 1. 
(iii) Notwithstanding this comparative advantage in terms of the transition 
economies, increases in the price level were distinctly higher than in 
developed market economies, even though the 'culprits' were also 
institutional and administrative changes and not only the 'core' inflationary 
factors alone. 
(iv) The above-mentioned disparity in inflation rates vis-d-vis partner market 
economies continued to persist in 1993. While the Czech government's and 
Central Bank's targets were 15-16%, a likely outcome is in the range of 16- 
18%. The significant deterioration compared to 1992 results (10.3% year 
average and 1 1.5% December to December) is mostly caused by institutional 
changes, in particular by the shift to a VAT regime at the beginning of 1993 
and by some further administered adjustments to still regulated energy prices. 
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(v) Unlike Hungary and Poland,[l3] unit labor costs in former Czechoslovakia 
did not exceed the initial pre-transition level in the course of the examined 
period. The wage developments, therefore, should not have been made 
responsible for price increases. However, the remarkable downward wage 
flexibility of 199 1 (real wages decreased by 24%) was unique and viable only 
once under the specific conditions at the beginning of the transition. 
(vi) Despite relatively higher domestic price increases compared to the main 
trading partners from 1990 to 1992, the implied exchange rate1PPP ratio of 
the CSK remained well above the order of 2; thus, significantly higher than 
in comparable transitional countries. This may be interpreted as a continued 
undervaluation of the CSK in comparative terms (but only according to this 
criterion). 
(vii) Given that the 'positive' inflation differential vis-6-vis partner market 
economies persists (reflecting also increasing pressure from current wage 
'recovery') and assuming an unchanged value of the nominal exchange rate 
of the CZK, the trend towards REER's appreciation is bound to continue, 
if not to accelerate in 1993. Although later than in Poland and Hungary, the 
Czech Republic is bound to face the issues concerning which exchange rate 
policies (or what changes) to adopt in order to cope with the challenges of 
competitiveness in the world markets and balancing foreign exchange 
accounts in the medium term. 
8.4 Choosing the Exchange Rate Regime 
Appropriate for the Present Stage of Transition 
Though at a differentiated speed across individual countries, the institutional and 
economic environment of the transition economies have undergone sweeping 
changes. This is their specific feature compared to the other parts of the world 
economy. With respect to the exchange rate, both the conditions for and impact 
of alternative exchange rate regimes differ in each transition stage and, 
accordingly, also the ways and means of defending the particular exchange rate. 
This provides the rationale for discussing them in terms of individual transition 
stages. 
8.4.1 Changed Environment 
In the case of former Czechoslovakia, the shift of the core of transition from 
macroeconomic to microeconomic dimensions, from the dominance of stabilization 
and liberalization to structural and institutional adjustment and consolidation, more 
or less coincided with the founding of the Czech Republic at the beginning of 
1993. In the substantially changed environment, conditions and goals were 
comparable with the situation at the start of the transition and the issue of a proper 
exchange rate regime is faced anew: should the choice be in favor of a fixed rate 
and, if yes, under which assumptions? What other alternatives might be reasonable? 
The relevant features of the present 'adjustment and consolidation' stage, 
separating it both from the previous as well as the following stages, are 
summarized as follows: 
(1) shifting the main thrust of the policies from macroeconomic to microeconomic 
and institutional fields; 
(2) progress in not only small scale but also large scale privatization in both 
production and financial sectors; 
(3) educational phase for newly established market agents and institutions of the 
factor markets, including stock exchange, interbank money and foreign 
exchange markets; 
(4) relaxation of the previously restrictive stance regarding macroeconomic 
policies and the gradual shift to a 'neutral type' combined with some selective 
measures to support economic recovery and especially oriented to the newly 
emerging private sector and small businesses; and 
(5) an extended regime of currency convertibility compared to the initial concept, 
but still keeping capital flows mostly regulated. The Czech koruna continues 
to be an internationally non-traded currency. 
As identified in section 3, the competitive edge resulting from the devaluations 
introduced in Czechoslovakia in 1990 was mostly eroded by the end of 1992 due 
to the 'positive' inflation differential vis-a-vis partner market economies and the 
resulting real exchange rate appreciation in the previous stabilization period. 
Consequently, the challenging issue facing policy-makers is: what type of exchange 
rate policies and of exchange rate regime would correspond best to securing 
balanced foreign exchange accounts in the medium run (i.e., not only temporary, 
short-term), given the conditions and requirements of the present stage? 
8.4.2 Should the Exchange Rate 'Lead' or 'Follow'? 
In principle, the competitive level of an exchange rate can be restored in two ways: 
(i) modification of the nominal exchange rate, or (ii) adjustment of domestic 
variables. If the real exchange rate's appreciation persists beyond certain limits, 
policy-makers have little choice than to resort to the first alternative in one form 
Exchange Rate Regime in the Transition Period 155 
or another. On the other hand, provided a satisfactory degree of flexibility and 
adjustment of domestic variables is achieved (the second option), the unchanged 
nominal exchange rate can remain competitive due to the stable or even 
depreciating real exchange rate. 
These alternatives reflect two different approaches to the exchange rate's role. 
According to arguments put forward by Corden (1991), the exchange rate either 
follows other policies and price and wage setting, or leads them. The first 
alternative, on the other hand, implies that the nominal exchange rate adjusts or 
is adjusted to the changing conditions in the course of time to attain real objectives, 
in particular balanced foreign exchange flows (referred to as the 'real targets' 
approach in Corden's terminology). Therefore, this alternative assumes nominal 
exchange rate flexibility. The second option, in which the exchange rate rather 
leads than follows, is the case of the 'nominal anchor approach'; namely, the fixed 
exchange rate is pegged to a stable major currency or a basket. 
The transition economies appear to be a clear case for at least some degree 
of nominal exchange rate flexibility; that is, the exchange rate should rather follow 
and not lead. The arguments for this option are based on the specific features and 
conditions of these nations, such as: 
(i) Apart from the exogenous shocks, the transition process implies turbulent 
domestic developments. The by-product of necessary adjustment and 
restructuring is a higher level of inflation compared to the partner countries 
and, consequently, the persistent trend of real exchange rate appreciation; 
(ii) Transition economies do not have enough funds and means to defend fixed 
exchange rates against short term pressures and, at the same time, lack the 
reputation for monetary stability as well as the institutional infrastructure for 
efficient defence of the exchange rate; and 
(iii) If not credible, the costs of maintaining fixed exchange rates would be 
excessively high (involving, for instance, the necessity of high real interest 
rates). 
These and other features motivated many observers to argue for some form of 
exchange rate flexibility in the transition economies.[l4] Schmieding (1992) claims 
that a 'flexible exchange rate' corresponds to the transformation. Nuti (1991) as 
well as Fry and Nuti (1992) suggest a real exchange rate anchor as the proper 
concept for the transition economies. Reality seems to correspond with this 
reasoning. Among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, only Poland,[lS] 
former Czechoslovakia and recently Estonia resorted to the fixed exchange rate 
option based on the concept of 'nominal anchoring' in the initial stage of their 
transition. The other countries opted for the managed float regime (including 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania) or for the adjustable (or crawling) 
peg (Hungary, former Yugoslavia). 
8.4.3 The Case for a Fixed Exchange Rate 
There is no reason to disqualify a priori the fixed rate option for a transition 
economy. Country-specific conditions and, as stated in our earlier discussion, the 
specific features of individual transition stages can substantially modify the ratio 
of likely costs and benefits for any particular country and/or stage. Initially, a clear 
distinction should be made between irrevocably (genuinely) fixed and adjustably 
pegged exchange rates (Willett et al., 1992). Given the extent of adjustment, 
uncertainties and shocks involved in the transition, it would be unrealistic to fix 
an equilibrium rate over the long term and to attempt to make it sustainable without 
inflicting unbearable costs on the economy once such a commitment has been 
made. 
In former Czechoslovakia, the authorities did not commit themselves to any 
pre-announced period of keeping the exchange rate unaffected despite progressing 
along the path of the strategy of a nominal exchange rate anchor. Nevertheless, 
the exchange rate of the Czechoslovak and now Czech koruna has been consistently 
stable for almost three years. At the start of the transition the main arguments for 
giving preference to the fixed exchange rate option included its disinflation impact, 
disciplining effects on the economic agents, and its role as a stabilized point of 
reference in the environment of general 'chaos' after sweeping price and foreign 
trade liberalization. Though to a modified degree of importance, these arguments 
continue to appear fully relevant at present and include the following key issues. 
(i) The information advantage of a stable nominal exchange rate continues to hold 
in the Czech conditions. Given the complete shake-up of the previous cost, 
profitability and price ratios coupled with the parallel, extensive reallocation 
of resources, the nominal exchange rate (a 'macroeconomic price' relevant 
across the whole national economy) can best assist the process of adjustment 
if a 'correct' signal exists that is simultaneously stabilizing and transparent. 
Under the prevailing conditions, volatile exchange rate fluctuations are likely 
to obscure other price signals and distort decisions and expectations. This 
argument is similar to that of Friedman on establishing and especially 
extracting the information on relative prices in the conditions of volatile 
inflation. "The broadcast about relative prices is, as it were, being jammed 
by the noise coming from the inflation broadcast" (Friedman, 1976, p. 20). 
(ii) The inflation record of former Czechoslovakia proved better than that of other 
transition countries. The recent Bank for International Settlements' Report 
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states, "The Czech and Slovak Republics maintained remarkable 
macroeconomic stability last ye ar... To a large extent this stability must be 
ascribed to the fixed exchange rate policy, which contained inflationary 
pressures despite a relaxation of macroeconomic policies" (BIS, 63rd Annual 
Report, Basel, June 1993). 
Despite relatively favorable results, the inflation rate in the stabilization 
period exceeded the average level in Western market economies. Should it 
be decreased to a comparable level, a further substantial advance in 
disinflation would be necessary. Such a goal is set for 1994, in which the 
annual rate of inflation (i.e., not only the 'core' inflation), should be 
decreased to the one digit level. This target appears even more demanding 
considering that the current stage is a period of extensive restructuring at the 
enterprise level and anticipated macroeconomic recovery. The continued 
stabilization effect of the unchanged nominal exchange rate would be, 
therefore, a considerable contribution to the disinflation efforts. 
(iii) The traditional arguments in favor of the nominal exchange rate option refer 
to its potential disciplining effects on economic agents, firms, households as 
well as trade unions and government authorities. Compared to the other 
instruments, the comparative advantage of the nominal exchange rate is given 
by its transparency and unified norm for all open sectors and activities. 
Though claimed to have a potentially significant effect, the real disciplining impact 
of the exchange rate might be only modest in the initial transition stage. After the 
devaluations of 1990, the existing gap between the current exchange rate and PPP 
widened further, securing a substantial competitive margin for most domestic 
producers.[l6] The determination of the authorities to maintain the existing 
nominal rate was not seriously tested in light of the favorable balance of payments 
developments. Yet, the situation has been gradually changing due to the consistent 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate increasingly 
asserts itself as an effective cost limit in the enterprise sphere. As a consequence, 
the disciplining role of the exchange rate could become a major factor of structural 
adjustment and of gains in competitiveness under the conditions of the current stage 
of transition. This assumes a firm determination on the part of the authorities to 
adhere to the policies of the fixed exchange rate, as well as master difficult 
situations and send clear signals to the economic agents, guiding their expectations. 
The medium term developments of the real exchange rate are instrumental 
in determining the potential of fixed exchange rate policy. Sustaining the fixed 
rate option may prove viable provided the existing inflation differential with respect 
to partner countries could be further substantially narrowed and possibly decreased 
to zero in the medium term. Experience shows that the nominal exchange rate can 
be maintained, even as the real rate appreciates, provided counterbalancing effects 
of the improved non-price factors of competition. Especially these effects are 
anticipated results of the hard currency policy. The Austrian example is 
encouraging. "Austria has increased her real market share in the OECD area from 
0.9% in 1970 to 1.08% in 1980. This 20% increase in Austrian market share took 
place despite a 18% revaluation of the real exchange rate of the schilling vis-ri-vis 
her trading partners in the same period" (Marin, 1985, p. 479). 
The key causal variables conditioning the outcome in the long run are the 
changes in productivity ratios compared to partner countries. If sufficiently 
favorable, both nominal and real wages may rise and the profit ratio is maintained 
without undermining price stability and, consequently, without causing an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Such a constellation materialized in postwar 
Germany, for example, with the resulting real depreciation of the DEM. 
The Czech economy faces the challenge of possibly exploiting the advantage 
of starting at a rather low level (productivity in manufacturing branches was 
estimated at 30% to 40% of the German level before the start of the transition) 
to advance relatively rapidly in the catch-up phase. As the potential compared to 
the past certainly increased (especially due to the impact of privatization and 
foreign direct investments), the issue becomes choosing the exchange rate strategy 
that would prove to be more rewarding in mobilizing this potential: the fixed rate 
option or the options based on the alteration of the nominal exchange rate? 
The common arguments against nominal exchange rate anchoring point to 
unfavorable allocative effects of the implied real exchange rate appreciation. The 
resulting profit squeeze in the open branches (in the so-called exposed sectors) 
makes export activities less attractive and, consequently, also the export related 
investment. As a result, the resources tend to flow to homeward-oriented activities 
(sheltered sectors) resulting in an unfavorable impact on both foreign exchange 
balance and productivity growth in the longer run. 
The arguments in favor of using the exchange rate as the nominal anchor cite 
the exchange rate induced improvements in cost and price competitiveness as well 
as in developing non-price factors of competitiveness. While a devaluation-type 
approach tends to provide additional advantages to low-value-added products, the 
nominal exchange rate anchor extends pressure to increase product quality, to move 
to higher-value-added products, and to introduce improved production and 
organization techniques. Consequently, dynamic, innovative producers are favored 
in such a situation. Precisely these issues are of key importance in the current 
Czech conditions: to reverse the past trends of regressing specialization and to 
support the upward movements of value-added tendency in both production and 
export patterns. 
The microeconomic and structural advantages of the fixed nominal exchange 
rate policy must be, however, compared with the macroeconomic constraints and 
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costs implied. Therefore, several assumptions are required to make the nominal 
exchange rate anchoring both rational and sustainable. These include: 
(i) Productivity gains are mostly long-run issues, so other factors must be 
available to take up the slack in the short to medium term; and 
(ii) Once the exchange rate is abandoned as an instrument of adaptation, the 
domestic adjustment mechanism must be flexible. This refers, in particular, 
to wage and income developments, where the institutional pre-requisites for 
a hard currency option are vital. If normal profit margins are to be maintained, 
the real wage compensation must be limited by the growth of labor 
productivity and trade unions must adhere to this rule.[l7] To be more 
precise, when identifying the leeway for wage increases to be cost neutral, 
the changes in the terms of trade and in the cost of capital should be 
accounted for.[l8] 
So, the hard currency policy cannot be reasonably resorted to under just any 
conditions and at any time. This leads to the next controversial issue facing the 
policy-makers; namely, how far to defend the existing exchange rate, in response 
to which signals, and in which conditions it would be warranted to change the 
regime to avoid persisting overvaluation and the resulting crisis and breakdown? 
Furthermore, the need to determine how to identify an overvalued exchange rate 
will be essential for dealing with potential problems in a timely fashion. 
The concepts of fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (Williamson, 1991) 
and of equilibrium real exchange rate (Edwards, 1991) were defined as reconciling 
internal and external balance in the medium run. Nevertheless, the issue of their 
operational identification remains. According to Williamson, at least a safely 
sustainable deficit on the current account in the medium run is required. Edwards, 
on the other hand, suggests that the discounted value of current account balances 
should tend to zero. There are, however, different types of current account 
imbalances: those that are benign (resulting from a temporary trade shock) and 
those reflecting persistent distortions and unsustainable accumulation of foreign 
liabilities, such as undesirable current account imbalances. Hence, not only the 
'order' but also the sources of the deficit and their impact are relevant and should 
be scrutinized accordingly. Temporary causes should be distinguished from 
persistent ones, and cyclical from structural ones. 
The medium term deficits on the current account have not been confined to 
only developing and transition countries. Almost all developed market economies 
experienced them - and not just as sporadic exceptions, but for whole periods at 
times. In the developed world, these deficits became especially widespread in the 
early 1970s due to oil shocks. Since 1980, the cumulative current account of the 
OECD countries has been persistently in deficit (though in relative terms this deficit 
was less than 1% of their GDP). 
In the conditions characteristic of the transition economies, the current account 
results are interrelated with the stage of a particular nation's development along 
the path of transformation and their respective economic reform strategies. Parallel 
to export-led and import-led growth, two such alternative strategies have been 
discussed for the conditions of the transition economies: namely, current account 
surplus and current account deficit. 
(1) Policy of current account surplus: This approach departs from the assumption 
that the increases in domestic demand are necessarily constrained, particularly 
in the initial stages of the transition, implying greater importance for growing 
foreign demand. Therefore, a sufficiently competitive exchange rate must be 
maintained throughout the period to secure trade and the current account 
surplus. The chain of reasoning is as follows: more exports than imports imply 
a higher demand for domestic products and services, higher investment, and, 
in the Keynesian tradition, higher domestic savings. A self-sustained export- 
led recovery can thus follow, based in principle on domestic resources (Herr 
et al., 1991). This rationale is based on two facts: 
(i) Export surplus implies strengthening of the domestic currency and sends 
positive signals to the investors, and 
(ii) Lessons from elsewhere point to the importance of domestic savings as 
the basis for successful development. 
(2) Policy of current account deficit: not only tolerable, but also reasonable for 
a recovery period in the transition economies. 
The reasoning for this statement is founded on the belief that the capital 
shortage is the major development constraint in the transition economies. The 
current account deficit implies, by definition, the use of foreign savings. This 
should alleviate the domestic constraints and enhance the country's 
development potential. Provided that the current account deficits are covered 
by capital inflows, the transition economies also benefit from the inflows of 
know-how, technologies, and management capacities that accompany capital 
flows, in particular foreign direct investment. 
From the static point of view, the current account deficit strategy rather 
depresses than increases demand for domestic products and services. However, 
in a dynamic setting, the increased domestic potential due to the use of foreign 
savings can be expected to generate a higher level of economic activity, 
investment, and savings as well as exports than would be otherwise achievable 
over the course of time. Of course, the extent of the current account deficit 
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must remain under control to avoid crises of confidence. The deficit can be 
considered sustainable if, for example, the dynamics of exports increase, 
implying an expansion of the share in world markets. 
In the former Czechoslovakia, the current account was in surplus since the 
beginning of the transition and the same trend is asserting itself in the present 
development of the Czech Republic. In accordance with the above discussion, 
even a likely shift to a current account deficit in the next period should not 
be, however, a priori taken for a compelling signal to substitute the fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
8.5 Conclusion 
However demanding and even unrealistic the fixed exchange rate regime may 
appear for the conditions of the transition, its benefits and costs vary for individual 
countries and stages of transition. It may prove both rational and feasible in two 
opposite cases: 
(i) For only a relatively short time span in order to initiate the disinflation process 
in a country with a very high inflation rate, or 
(ii) In a country with a low inflation record. 
The Czech Republic appears to qualify for the latter case and may be well on its 
way to economic recovery despite initial skeptism regarding the choice of a fixed 
exchange rate regime for the transition period. 
There are, however, relevant lessons from the experience of open market 
economies which should be duly accounted for: 
(i) It takes time to build up the credibility of the fixed exchange rate strategy, 
and it must be 'earned' (Hochreiter and Knobl, 1991). and 
(ii) As far as the capital flows remain mostly regulated, the complicating role of 
interest rate parity and in particular of speculative capital flows remains less 
important. The recent turmoil on European currency markets should underline 
the warning against any premature liberalization of the capital account. It 
appears necessary to pass the tests and the learning process under the 
conditions in which only the current account's fundamentals matter. 
Appendix 
Table 8.1A Change of Unit Labor Cost in Czechoslovakian Industry, 1990-1992 
(Jan. 1990 = 100) 
Quadratic 
Actual Regression 
199011 100.0 103.6 
2 96.7 100.8 
3 97.9 98.2 
4 95.2 95.8 
5 92.0 93.5 
6 85.5 91.4 
7 115.1 89.4 
8 94.3 87.5 
9 88.5 85.8 
10 84.8 84.2 
11 86.0 82.8 
12 92.9 81.6 
199111 69.5 80.4 
2 59.4 79.5 
3 72.3 78.6 
4 62.5 77.9 
5 68.4 77.4 
6 76.9 77.0 
7 84.4 76.8 
8 77.5 76.7 
9 79.3 76.7 
10 71.1 76.9 
11 81.7 77.2 
12 106.2 77.7 
199211 88.8 78.4 
2 69.7 79.1 
3 84.8 80.1 
4 72.6 81.1 
5 83.6 82.4 
6 80.4 83.7 
7 93.3 85.2 
8 86.1 86.9 
9 78.1 88.7 
10 74.7 90.6 
11 88.0 92.7 
12 113.4 95.0 
Nore: 1 = NEER, 2 = CPI Czechoslovakia, 3 = CPI basket currency countries. 4 = WPI Czechoslovakia, 5 = 
WPI basket currency countries, 6 = REER (consumer prices), 7 = REER (wholesale prices). 
Exchange Rate Regime in the Transition Period 163 
- Actual Quadratic Regression 
Figure 8.1A Unit Labor Costs (ULC) in Industrial Branches of Former CSFR, 
1990-1 992 
Notes 
[ l ]  As of the beginning of 1993, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a federal state. Its 
successors are two separate political entities, the Czech and Slovak republics which 
form a special type of customs union. Their inherited common currency could survive, 
however, only the first month of the existence of the new states. 
[2] Developing from the contributions by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1964). For 
a recent discussion see Wihlborg and Willett (1991). 
[3] This regime secured free and unlimited access to foreign exchange for import 
purposes, while the proceeds from exports should be transferred to the authorized 
banks at the current rate of exchange. The scheme was in 1992 extended to non- 
registered businesses as well and further liberalized, providing also for the possibility 
of hedging against currency risks. However, the convertibility regime has not been 
yet officially extended for tourist purposes. Citizens have the right to maintain private 
foreign exchange accounts, but they are entitled to buy only a limited amount of 
foreign exchange per year at the current rate of exchange. For 1992 and 1993, this 
amount was set at the equivalent of CSK 7,500, i.e., about USD 270 at the present 
exchange rate. 
[4] The radical changes implemented in Czechoslovakia were not, however, significantly 
ahead of the existing "state of affairs" in Hungary. Unlike Czechoslovakia, Hungarian 
reform was characterized by a number of successive steps towards import and 
domestic price liberalization in the course of time accompanied by elements of de 
facto forint convertibility, though not officially declared. 
[5] In improving the initial unsatisfactory situation in foreign exchange reserves, 
substantial support has been provided by international institutions, particularly the 
IMF and the EC. 
[6] In 1990, an attempt was made to use money supply (the volume of bank credits) as 
a nominal anchor. Given the transition conditions, with too many fluctuations and 
discontinuities, such a type of anchor could not prove satisfactory. 
[7] Both the composition of the basket and the relative weights of individual currencies 
were, however, revised on an annual basis. The respective shares in 1991 were as 
follows: DEM 45.52%, USD 31.34%, ATS 12.35%, CHF 6.55%, GBP 4.24%. The 
revised composition of 1992: USD 49.07%, DEM 36.15%, ATS 8.07%, CHF 3.79%, 
FRF 2.92%. As of May 2, 1993 the basket of the Czech koruna (CZK) is confined 
to only DEM and USD, with the weights 65% and 35% respectively. 
[8] This substantial forecasting error had its origin in the estimates of the real figures, 
for GDP and wages in particular. While the government's prediction amounted to 
a 5-6% drop of GDP in 1991, the actual fall was 15%; i.e., 3 times worse than 
expected. Consequently, the substantial deviations in the actual developments of the 
current account and of GDP from their forecasted values were evidently interrelated: 
the deeper fall of GDP was 'counterbalanced' by the higher current account surplus. 
[9] It included the change to VAT and introduction of unified income-tax regime. 
[lo] All the data and calculations presented below should be, however, taken only as 
illustrative for the existing trends. Particular caution is, of course, necessary in 
interpreting and comparing the purchasing power parity data. The qualifications 
referred to in standard market economies are even more relevant to the case of the 
transition economies. 
[ l l ]  The related issues for the conditions of the transition economies are elaborated in 
Oblath, 1992. 
[12] PPI for Czechoslovakia refers only to industrial products. 
[13] For their developments see "Central European Currencies in 1993" by Morgan, 1993. 
[14] The negative consequences of the currency overvaluation, experienced especially in 
several countries of Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s, also prompted the 
warnings against such mismanagement in the transition economies (Williamson, 1991). 
[15] In the Polish case, the fixed exchange rate regime was, however, only a very 
transitional solution. It was introduced as part of the shock-therapy type stabilization 
program of 1990 aimed at radical disinflation. Therefore, its existence was ex-ante 
linked only to this specific period. This regime, maintained from January 1990 to May 
1991 (in reality longer than initially intended, which was criticized by some observers 
as an outright policy mistake, for example, see Rosati, 1992), was subsequently 
substituted by more flexible arrangements. After May 1991, Poland moved first to 
a managed (adjustable) peg and since October 1991 to a crawling peg, and finally 
in February 1992 to a 'dirty crawl', introducing a new devaluation in addition to the 
applied crawling rule. 
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[16] However, this impact widely varied across individual branches and firms due to the 
legacy of the past. Most firms in the electronic industry, for example, found 
themselves non-competitive even with the devalued exchange rate. 
[17] One of the basic reasons behind the remarkable success of the Austrian hard currency 
policy lay in the support from the trade unions and the resulting wage self-restraint 
(Flanagan et al., 1983). 
[l8] The relevant experience in social corporatism and in voluntary incomes policies in 
a number of small European economies is discussed in Pekkarinen et al. (1992). 
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Microeconomic Issues in 
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Chapter 9 
Microeconomic Preconditions for 
Macroeconomic (1n)Stability: 
The Case of the Ukraine 
Vladimir Shevchenko* 
University of Kiev, Kiev, Ukraine 
9.1 Introduction 
The microeconomic issues of stabilization policies in the economies in transition 
acquire greater relevance once the overall macroeconomic situation and, more 
specifically, the inflation rate and financial system become more stable. Such a 
suggestion is based on two major preconditions. 
The first of these preconditions relates to the necessity of creating structural 
conditions for microeconomic optimization. In the former Soviet Union, the so- 
called national economic complex was structured and developed as a single system 
and the optimization criteria were derived from national economic efficiency. In 
reality this was only quasi-efficiency due to the impact of over-centralized distribu- 
tion of resources (mainly in physical terms), centrally fixed prices, evaluating the 
results of enterprises' activities as a percentage of plan fulfillment (formal relation 
number), and absence of real budget constraints for investments and costs. As a 
result, the macroeconomic quasi-equilibrium did not infer economic reality because 
of depressed demand, insufficient supply, constantly growing deficit of resources, 
hidden inflation, and concealed unemployment. 
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The single centralized economy could not really account for microeconomic 
efficiency. The constant losses of some industrial branches and enterprises were 
covered by budget financing or through different means of redistribution of en- 
terprises' profits. Thus, there was insufficient economic incentives to lower costs, 
effectively utilize resources and better satisfy customers. At the same time the single 
economy was diversified in a specific centrally planned way, with extensive spe- 
cialization and directly managed inter-enterprise relations. The price liberalization 
and market forces applied to such a structure have destroyed or completely changed 
the existing ties between enterprises. The persisting inertia of the former structure 
have created inflexibility to changing demand, self-crediting of enterprises, as well 
as maintenance of unprofitable ones. Under such conditions, declining output has 
actually become attractive for various enterprises from the economic point of view. 
The possibilities for development and modernization are still insufficient in the 
Ukraine due to the macroeconomic situation - especially the high inflation and 
interest rates. 
The second precondition are well-designed microeconomic policies, which 
secure flexibility in response to market forces and enterprises' incentives to effec- 
tively utilize resources. The growing importance of microeconomic policies has 
become a priority, as stressed by the Ukrainian Prime Minister Kuchma in 1993. 
He disclosed that detailed analysis of the industrial output decline in the Ukraine 
has revealed that 35% of the decline was caused by macroeconomic factors, such 
as: disrupting inter-enterprises links, inefficient financial transactions, and so forth. 
The remaining 65% of the decline was caused by the lack of effective manage- 
ment, poor technological discipline, monopolistic egoism, and other factors on the 
enterprise level.[l] 
The limitations of strong microeconomic policies are caused by instability 
characteristic of the economy in transition and related changes and adjustments of 
economic and especially macroeconomic regulations. These economies in transi- 
tion are dominated by at least five groups of factors, including: 
a continuous economic crisis and weak recovery prospects; 
a changing institutional structure and governmental regulations; 
a economic liberalization and emergence of market forces; 
r economic restructuring and modernization; and, 
a market reorientation towards foreign markets and growing integration into the 
world economy. 
Each country in transition possesses its own policy precipitated by a specific 
combination of these factors and its own concept of economic reforms. Therefore, 
the transformation style and the type of economy in transition must be studied on the 
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basis of both concepts of the economic transformation or transitional development 
theory, and as an analysis of key trends. The application of such an approach to the 
experience of the Ukraine also shows the necessity of comparative analysis with 
both East European countries and new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet 
Union. In the latter case, the political, national, cultural, and regional problems 
specifically influenced economic reforms and created remarkable trends. 
The macroeconomic instability in the Ukraine is a result of the interaction of 
a variety of these factors, so that the movement towards a consolidated situation 
presents a complicated problem. The macroeconomic policy tends to be based only 
on monetary approaches rather than on the creation of macroeconomic precondi- 
tions of microeconomic policies. At the same time, microeconomic processes are 
mainly a reflection of the inertia of economic structures and incentives, which are 
naturally only in a process of adjusting to new market conditions and forces. 
Solely monetary oriented policy decisions could not be effective from the point 
of view of a policy background because of the lack of an appropriate and competi- 
tive market structure. However, strict monetary policy is simultaneously required 
to achieve financial stabilization and creation of a functioning monetary system. 
As a consequence, it seems that microeconomic policies in transitional economies 
must be based on the principles of supply-side economics. High inflation, steep 
economic decline, and shortages of basic industrial and agricultural products would 
be long-lasting without economic incentives for effective utilization and distribu- 
tion of resources. The problem is that price liberalization in the absence of effective 
microeconomic policies will lead to the conservation of stagflation or hyperinfla- 
tion. Also, the transition from centralized to market distribution of resources would 
increase production and efficiency if: 
the emerging of markets would be structured and based on processes of corpo- 
ratization and privatization as the fundamental institutional changes required 
to create the desired market structure, environment, and incentives; and, 
the microeconomic policies are based on enforcement of incentives for increas- 
ing supply and quality of products and more effective resource utilization. 
In terms of short and long-term microeconomic policies, the combination of 
microeconomic stabilization and market structure optimization must be achieved. 
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9.2 Market Emergence: Impact of Soviet 
Disintegration, Price and Trade Liberalization 
Following the Russian lead, January 1992 marked the beginning of the period 
in which price liberalization followed by liberalization of foreign trade, a poorly 
managed ruble-based monetary system, defection of some new independent coun- 
tries from the ruble zone, inefficient financial control, and soft budget constraints 
described the situation facing members of the former Soviet Union, including the 
Ukraine. In this upheaval, the former directly managed system of supply was 
replaced by a transitional quasi-market with three main segments: 
1. the market of domestic products sold for Ukrainian karbovanets (UAK) - 
transitional currency; 
2. the post-Soviet market relations and trade with Russia and other newly inde- 
pendent states with payments in rubles; and, 
3. the foreign trade market with payments reoriented on a hard currency basis. 
These segments have different structures and dynamics of development. The 
market for domestic products has become more price elastic in the areas of consumer 
goods and food. In 1993, state contracts were still significant for a large part of 
industrial commodities and direct state regulation of prices in the energy sector 
and for some basic industrial goods has persisted. Indirect state control exists via 
regulation and taxation of the profitability rate of enterprises, as well as subsidizing 
some products such as, coal, milk, and bread. This type of regulation is mainly 
considered protective, but has influenced incentives to which firms are exposed. 
For example, for industries with long production cycles regulated profitability at 
25% of the costs was less than the monthly average inflation rate, estimated at 
30-50% for 1993. 
At the same time, several factors have obstructed the movement to market 
equilibrium. First of all, the energy price explosion became a main determinant 
of inflation. During 1992, crude oil prices increased an estimated 300 times, and 
wholesale prices in the energy sector as much as 237 times (all in nominal terms).[2] 
The continued increase of oil and gas prices was to reflect the rise to the eventual 
world level. At the beginning of 1993, the Ukraine was buying Russian oil at 
approximately 75-80% and Russian gas at 60-70% of the world price (in Russian 
ruble equivalent). Even decreasing the supply of crude oil from Russia could not 
prevent the Ukraine's trade deficit, the permanent high demand for rubles, and their 
steady appreciation with respect to Ukrainian karbovanets. 
The shortage of oil itself prompts inflation, causing output decline and stagfla- 
tion. In the short-term perspective, the forecasted decrease of Russian oil produc- 
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tion will result in continued economic decline and threaten economic reforms in the 
Ukraine. The uncertainty regarding the oil supply has forced Ukrainian producers 
to cut off production in various branches. Price increases of oil products to the 
world level during 1993 and 1994 makes many Ukrainian goods uncompetitive due 
to the high energy intensity of production processes and technologies.[3] The pre- 
carious energy situation must be resolved by saving energy based on modernization 
of industry and agriculture and altering the structure of the economy. The invest- 
ments necessary to achieve these targets, however, are very limited because of the 
severe budget deficit, extremely high interest rates, and the ominous inter-enterprise 
arrears. This situation has consequently interfered with changes in inter-enterprise 
relations corresponding to the unfolding market systems within the former Soviet 
Union. 
A consistently high rate of inflation has influenced the supplyldemand ratio, 
the criteria of microeconomic efficiency, and the structure of production. The 
contraction of demand due to financial limitations have not stimulated producers in 
some cases, but forced them to decrease output to the lowest possible level. Cost- 
push inflation has fostered the producers' inflationary expectations and stimulated 
them to overcalculate the cost of current production by at least the level of expected 
inflation. At the same time, the government has attempted to regulate the profit rate 
and the margin between wholesale and consumers prices. Such attempts perhaps 
will improve the monetary situation, but will not stimulate producers to increase 
supply. 
9.3 NIS Trade: Microeconomic Effects 
The Ukrainian trade within of the former Soviet Union is experiencing three main 
problems: disintegration, structural changes, and diversification of prices and cur- 
rencies. 
Disintegration was caused mainly by political reasons. The majority of NIS 
have presumably overestimated the economic difficulties connected with their 
sovereignty and self-management - a natural reaction in the wake of the crash of 
the former overcentralized system. After the collapse of the single Soviet market, 
NIS have initiated protection of own markets with regulations, restrictions, and 
licensing. The tendency for economic autarky is slowly but surely giving way to 
the realistic estimation of trade preferences and prospects. 
The disintegration of the former centralized Soviet Union has created specific 
problems with market performance. The general inelasticity of supply on the do- 
mestic market was negatively influenced by the loss of traditional markets within the 
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Table 9.1 Exchange Rate of Ukrainian Karbovanets to Russian Ruble 
(Selected Dates) 
Date 
17 November 1992 
24-26 November 1992 
8-10 December 1992 
24-25 December 1992 
19-21 January 1993 
2 February 1993 
27 February 1993 
31 March 1993 
National Bank of Ukraine 
Exchange Rate 
1.45 
1.45 
1.5 
1.54 
1.64 
1.64 
1.74 
2.8 
Commercial Banks 
Average Rate of Exchange 
(non-cash) 
Source: Uryadovy Courier, November 1992-April 1993. 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Substantial market segments previously 
classified as domestic, became foreign or quasi-foreign and were accompanied by 
many of the unfavorable elements of foreign trade, such as barriers to entry. The 
marginal costs of retaining or, in fact, re-entering such traditional markets often ex- 
ceed the margin profits. The immediate or even long-term substitution of domestic 
production for goods formerly imported from the NIS is not feasible in many cases. 
Furthermore, the distortions of relative prices has been accentuated by exchange 
rate problems, and inter-enterprise arrears across new borders; the latter generally 
being considered as semi-governmental debts. The reconstellation of markets - 
disintegrationhe-establishment, as well as world market reorientation - have a 
crucial impact on enterprise behavior. Thus, the fluctuating market segmentation 
could be considered as a special problem for the Ukraine and other NIS countries. 
The economic impacts of disintegration have been evaluated mainly with 
respect to the effects on changes in terms of trade and enterprises' optimization. 
The Ukraine has a positive trend in terms of trade with the world market because of 
the gap in domestic and international trade prices. For example, the domestic price 
for coal (in USD equivalent) was estimated as only 1 6 2 5 %  of the international 
market price and 28-30% for steel in 1993: the situation in other sectors was more 
or less similar. Energy was an exception since prices moved more rapidly to world 
levels. Such correlation would be maintained during the time of high inflation 
because cost and domestic prices grow comparatively slower than the inflation 
rate, resulting in a depreciation of the Ukrainian currency. 
The changes in the exchange rate of Ukrainian karbovanets (UAK) to the 
Russian ruble (RBL) are unpredictable and have been periodically erratic, mainly 
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due to a large supply of money to the market as a result of credit emission or 
substantial increase in demand for rubles. The exchange rate of UAK to the ruble 
was announced officially in mid-November 1992. However, as a consequence of an 
earlier decision of the Central Bank of Russia to freeze money transactions between 
Russian and Ukrainian enterprises since 1 July 1992, the 'black market' exchange 
rate grew rapidly between July and November 1992 due to the high demand for 
rubles by Ukrainian enterprises and companies with bank accounts in Moscow, 
as well as the high risk of such semi-legal transactions. According to unofficial 
sources, the 'payments' for such transactions rose from 1 % to 15% in cash. 
Such an unmanaged establishment of UAKIruble exchange rate have had some 
important consequences for enterprises: 
1. During 1992-1993, the supply of many products and raw materials from Russia 
to the Ukraine and also in the reverse direction have been suspended or, in 
numerous cases, completely stopped. 
2. The bilateral debt between enterprises grew rapidly, so that domestic enterprise 
arrears are multiplied by cross-border enterprise arrears. 
3. The debt of Ukrainian enterprises to those in Russia was essentially covered 
until March 1993. At the same time, Russian enterprise debt to the Ukraine 
continued to grow because of continued supply of commodities without pay- 
ment guarantees. Such a phenomenon could be considered as a combination 
of self-crediting of Ukrainian enterprises and inertia of long-lasting supplier 
ties. 
4. The internal variability throughout the ruble zone, different rates of exchange, 
and difficulties of transferring money to other republics had a depressive influ- 
ence on inter-enterprise turnover and caused both output decline and autarky. 
Our currencies, with parallel connection to ruble zone, imply instability in 
financial infrastructure. 
5. The enterprises and banks have started to use the semi-covered forward rate 
of exchange which is up to 30% higher than the officially announced rate in 
order to hedge against risks arising due to difficulties associated with money 
transactions and inflation. 
In summary, the monetary and banking situation stimulated enterprises not to 
increase production and to decrease the number of customers, tending to exclude 
primarily those from NIS. 
Economic dependence on Russia due to rapid growth of oil and gas prices has 
become a major factor influencing Ukrainian economic prospects - either slow 
stabilization or continuing destabilization. Another move of oil and gas prices 
towards the world level will cause a further deterioration of the economic situation 
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in the Ukraine. The energy factor will increase the trade balance deficit with Russia, 
the domestic inflation rate, costs of production, and, finally, a greater decline in 
output and incomes. Thus, the unpredictable energy situation is now the major 
factor of macro- and microeconomic instability. In order to avoid a full-fledged 
subsequent energy crisis, time and investment is required to diversify the oil and 
gas supply, modernize the economy to promote lower energy consumption, and 
overcome the total dependence on a single source and type of energy supply. 
The existing political instability in Russia can not be overcome soon because 
of complicated and multifaceted processes regarding the distribution of powers and 
their foreseen decentralization. The political frustration in Russia will produce un- 
predictable stresses for the Ukrainian economy. Generally speaking, the Ukrainian 
economy will eventually become more dependent on exogenous factors as, for 
instance, relations with other NIS and the world economy. 
9.4 The World Market: Microeconomic Impacts 
The total trade turnover with non-NIS in 1992 was worth 5,981.9 million USD 
(exports of 3,840.2 mln. USD and imports of 2,141.7 mln. USD). While the majority 
of exports went to China (679.7 mln. USD), Czechoslovakia (421.3 mln. USD), 
Turkey (323.1 mln. USD), and Italy (282.3 mln. USD), the major imports were from 
Germany (246.6 mln. USD), Italy (217.9 mln. USD), Czechoslovakia (198.2 mln. 
USD), and South Korea (194.8 mln. USD). The share of barter trade was 37.2% in 
export and 28.8% in import. The geographical distribution of total non-NIS trade 
in 1992 was as follows: Europe (43.7%), of which Italy (6.8%), Germany (6.3%); 
Asia (32%), of which China (15.5%), Turkey (6.4%); Africa (1.8%); SouthLNorth 
America (2.5%); Baltic States (20%), of which Latvia (1 l.2%).[4] 
During 1992, credit agreements for a total of 1.9 billion USD were signed with 
the governments of Germany, Canada, and the USA. At the end of 1992, already 
650 joint ventures were operating in the Ukraine and their share in export was 
5.7%. As many as 3,340 cases of foreign investment were registered for a total 
amount of approximately 900 million USD.[5] 
After officially leaving the ruble zone, the exchange rate of UAK to USD was 
determined on the basis of cross-rates between the currency rates of ruble to USD 
and ruble to UAK. The lack of rubles and domestic currency reserves in the Ukraine 
allowed the UAK rate to fall dramatically. The most substantial drop in the rate 
was just immediately after official introduction of Ukrainian karbovanets in mid- 
November 1992: the rate fell to 50% of its initially quoted value. Subsequently, the 
Governmental decree on currency regulation was introduced at the end of March 
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1993, obliging exporters sell to 50% of foreign currency revenues on the currency 
exchange causing a further drop in the exchange rate. 
Trade with non-NIS countries and the dramatic change in the exchange rate 
relative to USD substantially influenced enterprises, managerial behavior, and 
microeconomic optimization for the following reasons: 
1. The difference between domestic and world prices stimulated enterprises to 
increase exports. 
2. The export structure, in which more than 90% are raw materials, fertilizers, 
metals and other basic products, was not conducive to economic growth. 
3. The export revenues of enterprises were not effectively used for investments 
and innovation. At the same time, the supply of imported consumer goods 
forced inflation to rise. For some products such as cigarettes, liquors, coffee, 
tea, and electronics, the high quality import products are 'price leaders'. 
4. Domestic producers of electronics, TV sets, computers, and machinery were 
no longer competitive and struggled to survive. 
5. The industries, agriculture, and services, which had imported much equipment, 
raw materials, and spare parts, were faced with currency limitations and have 
been collapsing. For example, the city transportation is worsening because 
local authorities have no money to buy Czech trams and trolleys and Hungarian 
buses or spare parts for them. 
6. Some industries, for example, TV sets, electronics, and machinery, have main- 
tained a high level of cooperation with NIS and others. The rule to sell 50% 
of currency revenues was also applied to the Russian ruble. This severed 
cooperation and tended to cause further industrial decline. 
7. The declining exchange rate has increased the cost of production and propa- 
gated inflation. 
8. The imported equipment recalculated in UAK but based on the high exchange 
rate of the USD could have rapidly increased the enterprises' capital. In such 
cases, the cost of existing and newly imported equipment became mutually 
incomparable, the high price raising depreciation cost and the general cost 
level while decreasing labor productivity and profitability of enterprises. 
9. The decision-making concerning currency investment credits have been made 
on the basis of old, Soviet-style, production-oriented approaches, without 
adequate market research and project management. Thus, the repayment of 
investment credits has been increasingly considered in mainly a formal sense 
and, while it has already contributed to the worsening of the contemporary 
problem of payment balance for the time being, it may generate inflationary 
pressures in the future. 
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Price dumping by exporters, the large share of barter trade in total trade, the 
overpayments for imported equipment, and other forms of 'destructive' incentives 
for export-import activities of enterprises continued in the Ukraine throughout the 
first quarter of 1993. In Russia, the package of governmental tariff and non- 
tariff regulation of foreign trade was implemented at the beginning of 1993, which 
more effectively stimulated the drive for export efficiency and assured the financial 
interests of the state. 
It becomes obvious that the effort needed to achieve microeconomic optimiza- 
tion must now be based on institutional changes. Ownership must be restructured 
in order to constitute a new market structure; a type of market environment for 
the enterprises that is conducive to competition. Unfortunately, the institutional 
changes in the Ukrainian economy have been insufficient and contradictory. For 
example: 
The anti-monopoly law was adopted and the anti-monopoly committee subordi- 
nate to the Ukrainian Parliament was established but, in reality, anti-monopoly 
regulation could not be considered visible or effective for the implementation 
of reforms. The government has used the level of profitability of monopolies 
as the indicator for monopolistic activities; 
In January 1993, the Ukrainian government adopted a decree on renewing the 
right of the ministries to operate as owner of state assets and state companies' 
property. At the same time, enterprises lost the right to be co-founder of joint- 
stock companies, joint ventures, or to establish affiliated companies. Such 
rights were transferred to the ministries and the State Property Fund; 
The right to make decisions regarding the leasing of the enterprise funds was 
transferred from the employees unions to the State Property Fund; 
In 1993, the corporatization started leading to large-scale privatization. 
As a consequence of the last points, all general managers of enterprises were 
subsequently dependent on personal contracts with ministries, and their wages will 
eventually depend on a fixed sum plus some bonus upon fulfillment of the planned 
results for output, profitability, and utilization of funds. In addition, managers' 
decision-making became limited in different ways. For example, in order to travel 
abroad, the responsible minister must have written permission from the Cabinet of 
Ministers, and the enterprise general manager - managers faced even more strict 
and complicated regulations. 
The restoration of former (ministerial) branches of managerial hierarchy has 
protected government property from utilization for private interests, as it was of- 
ficially explained. Yet, this is severely limiting the change of enterprise structure 
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and micro-based optimal institutional changes. In combination with other regula- 
tions, such attempts could not permit financial divorce of enterprises from the state 
in order to create real economic responsibility of enterprises, and to adjust their 
interests to market oriented incentives. 
The relatively slow institutional changes and the postponement of small pri- 
vatization and large privatization have not created necessary preconditions for 
strengthening enterprise budgets. The periodical credit emission for covering inter- 
enterprise debt simply promoted continued existence of ineffective enterprises, did 
not limit price growth, and did not induce cost reduction. The move to more ac- 
tively begin bankruptcy procedures combined with faster privatization, could have 
initiated the movement toward strengthening enterprises' budgets. Without these 
measures, one could not expect some turning point in enterprises incentives for 
cost efficiency and real competition. 
9.5 Summary 
1. Macroeconomic instability- high inflation, high interest rates - in combina- 
tion with changes in legislation and taxation have not yet created preconditions 
for microeconomic optimization in the Ukrainian transformation. 
2. The inertia of production/distribution decision-making of enterprises' man- 
agers, an unstable economic and legal environment, soft budgets of enterprises, 
and their self-crediting limited enterprise adjustment to the emerging market 
signals. 
3. The economic reforms in the Ukraine and its economy were considerably 
vulnerable to external factors such as oil and gas supply/prices, trade and pay- 
ment balance with NIS countries, and the decrease of the Ukrainian currency 
exchange rate to the Russian ruble. 
4. The adjustment to market signals has been complicated for Ukrainian enter- 
prises because of different trends in three market areas: domestic market, 
NIS market, and world market. The main problems are derived from differ- 
ent comparative advantages and competition in each market area, different 
trends in rates of exchange, and differences in tariff and non-tariff regulations. 
Consequently, the enterprises' behavior has been distorted in different markets. 
5. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the unstable regulations of trade 
between NIS countries, and the continued interdependence of enterprises as a 
result of the former system of cooperation and specialization for maximizing 
benefits for the single economy have accentuated economic difficulties caused 
by severing economic ties. At the same time, those conditions resulted in 
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autarky and protectionism, influencing a combination of regional and structural 
changes in some cases. 
6. The negative payment balance of the Ukraine in trade with Russia and various 
exchange rates to the Russian ruble originating from different states of the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) could not stimulate enterprises to increase trade 
with NIS. So, that the free trade zone would be the most suitable market model 
for the FSU and a common reserve currency is necessary. 
7. The future of economic relations in the Ukraine and other NIS countries depend 
on the advance of economic reforms in Russia. The political struggle in Russia 
could lead to growing dependence and uncertainty in relations between states 
and enterprises. 
8. The institutional changes for micro-based optimization are undertaken more 
slowly in the Ukraine than in Russia. Administrative control over enterprises' 
property, limits to leasing enterprises, and halting corporatization and priva- 
tization are the main obstacles for strengthening enterprise budgets and the 
emergence of market-oriented incentives and decision-making. 
Notes 
[I] Uryadovy Courier, 10 April 1993. 
[2] Uryadovy Courier, 21 January 1993. 
[3] Estimated supply should have reached 30-37 million tons. (Uryadovy Courier, 21 
January 1993.) The forecasted decline of oil output in Russia during 1993-1995 would 
cause a contraction of the supply from Russia and necessitate increased oil purchases 
from the world market. The related expenditures in terms of world prices would be an 
estimated 5 billion USD annually. In comparison, Ukrainian export revenues i n  hard 
currency was only 3.8 billion USD in 1992. 
[4] Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine; data from January to September 1992. 
[5] Uryadovy Courier, 21 January 1993. 
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Product Slump in Czechoslovakia: 
Several Heterodox Remarks 
Pave1 Mertlik 
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 
10.1 Features of the Czechoslovakian Recession 
in 1991-1992 
After embarking on the process of transition to a market economy on 1 January 
1991, the macroeconomic development of the Czechoslovakian economy was 
characterized by a deep two-digit recession. Real GDP decreased by 15.9% during 
1991 compared with the 1990 while the real net material product decreased in the 
same period by 19.2%.[1] The level of officially registered unemployment also 
increased rapidly.[2] Although the recession continued in 1992, the decline was 
no longer so rapid and some signs of macroeconomic stabilization or even slight 
revival in the economy were observed. Unfortunately, these signs represented only 
a temporary break before a new decrease of both Czech and Slovak economies 
in 1993. In 1992, real GDP decreased by about 8.7% (compared with the previous 
year).[3] For basic data concerning the development of Czechoslovakian output 
and unemployment in the years 1990 to 1992 see Tables 10.1 and 10.3 in the 
Appendix. [4] 
Regarding to the individual components of aggregate demand in 1991, real 
investment, real personal consumption and real exports decreased substantially, 
as well as real incomes and real retail sales. However, despite the extensive 
contraction of aggregate demand in real terms, it definitely cannot be considered 
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as the sole cause of the Czechoslovakian recession. The nominal indicators for 
1991 present a very different picture: increases in every case. The annual rate of 
inflation (the annual increase of the level of the consumer prices at the end of the 
year) was 53.6% (see Table 10.2 in the Appendix). Thus, a good portion of the 
causes for the contemporary recession must be on the supply side of the economy, 
and due to the present contraction of the aggregate supply we should rather speak 
about a slumpflation or a stagflation in Czechoslovakia than about recession in 
the traditional sense (i.e., a product slump caused by a decrease of aggregate 
demand; for a detailed discussion of this issue see section 10.3.1 and Mertlfk 
(1993). The nature of the recessional development in Czechoslovakia throughout 
1992 reflected the most important features from the preceding year. 
The purpose of this paper is to present several explanations for the economic 
decline in former Czechoslovakia. In addition to conventional macroeconomic 
explanations, we focus on alternative microeconomic-based factors. 
10.2 The Conventional Explanations of the Causes 
of the Czechoslovakian Recession 
The sources of the Czechoslovakian recession during 1991 and 1992 have been 
widely discussed. The conventional domestic interpretations of these phenomena 
describe the recession as a result of the dramatic restrictive policies of the 
government, of the collapse of the former COMECON market, the sales crisis on 
Western markets (as a result of the contemporary world recession),[5] and the 
necessary adaptive restructuring of the supply side of the Czechoslovakian economy 
to meet the preferences of the buyers after the liberalization of foreign trade and 
the hardening of budget constraints. All these explanations are at least to some 
extent correct; of course, some more than others. All in all, though, these reasons 
still do not seem sufficient in the quantitative sense: could the combination of these 
phenomena indeed be the cause of such a deep and rapid recession, particularly 
as illustrated in some indicators not previously used in recent Czechoslovakian 
history?[6] 
The role of the government's restrictive macroeconomic policies in the 
decrease of Czechoslovakian output seems limited since the analysis of the 
monetary policy in 1991 does not account for this factor as restrictive. However, 
this should not necessarily imply that such policy should mechanically cause an 
expansion of the aggregate demand. 
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10.2.1 Fiscal Policy 
Considering fiscal policy objectives, the budget surplus planned by the government 
for 1991 was not reached. Instead, the result was a budget deficit of 10.4 billion 
Czechoslovakian koruna (CSK), which represents 2.0% of nominal public 
expenditure and 1 .l% of nominal GDP. But nominal public expenditure increased 
by only 12.0% in 1991 in comparison with the previous year, which means that 
the ratio of nominal public expenditure to nominal GDP decreased from 56.2% 
in 1990 to 52.2% in 1991 (see Table 10.1 in the Appendix). Simultaneously a slight 
decrease of the level of taxation (differentiated decrease of both corporate profit 
tax rates and turnover tax rates) was realized.[7] 
If one accepts a simplified assumption that the potential real GDP was 
constant during such a short one year period, then one must also assume an 
increase of the potential nominal GDP by about 50% to 55% due to the growth 
of the rate of inflation. These assumptions allow us to conclude that the cyclically 
adjusted deficit built-in into the construction of the 1991 budget was lower than 
in the previous year. Therefore, the budget was constructed as a restrictive one 
in real terms since the increase of nominal public expenditure by 12.0% is 
significantly lower than the assumed increase of the potential nominal GDP (and 
it actually represents a decrease of real public expenditure by 21.8%). 
A slightly different picture of the fiscal policy for 1991 may be obtained if 
the sector of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is included in the public sector and 
their budgets into the system of public budgets. According to rough estimates of 
the Czechoslovakian State Bank (SBCS) and Czechoslovakian academia, the 
insolvency of SOEs reached about 150 to 180 billion CSK at the end of 1991 (and 
about 200 billion CSK by June 1992, (see Sulc, 1992)), which represents an 
increase of approximately 100 to 150 billion CSK since its initial level of about 
30 to 50 billion CSK at the end of December 1990. This constitutes an increase 
of about 100% to 500% during 1991 (or by about 150 to 170 billion CSK, i.e., 
300% to 566.7% until mid-1992).[8] As SOEs still represent a part of the public 
sector, the increase of the insolvency of SOEs may well be interpreted as a hidden 
deficit of the system of public budgets. If this was accepted, then the officially 
stated budget deficit of 10.4 billion CSK is a considerable understatement, and the 
formerly presented conclusion about the restrictive character of the 1991 budget 
should be made on a different quantitative level. The 1991 nominal public 
expenditures including these hidden 100 to 150 billion CSK would rise to a level 
exceeding the 1990 nominal public expenditures (including hidden expenditures 
of 30 to 50 billion CSK on the same principle) by between 20% and 35%: that 
means, by 20 to 35 percentage points less than is the assumed 1991 50% to 55% 
increase of the potential nominal GDP. 
The monetary effect of the phenomena of insolvency and subsequent mutual 
indebtedness of enterprises is also important. These processes undoubtedly represent 
a hidden money issue that is completely beyond the control of the Central Bank. 
Thus, the phenomena of insolvency and mutual indebtedness of Czechoslovakian 
enterprises form a specific connecting link between the fiscal and monetary spheres 
of the economy. 
10.2.2 Monetary Policy 
The government's effort to provide a restrictive monetary policy during 1991 was 
definitely unsuccessful in terms of the quantitative theory of money. According 
to the SBCS, the M2 aggregate increased by about 25.2% during 1991.[9] This, 
no doubt, would imply a monetary expansion. If we put the relative changes of 
P and Q as: 
and 
(refer to Tables 10.1 and 10.2 in the Appendix for data on annual inflation and real 
GDP), and the relative change of M as: 
into a slightly modified Fisher equation, such as: 
we obtain 
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which simplifies to 
v199 1 1.292 = 1.252 . -
'1 990 
and finally results in: 
No official data about the change of the velocity of money are available in 
Czechoslovakia. We can only assume its decrease due to the significant increase 
of savings during 1991 compared with 1990 when the increase of savings was almost 
negligible (see Table 10.1 in the Appendix).[lO] But such an assumption is very 
weak since there are many more important, unknown factors determining the velocity 
of money. Therefore, it is difficult to correctly interpret the figure of 1.032 that 
is the result of V1991N1990from our Fisher equation (4) as a yearly relative change 
of the velocity of the money supply. The result should rather be a figure representing 
the yearly relative change of the velocity of money and the simultaneous yearly 
relative change of the hidden money issue stemming from the mutual trade crediting 
of SOEs discussed at the end of section 10.3.1. Separating the influence of these 
two phenomena in the process of determining the value of our V1991N1990, and 
to reasonably estimate their relative weights seems almost unresolvable. However, 
the discrepancy of 4 percentage points between the values of 
and 
resulting in the 3.2% increase of the value of our 'velocity' V1991 in comparison 
with its value V1990, can be intuitively well imputed to the phenomenon of the 
hidden money issue - if we account for the sharp increase of the level of the 
insolvency of SOEs during 1991. 
Another question to address is the impact of the growth of the money supply 
- especially of long-term deposits and foreign currency deposits - on the 
behavior of the economic agents and on the development of aggregate demand. 
Let it be emphasized, once again, that there do exist other factors and facts 
complicating the original picture of monetary expansion. These include the level 
of interest rates, the structure of issued bank credits, and the access of different 
sectors and agents in the economy to these credits. 
First, we must realize that the high nominal commercial interest rates (between 
13% and 24%) had a nearly prohibitive impact, particularly for the emerging and 
small private sector. This prohibitive impact of the high nominal interest rates was 
significantly reinforced by two other phenomena: by short time allowances of 
generally all bank credits to the private sector (the commercial banks provided 
mostly only two- andlor three-year credits) and by the very conservative risk-averse 
behavior of banks. The banks were generally interested in the property guarantees 
and particularly in real estate holdings of their clients only, paying attention to the 
feasibility of the entrepreneurial projects of clients only if the property guarantees 
appeared to be satisfactory. As a consequence of the concurrence of all of these 
facts, the access of the private sector to bank credits was highly limited. 
Some SBCS estimates reveal that about 16% of new bank credits issued by 
Czechoslovakian commercial banks went to the private sector in 1991. But an 
important part of this money - about 20% - was designated for purchases of 
businesses, i.e., more or less real estate, in the auctions of the Small and Large 
Privatization Programs and, therefore, did not represent real investment. The 
objective of such transactions was to shift the state property to private owners and 
not to finance reconstruction and/or development of these businesses. This fact 
has an important monetary (and macroeconomic) impact: the money for the Small 
and Large Privatization auctions, in fact, did not form a part of the aggregate 
demand. The money was shifted (via paying in the auctions) to one of the National 
Property Funds (Czech or Slovak), where it was essentially frozen and did not 
dissolve back into the economy for at least 1991 and 1992. The budgetary use of 
funds acquired via privatization started to a broader extent only in 1993; for 1994, 
however, the revenues of the Czech budget explicitly presumes a subsidy of 18 
billion Czech crowns from the National Property Fund. 
Secondly, the importance of the shadow creation of deposit money via the 
behavior of SOEs must be re-emphasized. Their mutual crediting and resulting 
mutual indebtedness tolerated by the government actually constituted an important 
part of aggregated demand, contrary to the former case of the Small and Large 
Privatization credits. Therefore, the real budget constraint in the state-owned sector 
was, in fact, much softer than that in the private sector. The evil of the prevalently 
soft budget constraint with respect to SOEs inherited from the centrally planned 
economy (CPE) had continued in 1991 and is continuing now, too, even if formally 
the share of the state-owned sector in the newly created bank credits was relatively 
smaller than in the past. SBCS estimates suggest that the figure lies close to 60%, 
while the output of the state-owned sector was still estimated to be more than 90% 
of the Czechoslovakian real GDP at the end of 1991 and still about 80% at the 
end of 1992. 
Thus, we may conclude that a very important feature of the actual 
Czechoslovakian monetary policy in 1991 was its selective impact on the economy, 
Product Slump in Czechoslovakia 187 
unfortunately and paradoxically negatively influencing particularly the development 
of the private sector and the level of real investment in this sector. The original 
picture of a pure monetary expansion has vanished and we may finish our 
reflection of the development of the monetary sphere of the Czechoslovakian 
economy with labelling the actually performed monetary policy as an ambiguous 
one, with some expansive, and some other restrictive moments. 
10.3 Alternative Explanations for the Recession 
Increasing costs (caused both by the devaluation of the CSK and by the increase 
of nominal wages, rents, interest rates, and prices of energy sources, raw materials, 
and agricultural products), monopolistic/oligopolistic behavior of SOEs after the 
price liberalization, and the impact of institutional change (mainly privatization) 
are sometimes, but much less frequently, also discussed as the sources of the 
Czechoslovakian recession in 1991 and 1992. Just as the decrease of real aggregate 
demand had several reasons (we observed decreases of all its components, i.e., 
private consumption, private investment, public expenditures and exports), the 
decrease of the aggregate supply can also be explained as a more complex 
phenomenon. Besides monopolization and increasing input costs, we may 
distinguish at least two other important factors determining the decrease of the 
aggregate supply. One might refer to them as the loss of governmental control 
over the state-owned sector of the economy and the 'privatization agony'. All these 
developments contributed to the Czechoslovakian recession of 199 1. 
10.3.1 Monopolization 
The industrial structure of the Czechoslovakian economy cannot be compared with 
anything known from the developed capitalist countries. According to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), more than 50% of 
Czechoslovakian industries were perfect monopolies, i.e., only one firm per sector, 
before the start of the economic transition in 1991. And, in most other industries, 
only two or three firms were involved (Zemplinerov8, 1989). Thus, the total 
number of all enterprises including cooperatives and a few private firms hardly 
exceeded 2,500 in 1990. This enormous level of industrial concentration was 
overwhelmingly an artificial, administered one: many of the big enterprises could 
be easily divided in several parts due to the absence of tighter, real economic 
relations between their plants. Unfortunately, nothing like this was done during 
1990, and the starting point of the transition - when market liberalization was 
introduced on 1 January 1991 - was undertaken under the conditions of the 
former communist, centrally planned monopolistic structure and institutional 
background, including the ownership relations (property rights). 
This enormous degree of monopolization significantly affected CSFR 
economic development after starting the reform. The nature and the role of 
monopolies in CPE went far beyond their importance in a capitalist economy. A 
monopoly was a crucial point in the structure of the performance of a CPE. It had 
a determining significance for the economy's functioning and character. The very 
substance of the monopoly, i.e., the relation between agents based on the 
redistribution of their incomes in favor of one of them and at the expense of 
another, represented one of the most important - or perhaps the most important 
- channel of distribution in a CPE. The nature of the specific monopolies under 
the centrally planned system was based on its institutional organization. The 
monopoly position of firms belonged not only to the largest but, in principal, to 
all firms in the economy. Such was the case since the whole economic system 
of central planning was based on power relations and on distribution of power 
(HmEi7 1990; Klaus and Tiiska 1988; MlEoch 1992; Rusmich 1987; Rusmich 
1988). This entire complex system of inequalities of agents was not at all broken 
in the transition process - rather, it was enforced. This situation, which may 
appear strange for an observer not well acquainted with the logic of the functioning 
of a CPE, is quite natural if we realize that the process of marketization of the 
economy also implies the existence of the process of transforming the monopoly 
relations into a legal, institutionalized structure while the monetization of the 
economy simultaneously achieves a more 'traditional' manifestation of monopoly 
power - through monopoly prices and profits. The post-1990 CSFR inherited the 
specific monopolies of a CPE, which have been best equipped to now start to live 
their new life in the liberalized markets - charging monopoly mark-ups and 
limiting production. 
The monopolistic structure of the economy results in numerous serious 
consequences analyzed by economic theory, especially by the Marxist, 
Institutionalist, and Post-Keynesian schools; the most important contribution 
probably made by Michal Kalecki and his followers. One of the most popular 
among these consequences is price rigidity, which is the result of the typical 
behavior of the monopolist andfor oligopolist firms based on their price-setting, 
i.e., on administering of prices of their commodities produced. The monopolists 
(oligopolists) administer their prices according to their average variable costs or, 
in other words, their prime costs, to which they add a mark-up covering their 
average fixed costs also known as their overheads and their net profit. The volume 
of profit is then the manifestation of the degree of monopoly of their position in 
the industry or on the market in general. These prices, labelled by Kalecki as 
cost-determined prices, show a tendency towards rigidity because the prime costs 
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are constant for a standard operated capacity range in the short run. On the 
contrary, the monopolists (oligopolists) answer by setting new higher prices to any 
significant growth of the prime costs. Hence, a constant tendency to cost-push 
inflation is present in any monopolistic economy in the long run. As regards to 
the change in demand, the monopolists (oligopolists) usually do not react with a 
change in prices but by changing the quantities of the production supplied. 
Therefore, their individual supply curves are more or less absolutely price elastic; 
namely, they are parallels with the axes of quantities of output in standard 
supplyldemand graphs. 
The result of the monopolistic-type firm behavior in an economy with a high 
level of monopolization is the fact that its aggregate supply curve is also highly 
price elastic and hence flat. This has other serious consequences that manifest 
themselves particularly in the context of the diminishing aggregate demand. 
After the liberalization of prices and cancellation of the former 
command-allocative coordinating mechanism of central planning, the need for 
setting the 'proper' or 'right' level of mark-ups emerged as very urgent for the 
enterprises. This was not only due to their need to manifest the degree of the 
monopoly of their positions, but also due to the simple fact that the mark-ups 
inherited from the system of central price-setting were extremely low, not covering 
the distribution costs, the costs of the risk of marketing the products, and so forth. 
This objective need to overcome the factual undervaluation of goods connected 
with the monopoly power and monopolistic behavior formerly created a significant 
supply-side inflationary push. I suggest that these phenomena occurred in the first 
six months of 1991 after the price liberalization: According to my explanation for 
this period, Czechoslovakian firms went through the tdtonnement process of finding 
the appropriate initial mark-ups satisfying their income and accumulation (or 
growth) needs by setting their individual equilibrium states, as well as creating 
some Labinian market equilibrium situations in their respective industries. 
If we put the observable tendency of growth and later stabilization of prices 
of non-food-stuff goods in the Czechoslovakian economy during 1991 together 
with its typical monopolistic structure, then the cost-push inflationary character 
of economic development after the liberalization of markets in January 1991 should 
not be a surprise. In the Czechoslovakian case of 1991, the empirical evidence 
confirms the conclusions of the economic theory once again. Thus, we have 
actually experienced almost a textbook example of stagflation during these months; 
namely, a macroeconomic situation when the price level is growing and the output 
is falling as a consequence of the decline of aggregate supply (for a detailed 
macroeconomic analysis of the price level development of the Czechoslovakian 
economy during 1991 see Mertlik 1993). 
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10.3.2 Institutional Changes 
The process of institutional changes belongs to the most important sources of the 
disturbance on the supply side and, hence, of the decrease of GDP and gross 
industrial output in the Czechoslovakian economy within the period of economic 
transformation since November 1989. The most notable area of institutional 
changes in this context is definitely privatization, but other meaningful institutional 
changes preceding or parallelling privatization also had played a significant role. 
For instance, the loss of state control over the economy (particularly, but not only, 
over the state-owned sector) before the start of privatization is also a factor with 
inomissible relevance for explaining the contemporary Czechoslovakian economic 
recession. 
10.3.2.1 The Loss of State Control 
Before the privatization process began, the crucial event was the abolition of the 
'leading role' of the Communist Party and the disestablishment of the State 
Planning Commission. Both these institutions, the network of the District 
Committees of the Communist Party with their industrial divisions and secretaries 
for industry as well as the State Planning Commission, played a key role in the 
process of governmental control and supervision of SOEs. The concentration of 
government policies during the first two years of the transformation (1990 and 
1991) was generally oriented more towards destruction of the old system than 
towards construction of a new one. Consequently, space opened for the widely 
scattered practice of the so-called 'spontaneous privatization' in the area of 
' ownership of assets and other property rights. 
A typical phenomenon observed in this context was that managers of SOEs 
were establishing their own private firms and organizing contracts between these 
and their SOEs. The prices at which these contracts had been negotiated were, 
of course, significantly advantageous for their private firms - they were using 
'transfer prices': high (overvalued) prices for deliveries of goods and services from 
their private firms to their SOEs and low (undervalued) prices for deliveries of 
goods and services in the reverse direction. Thus, with the help of these 'transfer 
prices' the assets of the state-owned sector were invisibly shifted into the hands 
of the managers and their families and friends - the owners of the respective 
private firms. This 'spontaneous privatization', usually organized in much more 
sophisticated forms than described here, consequently also lead to the reduction 
of the output of the state-owned sector, both actual and statistical, and consequently 
to the decrease of (at least) the statistically displayed GDP. A sophisticated 
analytical description of these processes of 'spontaneous privatization' can be found 
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in the recent paper by MlEoch (1993): he describes typical models of 
microeconomic behavior within the state-owned sector during the pre-privatization 
period. He calls them "Twins, Leeches, Vegetative survival, Faithful custodians 
and Guided bankruptcy". Further, he describes typical privatization strategies of 
management of various firms and investment privatization funds and relates them 
to his analytical framework of pre-privatization models mentioned above. Among 
his many original results in this field, perhaps the model named 'survival by the 
grace of banks' is most interesting. It offers an analytical tool for explaining deep 
internal microeconornic causes of the growth of insolvency and mutual 
indebtedness of (former) SOEs, showing that the survival of (former) SOEs is in 
common interest of both (former) SOEs and banks due to the costs of a growing 
insolvency burden. The core of MlEoch's contribution in this paper, however, is 
in his evolutionary approach: he describes the privatization process in (former) 
Czechoslovakia like an adaptive process in which control groups of (former) SOEs 
restructured themselves, keeping the corporate governance in their hands and 
transforming their past semi-formal and informal quasi-ownership entitlements into 
formal property rights. 
Another important feature of the informal institutional change in the course 
of the transformation process in countries undergoing the transition to a market 
economy (and namely in the period preceding privatization, but it refers also to 
the privatization period itself) was analyzed by McDermott (1993). He studied 
the organizational structure of pre-1989 Czechoslovakian industry with its system 
of industrial associations (so-called VHJs) that operated like almost autarkist bodies 
with only negligible mutual trade (this phenomenon is an important component 
of Rusmich's concept of the 'internal disintegration' of CPEs, see Rusmich 1992). 
Although VHJs were disestablished and their managements no longer exist after 
1989 (only few of them were transformed into holding companies in the 
corporatization process closely preceding privatization), their relations of 
cooperation have persisted: the decisive volumes of commodity exchange flows 
within the economy have not changed. Moreover, the mutual indebtedness and 
insolvency of firms is mostly a result of mutual crediting of firms formerly 
belonging to the same VHJ. At least before the bankruptcy law came in power 
in April 1993, firms coming from the same VHJ also successfully collaborated 
in guided misuse of the legal institute of 'secondary insolvency':[ll] they 
intentionally and in mutual agreement did not pay each other for their mutual 
deliveries of goods and services. These practices kept sales, 'profits' and wages 
on appropriate levels. As a by-product of these operations, their secondary 
insolvency was growing rapidly but their primary insolvency remained unchanged 
- so there was no threat of liquidation from the government. Moreover, their 
formally displayed economic results might have been even splendid and looking 
attractive, especially for voucher holders, for example. 
All these negative phenomena of the pre-privatization period seem closely 
connected with the 'in-between' pre-privatization situation of uncontrolled 
spontaneous development taking place still within the former property rights 
structure. In this structure income incentives necessarily lead not to competitive 
market-type behavior but to specific rent-seeking behavior unacceptable from the 
point of view of public morale. The deep and radical uncertainty connected with 
this situation generated only short-term behavioral patterns of economic agents. 
10.3.2.2 Privatization 
The behavior of SOEs and their managements in the course of the privatization 
process was directly affected by the preceding pre-privatization period. The process 
of privatization itself had also created a situation of uncertainty in which the 
short-term goals of the management seemed to be the only rational ones. The 
managers were uncertain regarding preservation of their enterprises and their 
positions after privatization; on the other hand, they had an extraordinary chance 
to participate significantly in the distribution of national assets. This challenge led 
to several models of activities, both formal and informal, and seems to be the key 
determinant of the managers' behavior in the situation of privatization expectations, 
and subsequently of the performance of their SOEs. 
The core of this behavior was the way in which the management of SOEs 
developed privatization projects for their enterprises. In the case of smaller 
enterprises, they often recommended to sell their enterprise - or one or more of 
its parts, the efficient 'raisins' - according to the respective section of the Large 
Privatization Act into hands of a 'formerly appointed owner', which usually was 
their own private firm or some foreign firm. Alternatively, the managers chose the 
method 'all for vouchers', believing in the possibility of a manager or employee 
buy-out of their enterprise for investment vouchers in the voucher privatization 
(usually with help of their own investment privatization fund (IPF) established 
especially for this purpose). In yet another possibility, typically in the case of large 
enterprises, the management simply believed in decisive managerial control over 
'their' firm against weak and badly informed institutional voucher holders 
(investment privatization funds). In all these three cases, managers were interested 
in the market value of their SOE: they needed to have it as low as possible. In 
the first case, to save their own capital, in the second case, to save the capital of 
their foreign partner and this way to secure a high commission from such a contract 
(and perhaps also their positions in the management of the enterprise after 
privatization), and, in the third case to be able to obtain the controlling packet of 
the shares of their enterprise for vouchers which they had collected. In each case, 
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the managers had the same opportunities to diminish the market value of their SOE 
and to manifest its inefficiency; that means, to reduce its output, employment, 
profit, and so on. In the case of the 'all for vouchers' method, it was also very 
important to convince the general public about the inefficiency of the enterprise, 
so that the public would not be interested in the shares and would not order them, 
allowing managers to easily, safely and inexpensively procure these shares in the 
respective wave of privatization. This specific behavior of the management of 
SOEs that were subject to the privatization process according to the Large Scale 
Privatization Act represents another important source of the decrease of the output 
of the state-owned sector, and thus of GDP. In an attempt to label this specific 
and historically unprecedent situation, some Czechoslovakian economists (and 
recently even some government ministers) speak about the 'privatization agony' 
of the state-owned sector or of the whole Czechoslovakian economy. 
For a recent empirical analysis of privatization projects and of behavior of 
different agents involved in the privatization process in the Czech Republic 
(including the Ministry for Administration of the National Property and its 
Privatization of the Czech Republic - MANPP), see the empirical and descriptive 
paper by Capek and Buchtikov6 (1993). They analyzed the first wave of the Large 
Privatization in the Czech Republic according to the structure of submitted, 
approved and rejected privatization projects. The authors discovered important facts 
about revealed preferences of management of SOEs and of other interest groups 
presenting the privatization projects, and also about revealed preferences of 
MANPP demonstrated in its approval or rejection of submitted projects (including 
distribution of preferences according to size, industry, profitability, and export 
performance of SOEs). In addition, Capek and Buchtikovh articulated a hypotheses 
identifying industrial coalitions formed in the course of Large Privatization. Perhaps 
the most striking result of this research, however, is the discovery of a shocking 
similarity of the privatization procedures - based on individual privatization 
projects and their following consideration in the 'economic center' - to the 
traditional procedures of central planning. In both cases, the managers as 
controllers of information are the strong party in the negotiations; the ability of 
the 'economic center' to influence the results of privatization of each particular 
part of state property is limited (similarly as was its ability to influence enterprise 
plans before 1989) simply because the 'center' more or less knows about each SOE 
only what its management allows or wants the 'center' to know. Basically, 
MANPP could approve only what management of SOEs were suggesting. 
Consequently, the traditional principal-agent problem of central planning (mighty 
enterprises versus helpless government) was repeated once again. 
10.4 A Light at the End of the Tunnel? 
The Czechoslovakian government repeatedly ensured the public that the principal 
way to remove all major internal causes of the recession, to terminate the 
'privatization agony', and consequently embark on a path of economic growth 
based on healthy roots is to complete privatization in as rapid a pace as possible. 
However, many Czechoslovakian economists are much less optimistic in evaluating 
the feasibility of the fast privatization policy ci la Tchkque, particularly using the 
outspoken voucher method in the context of the desirable economic revival. The 
following lists and explains several reasons for such doubts. 
(i) Monopolization: In the first privatization wave of the Large Privatization 
process an important part of the Czechoslovakian national wealth was 
privatized via the voucher method. Actually, it was more than 299 billion CSK 
(about USD 11 billion) of book value of property, which represents about 114 
to 113 of the total value of assets selected for privatization in Czechoslovakia 
(the government intended to transfer between 70% and 80% of the assets of 
SOEs into private hands in this fast pace). From these 299 billion CSK of 
assets (in book value), the decisive majority is to come under the control of 
IPFs. 
These IPFs, special mutual funds established by banks, consultant firms and 
private capital companies, collected investment vouchers from the public and 
used them in the respective privatization wave of the Large Privatization for 
purchasing shares of SOEs. According to the current legislation, one IPF can 
control not more than 20% of shares of one enterprise. In the first 
privatization wave these IPFs collected over 72.1 % of all issued investment 
points, and the distribution of these points among the 436 existing IPFs is very 
disproportional: for example, the 13 largest IPFs had collected 56.4% of all 
issued investment points, and the 14 largest IPFs 'bought' 26.4% of the book 
value of all enterprises privatized in the first wave. Preliminary data on 
distribution of investment points among IPFs after registration of about 75% 
of the total amount of investment points collected by IPFs in the Center for 
Voucher Privatization of the Federal Ministry of Finance are shown in Table 
10.4 of the Appendix. 
A reinforcement of the monopolisticloligopolistic structure of the 
Czechoslovakian economy can be expected because of the enormous 
concentration of ownership in the hands of a small number of the IPFs that 
remind us now of large holding companies rather than mutual funds. We can 
expect agreements on prices, market shares, price leadership, and all other 
Product Slump in Czechoslovakia 195 
typical elements of the monopolistic/oligopolistic behavior. Some first 
manifestations of such a behavior can be observed already. 
(ii) Disinvestment: The management bodies of the IPFs have contracts according 
to which they receive their remuneration as some percentage share of the total 
book value of shares of enterprises under control of their IPFs. Very probably, 
some of the IPFs' managements will follow a short-run strategy to earn the 
highest possible remuneration in the first years and then to exit. This means 
that they will be interested in the financial growth of their IPFs rather than 
in the growth of enterprises under their control, and, thus, in financial 
investment of dividends drawn from 'their' enterprises rather than in direct 
productive re-investment of profits in these enterprises. For this reason, the 
IPF managers may draw as much of the profits from 'their' enterprises to their 
IPFs as possible in order to maximize their assets, and thus to maximize their 
remuneration. Hence, the significance of a firm's long term future will be far 
less important. 
(iii) Stock Market Collapse: The campaign of some of the IPFs was based on the 
public promise that they will buy their shares back from the public after one 
year for at least ten (or even fifteen) times the price that shareholders 
expended to obtain their investment vouchers subsequently allocated to the 
respective IPF. For example, if someone allocated all his investment vouchers 
(i.e., 1,000 investment points) to such fund, he or she was promised to get 
at least 10,350 CSK after one year since the administrative fee for the voucher 
stamp, voucher book, and registration was 1,035 CSK altogether. This may 
become the crucial failure of the whole voucher privatization project and its 
implementation, as during the next two years the key economic problem of 
such IPFs will be their shortage of liquidity. In order to meet all their 
liabilities (to fulfill the promises of the back buy-out of their own shares 
particularly, but also to pay their debt services to banks - many of the 
biggest IPFs are heavily indebted, not least due to the enormous costs of their 
massive advertising campaigns), the IPFs will have to sell part of the shares 
they control. This situation can create an important surplus of stock on the 
emerging domestic capital market. The low domestic demand for shares will 
then cause a significant fall in the market prices of shares. The behavior of 
many households may be similar - as new shareholders many households 
may prefer liquidity, and thus they may try to sell their shares immediately 
after they will receive them. 
The low level of prices on the stock exchange naturally will not support 
the revival of the economy. Whether this expectation of the stock market 
collapse will prove to be true or false is uncertain. Yet, in any case, it seems 
inevitable that the banks (as creditors) control over the IPFs will grow - and 
consequently over the enterprises under their control. But will Czech and 
Slovak banks prove to be the 'right' owners? 
(iv) Continuing the 'Privatization Agony': Finally, the very purpose of 
privatization was to solve the problem of 'absentee ownership' inherited from 
the centrally planned economy and thus to solve one of the sources of the 
'privatization agony'. The government intended to find a tangible owner for 
any part of the so far anonymous state-owned property. The ownership control 
of enterprises was believed to be a key prerequisite of their efficient economic 
performance. The voucher privatization, however, seems to lead to results very 
distant from this officially declared neo-liberal target in most cases. The new 
owners are mostly institutional owners (IPFs and banks) without appropriate 
managing, controlling and supervising powers. They hold large property (up 
to 20% in several tens or even hundreds of enterprises) but with only limited 
qualified professional skills and capacity. And, like in the model of central 
planning, they suffer from a lack of information - the information monopoly 
is on the side of enterprises' managements. In this situation, the 'unity of 
interests' of enterprises (their managements) and of IPFs andlor banks as 
owners is a necessary precondition of their desired efficient operation. On the 
other hand, under any collision or contradiction of interests of owners and 
managers the principal-agent problem arises; and, in the Czech and/or Slovak 
specific situation of legal and moral gaps (not to mention low financial 
discipline, monopolistic commodity markets, and a very weak and insignificant 
stock market), it may have a destructive effect. The chaotic result may prolong 
at least some features of the period of 'privatization agony' for the recently 
privatized SOEs, a situation when enterprises are without any effective control 
of their owners. Hence, the voucher privatization may result in a large-scale 
and considerably long-run 'institutionalization' of absentee ownership. 
10.5 Some Lessons from the Czechoslovakian Case 
The Czechoslovakian experience with the behavior of economic agents in the 
course of the privatization process and in the pre-privatization period and its 
negative macroeconomic and societal effects suggest several general hints or policy 
recommendations for future large-scale privatizers. 
First of all, the institutional preparation of the privatization process - as 
detailed as possible - seems to be a factor of crucial importance. All methods 
to diminish uncertainty, increase transparency and possibilities of democratic public 
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control over the privatization process, and to avoid or limit any non-governance 
situation, are welcomed. Consistency of legislation and minimization of possible 
legislative gaps also belong to this point. Rules must be clear, strict and 
unchangeable, and all agents have to be aware of it. 
Secondly, be as fast as possible but not at any expense. A time-consuming 
detailed and complex preparation saves time and costs during the actual 
privatization procedure. 
Thirdly, proper macroeconomic stabilization of the economy (stable economic 
environment) plays an important role in creating a financial discipline in the 
enterprise sphere. The soft budget constraint situation for SOEs (including that 
created spontaneously by mutual crediting and insolvency) should be eliminated 
before the start of privatization. 
Fourthly, beware of monopolies. Deconcentration of industries (particularly 
those oriented to the domestic market) based on re-organization of large 
administratively concentrated SOEs should necessarily precede the privatization 
process. Mere change from state monopolies to private ones brings only bitter 
fruits. 
Fifthly, space for adaptation for inefficient enterprises is essential. Only the 
market can select winners and losers, but a firm may become a winner only if it 
has a real chance to restructure. Thus, a special time-constrained and precisely 
defined economic regime of the transitional period seems to be a necessary 
prerequisite for the feasibility of the healthy future economic growth based on 
prosperity of former SOEs. 
Last but not least, a supply-side industrial policy based on support of genuine 
entrepreneurship (not on conservation of the old industrial structure) may be very 
helpful. The slogan of support for nests of high performance is utmost relevant 
in the transformation period. 
Another important question is the general design of a large-scale privatization 
program. In this context, the Czech and Slovak experiences with the free 
distribution of assets reveal that negative outcomes like non-transparent 
concentration of property rights in the hand of banks, zero (or perhaps rather 
negative) financial returns of the budget, or zero capital inflow into voucher 
privatized enterprises will probably be more significant than the most important 
positive feature of the method of free distribution - its speed. 
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Table 10.1 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 
end of the year 
absolute annual change of ' 
Nominal 
Indicator 
1990 1991 Change 
(%I 
GDP 811.3 977.8 20.5 
NMP 669.9 828.1 23.6 
Savings of ~ouseho lds '  280.6 331.6 18.2 
Increase of savings2 1.2 51.0 4150.0 
Investment 204.5 217.1 6.2 
Personal Consumption 383.0 390.1 1.8 
Public Expenditures 455.9 510.7 12.0 
Export 215.3 321.2 49.2 
Personal Incomes 519.4 576.8 11.0 
Retail Sales 381.2 372.8 -2.2 
GrossIndustrialOutput 1025.03 1155.8~ 12.8 
Gross Construction Output 15 1.0 156.6 3.7 
own calculations from real indicators in 1989 prices 
own calculations from nominal indicators 
Sources: Statisticky bulletin FSU, 1992, No. 1, 11; Statisticks roEenka ~ S F R  1992; State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia Annual Report 1991; The S B ~ S  Report for the 1st Half of the Year 1992; Own 
Real 
1990 1991 Change 
(%I 
727.0 611.4 -15.9 
567.8 458.8 -19.2 
251.4 207.4 -15.9 
1.1 31.9 3172.7 
202.1 135.74 -35.2 
334.8 228.1 -32.8 
408.5~ 319.34 -21.8 
192.9~ 200.g4 -16.5 
465.44 360.74 -22.5 
341.6~ 233.14 -31.8 
918.5~ 722.73 -21.3 
135.3~ 97.94 -27.6 
calculations. 
Table 10.2 Price Levels in the End of the Year, Annual Change (5%) 
1991 1992 
Consumer Prices 
Industrial Prices 
Construction Works Prices 
Source: Statistick6 piehledy, 1993, No. 1,  2. 
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Table 10.3 Rate of unemployment* 
- 
Month 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
* End of the month 
Source: Statistick6 piehledy, No. 3, 1992, No. 1, 1993. 
Table 10.4 Investment Points Concentration in IPFs 
Size of IPF Number of IPFs % of All Investment 
(in mill of investment points) Points 
Sources: Centre for Voucher Privatization of the Federal Ministry of Finance; Own calculations. 
P. Mertlik 
The Czech Bureau of Statistics still works with the system of the balance of the 
national economy (the soviet-type system of statistical representation). This system 
produces the indicator of net material product (NMP) and other indicators of the 
NMP-type such as the gross material product and so on. The GDP data quoted here 
and in Table I of the Appendix represent only official qualified estimates of the 
Federal Bureau of Statistics and/or of the Czech Bureau of Statistics, not exact 
indicators produced by a system of national accounting. 
The unemployment rate in Czechoslovakia is calculated as the ratio of the number 
of unemployed divided by the number of all population in the 'productive age', i.e., 
between 15-60 years. If measured in the standard way (i.e., number of unemployed 
divided by the size of the labor force) the figure would be about 2-3 percentage points 
higher according to the estimate of the Czechoslovakian government. 
According to the estimate of Vladimir Nachtigal from the Institute of Economics of 
the Czech National Bank, Prague (Hijek, et al., 1993). The official estimates of the 
Federal Bureau of Statistics and/or of the Czech Bureau of Statistics for 1992 were 
not available at the time of writing this paper. 
Unfortunately, no relevant macroeconomic indicators of the former Czechoslovakia 
were published for 1992, and probably never will be, due to the cessation of the 
CSFR. The Federal Bureau of Statistics ended its existence in December 1992 too 
early to produce final 1992 data and the Czech Bureau of Statistics produces data 
for the Czech Republic only (and similarly the Bureau of Statistics of the Slovak 
Republic only for Slovakia). Thus, I limit my analytical focus (covering all of 
Czechoslovakia) to the development of 1991. 
According to the calculations of the CSFR Federal Bureau of Statistics, 
Czechoslovakian exports decreased by 16.5% in real terms during 1991 compared 
with 1990. During the same period, the share of exports to developed market 
economies in the total nominal export had increased, i.e., from 46.7% (FRG including 
GDR) to 51.9%), while the share of exports to centrally planned economies and 
transitory economies decreased from 49.0% (GDR included) to 39.3% and the share 
of exports to less developed economies remained essentially unchanged. 
During the Great Depression from 1930 to 1934, Czechoslovakia experienced a drop 
in GDP by more than 20% and in real industrial output by more than 40% (according 
to post-war estimates), but such a rapid slump in one year, as in 1991, was never 
previously recorded. 
For a detailed discussion of the budget development in former Czechoslovakia and 
in the Czech Republic, see the contribution of Pavel S t ~ ~ i n e k  in this volume. 
This insolvency of SOEs is probably the most dangerous time-bomb in the 
Czechoslovakian economy, and in the process of its uncontrolled cancer-like or rather 
AIDS-like proliferation it now increasingly affects also the newly growing private 
sector since trading with SOEs is inevitable for private enterprises in many cases). 
More new enterprises, both private and state-owned, are now being drawn into this 
disaster every day, and no one knows how this process will end. If the bankruptcy 
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act was actually applied by the courts, 80% of Czechoslovakian SOEs should be 
immediately closed (Sulc, 1992) - at the moment the state-owned sector as a whole 
still produces roughly about 80% of GDP. 
[9] Without foreign currency deposits. The M2 aggregate including foreign currency 
deposits even increased by 27.3%. In order to obtain this figure, the value of the 
respective V1991N1990 would be 1.015 and the difference between the values of 
'1991 ' e l991 = M1991 
-= 1.273 
'1990 ' e l990  and 1990 
would represent about 2 percentage points. 
[lo] The marginal propensity to save in 1991 was 88.8%, while nominal personal incomes 
increased by 11.0% and nominal savings of households increased by 18.2% in 
comparison with 1990. The marginal propensity to save in 1990 was 3.3% due to 
the increase of nominal personal incomes by 7.5% and an increase of nominal savings 
of households by 0.4% compared with 1989. At the end of 1989, the level of nominal 
personal incomes reached 483.0 billion CSK and the level of nominal savings of 
households reached 279.4 billion CSK. 
[I!] Secondary insolvency is defined as insolvency resulting from the inability of the 
customer to pay outstanding bills. Goods delivered to the customer according to his 
order but not paid are considered as sold. 'Profit' from such 'sale' is accounted for 
as a real profit from a real sale when the customer pays the bill. The institutional roots 
of the insolvency problem inherent in valid Czechoslovakian accounting regulations 
are obvious. Primary insolvency is defined as insolvency resulting from the external 
inefficiency of the firm, i.e., from its inability to sell its production on the market. 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Economy are allowed to close 
an insolvent firm (to force its liquidation) only when the cause of its payments 
difficulties is primary, not secondary, insolvency. 
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Program for the Workshop on 
Macroeconomic Stabilization of 
Economies in Transition 
Hotel President 
Prague, Czech Republic 
22-24 April 1993 
Thursday, 22 April 
12:30 REGISTRATION 
13:OO Lunch 
14:OO OPENING REMARKS 
TOPIC 1: Price Liberalization in a Post-Socialist Economy: 
The Impact on Macroeconomic Stability 
Chairman: Miroslav H rnCF 
MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: 
COST AND B E N E ~ S *  by Jan Klacek 
Comments by Wim Swaan, Jan Foltin and Jeremy Carter 
PRICE LIBERALIZATION IN ROMANIA by loan Buda 
Comments by Karel Kouba and Alma Kanani 
The corresponding paper in this conference volume was written by I. Sujan and M. Sujanovh. 
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TOPIC 2: The Role of Monetary, Fiscal, and Wage Policies 
in Stabilizing the Economies 
BUDGET DEFICIT AND INFLATION IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: THE CASE OF 
POLAND by Stanislaw Gomulka 
Comments by Werner Riecke and Mario Nuti 
18:45 Close of Session 
19:OO Social event 
Friday, 23 April 
SOLVING PROBLEMS OF THE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES; 
UNCOLLECTIBLE CREDITS AND THE CLEANING UP OF THE COMMERCIAL 
BANKS PORTFOLIO AS A MACROSTABILIZATION CRITERION IN THE 
TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY by Nadezda Sandolova 
Comments by Aurel Berea and Marek Dabrowski 
THE BUDGET REFORM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
by Pavel Stepanek 
Comments by Gorazd NikiC and Karol Lutkowski 
MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM IN THE ECONOMICS TRANSFORMATION: THE POLISH 
CASE by Andrzej SopoCko 
Comments by Andrei Illarionov, Stefan Sotirov and Grant Kirkpatrick 
Press Conference 
13:30 End of Press Conference and Lunch 
14:30 Workshop Reconvenes 
TOPIC 3: Exchange Rate Policy and External Pressures: 
Search for a Stabilizing Anchor 
Chairman: Stanislaw Golmulka 
THE POSSIBILITY FOR USING THE EXCHANGE RATE AS A NOMINAL ANCHOR 
FOR THE DOMESTIC PRICE LEVEL - SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE HUNGARIAN 
CASE by Artur Szentgyorgyvari 
Comments by Andrzej Topinski and Stefan Adamec 
STABILIZING THE MARKET? 1992 EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OF THE CENTRAL 
BANK OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION by Andrei Kovalev 
Comments by Peter Havlik and Anton Pashov 
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EXCHANGE RATE AND THE TRANSITION: THE CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
by Miroslav HrnEF 
Comments by Jan Stanovsky and Anila Bashllari 
19:30 Close of Session 
Saturday, 24 April 
09:OO Workshop Reconvenes 
TOPIC 4: Macroeconomic Preconditions for Macroeconomic (1n)Stability 
Chairman: Grant Kirkpatrick 
MICROECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS FOR MACROECONOMIC (IN)STABILITY 
by Vladimir Shevchenko 
Comments by Elena Durr~itrescu and Jean-Louis Brillet 
PRODUCT SLUMP IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 
by Pavel Mertlik 
Comments by Zvonirnir BaletiE and Jeno Koltay 
FREE DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES IN EAST EUROPEAN PRIVATIZATION 
by Ivan Major 
Comment by Dane5 Brzica 
Country Presentation - Albania by Alma Kanani 
13:30 End of the Workshop, Lunch 
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